When end-to-end encryption is done correctly, the answer is "we literally can't access it" as a matter of mathematics, whether the state accepts it or not.

A state that does not accept it might retaliate against the entity giving that answer or forbid future use of end-to-end encryption without backdoors, but the truth of the answer doesn't depend on anyone's acceptance.

Isn't that when the state prohibits your service? So then no body cares about your mathematical proof because it's a crime to use it.

This is what has happened in many countries already.

Sure, but that's a case of "we're prohibited from providing end-to-end encryption and preserving user privacy so we can scan for prohibited content as mandated by authorities", not "we are keeping children safe while still preserving user privacy"

Legal terms such as "murder", "fraud" and "rape" do change as effect of regulatory changes. "Encryption" and "privacy" do not.

There's a limit to how much you can bend semantics in your PR before it breaks and you get backlash.

But if you're a company like apple, it'd be bad business to wait until large government bans your service/device before you respond to it. Much better to read the tea leaves and get a head of it.

Again, their double-speak and redefining words don't help with the reception.

They're deliberately misrepresenting what's happening, appearing surprised when people misunderstand, and bundling together legitimate criticism with misunderstandings.

I can draw some parallels to how Google went out with FLoC.

Honestly I can't tell where Hanlon's razor should cut here.

What’s the double speak? It’s quite clear they are trying to maintain e2e encryption while also achieving CSAM scanning. Google/Facebook/Microsoft do this by scanning everything unencrypted. Apple do it while maintaining encryption and are being punished for it. It’s insane.

iCloud is not end-to-end encrypted, and Apple has not announced plans to add that option. Apple has the technical ability to scan images on the server.

iCloud (at least for photos) is (effectively) "end to end encrypted". All photos are encrypted or decrypted only on the device (or after being downloaded to a browser), they never exist as human viewable files on iCloud. No one, except the owner of the account, can decrypt the file. This is why the checking for illegal file has to happen before they are upload. It cannot be done on the server, the encrypted file can never match the hash. What Apple has done that is real genius is that for each image identified as illegal, a part of the key is encrypted and sent with the file to Apple. After a threshold is met, the account is locked, the user notified of the appeals process, and Apple can decrypt and have the files verified. 1 or 2 false positives changes nothing.

Yes, they have the ability, but they found a way NOT to do that. Instead maintaining user privacy. And the world hates them for it, and would prefer they just unencrypted and scanned everything… doesn’t make sense.

There’s nothing stopping governments from banning E2EE, but in the absence of such bans, no one is under any obligation to build systems that empower them to spy on their users.

I wouldn’t be sure about that, the phone companies already have a legal obligation to allow wiretapping and the government is very happy to put gag orders on this stuff.

Shouldn't the E2EE apple walled-garden app equivalent of wiretapping be pushing an app update to the suspect's phone with a sidechannel added for law enforcement to snoop, with warrant in hand?

CALEA has a carve out for encryption. I’m sure when E2EE is about to be deployed to the masses the law will be updated to force key escrow.

Courts can order them to collect data on users.

The law may say that government isn't allowed to spy on people. So no, the state cannot just come and demand anything it wants.

Problem is that the law is self-contradictory and it is up to the judicative institutions to fix it as soon as possible.