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Re:Aaron Swartz v. United States by tptacek on Monday July 25, 2011 @04:07PM (#2804369)
If by "thought crime" you mean "establishment of mens rea", it's been 1984 since English common law.
Re:Aaron Swartz v. United States by ynniv on Monday July 25, 2011 @04:19PM (#2804424)
"mens rea" means that there was knowing intent to commit a crime. Clearly there was mens rea is this case as steps were taken to circumvent and conceal the act. mindcrime's point is that your comment suggests the crime could be escalated based on some possibility that the defendant might commit a more serious crime. This more serious crime was of course not committed, thus making it a crime of thought.
Re:Aaron Swartz v. United States by tptacek on Monday July 25, 2011 @05:26PM (#2804730)
We have our wires crossed; I see why: I'm writing message board comments, not essays.

There are two issues of intent here:

(1) There is the question of whether Swartz's repeated accesses of JSTOR were done knowing that access was wrong, or recklessly, or purposefully to accomplish an illegal end. This question, of "mens rea", is I think reasonably established in the charging documents by things like MAC address spoofing.

(2) There is the entirely speculative question of whether Swartz had the intention of "liberating" all of JSTOR onto BitTorrent. Nobody knows whether this is true except Swartz and possibly the DoJ. My suggestion here is only that we don't know all the evidence, and perhaps some of the severity of the DoJ's response is based on evidence they have but have not yet disclosed to the public.

The confusion here is my fault. Sorry.

I certainly don't believe that Swartz should be prosecuted for thinking JSTOR should be liberated, or that the DoJ should be building a case based on what they think he was going to do next.

Re:Aaron Swartz v. United States by firebones on Monday July 25, 2011 @08:44PM (#2805447)
Based on the text of the indictment, the establishment of his intent with the documents is the one claim that doesn't appear to established with any mention of supporting evidence. This stands in stark contrast to the meticulously detailed accounts of MAC address changes, computer purchase history and surveillance video describing his actions.

The question that this hinges on is whether there is hard evidence of his intent; either there exists a clear statement from Swartz of his intention (e.g., say, a chat log from an informant where he expressed his intent, or an actual upload) and they didn't feel the need to share this info to get the indictment, or they're just trying to make up some circumstantial case (oooh, look, he had a BitTorrent client on a laptop we seized) to justify the harassment.

I would guess that it must be something very weak, ambiguous and circumstantial which is why they didn't feel the need to substantiate the claim. But then again, given the long time frame (many months) and the rashness of some of the behavior Swartz displayed, I wouldn't be at all surprised to find that someone got him to say something via electronic means that could be construed as an intent to P2P the documents.

Re:Aaron Swartz v. United States by nitrogen on Tuesday July 26, 2011 @01:26AM (#2806092)
This question, of "mens rea", is I think reasonably established in the charging documents by things like MAC address spoofing.

On this point specifically I hope that, if it would be beneficial and accurate, Swartz's attorneys bring up the point that:

1. Programmers routinely work around various limitations to do their jobs.

2. Those limitations may originate in the laws of physics, limitations of current technology, or excessively strict corporate IT policies.

3. Those workarounds may include changing MAC addresses, connecting to a different switch port, etc.

4. Therefore, a programmer such as Swartz would have considered his actions in an engineering context. Overcoming any blocking or access rate limitations imposed automatically by JSTOR's systems would be seen by Swartz in the same light as bypassing a faulty router or otherwise routing around network damage, rather than as a specifically legal affront.

5. Thus, at first glance, mens rea is not present.

Re:Aaron Swartz v. United States by mindcrime on Monday July 25, 2011 @04:22PM (#2804434)
Ok, IANAL, but I don't see the connection. My understanding of the use of "mens rea" in criminal law was that it referred to the necessity of intent, in order to qualify an action as a crime. I've never understood it to mean that intent - by itself - can be considered a crime.

My point above is that if Aaron did not actually distribute the files to bittorrent, then making any relevance of his intent to do so, is "thought crime." And as you can no doubt gather, I would consider such a thing to be total bullshit. That is, bullshit vis-a-vis my personal view of a sort of universal ethics... not necessarily with with regards to US government statutes.

Re:Aaron Swartz v. United States by tptacek on Monday July 25, 2011 @05:29PM (#2804753)
If they caught Aaron, he gave up all the documents, and in the course of investigating him got a warrant for his email, wherein he wrote a series of messages about how he planned on liberating JSTOR, the evidence of his intent becomes relevant.

We are just talking here. I have absolutely no reason to believe that there is evidence that Swartz was going to liberate JSTOR. It's just, people seem to want a "why is the DoJ going so nuts about this", and I'm just saying, "here's a what-if".

Re:Aaron Swartz v. United States by tedunangst on Monday July 25, 2011 @05:08PM (#2804637)
So if the security guard catches me with my pockets stuffed with loot before I actually go out the door, would you say it's not shoplifting because I only intended to commit the crime, but didn't complete the act?
Re:Aaron Swartz v. United States by jtheory on Monday July 25, 2011 @09:35PM (#2805583)
I'd say that's true.

What's the difference between the scenario you described and forgetting to pick up a basket by the door then using your pockets to hold what you intend to buy?

There's a reason why security normally waits until the person leaves the store to nab them.

Re:Aaron Swartz v. United States by pak on Tuesday July 26, 2011 @12:48AM (#2806027)
How do you understand the charge of attempted murder then?

A man brings a gun to a political demonstration where a VIP with whom he violently disagrees will be arriving. He reaches the front of the crowd and as the VIP draws near, the gun slips from his pocket and he is arrested. Are you meaning to tell me he shouldn't be charged with attempted murder just because he hasn't yet pulled the gun out and engaged the trigger?

Just so you know, people have already been convicted under these circumstances, so the case law is already pretty clear.

Re:Aaron Swartz v. United States by jtheory on Saturday July 30, 2011 @08:15PM (#2827180)
Well, I wouldn't charge them with murder. You were talking about charging someone with shoplifting (not even "attempted shoplifting", if that exists) merely for holding not-yet-purchased items in their pockets while still in the store.

Attempted murder is a crime with a specific definition in specific laws. It's harder to make this charge stick than murder, for obvious reasons, but police are rather more likely to arrest someone they think is attempting murder than arrest someone they think is considering shoplifting, for equally obvious reasons.

...What does any of this have to do with planning to distribute files by bittorrent? These are not useful analogies.