I doubt this. If they were all images that this person happened to be into, maybe... But even then, I think it would likely make their addiction to child porn worse, which is it's own psychological problem that is probably worse for society than the trauma suffered by current employees. What happens when they leave that job, and are used to seeing hundreds of cp images a day?
Not to mention, that some of the stuff the scanner would be looking at would probably be horrific, and violent. Looking at that kind of thing all day would probably have similar psychiatric affects on pedophiles and non pedophiles. In the worst case, it might cause some pedophiles to start to like the worse images out of boredom from seeing so much cp.
Overall, I'd say this is would just be a bad avenue to go down.
We don't ban child pornography because it leads to more viewing of child pornography. We ban it because we recognise that demand for CSAM breeds supply of new CSAM. Also because it is—by definition—the product of child abuse.
If there are ever going to be any "natural" matches to any CSAM hashes, it's probably going to be a photograph of people who are coincidentally in a similar pose at a nearly identical angle and strikingly shading.
This entire system is ripe for false positives AND adversarial attacks.
A = prepubescent minor
B = pubescent minor
1 = sex act
2 = "lascivious exhibition"
The categories are described in further detail (ugh) in this PDF, page 22: https://www.prosecutingattorneys.org/wp-content/uploads/Pres...It’s not reasonable to dispute the 1 in 1e12 false positive claim on mere speculation.
It's entirely reasonable. Have you seen https://thishashcollisionisnotporn.com/ ?
Extraordinary claims require extraordinary evidence.
It would be far easier (and far more effective) to just acquire child porn, break into your victim's house, stash physical prints under their mattress, and then contact the police.
Furthermore, the website includes numerous misleading statements about Apple's system, or makes critical omissions on the description of Apple's system. Whatever side you're on, misleading arguments should be dismissed for what they are.
Onge again, extraordinary claims require extraordinary evidence.
It's entirely possible to make a cryptographic hash algorithm that has an exceptionally low probability of natural collisions but where adversarial collisions are trivial.
It's also possible to create a cryptographic hash algorithm where occasional natural collisions are expected, but adversarial collisions require brute force.
They'd be completely anonymous and fully covered, with an endless pipeline of naked kids images being delivered to them.
The idea that if you take a picture of your kid in the bath, it just happens to match a CSAM fingerprint and then gets silently transmitted to anonymous reviewers for "review" is terrifying.