In that scenario, you'd want people to say "but wait, there's no signature on this, it could be fake" and then only trust the video as much as you trust the source (not the claimed source).
Any visual artifact can be mocked, so we end up with the same problem as clickbait titles, where the conclusion one arrives at from just a title can be disproved, but it doesn't prevent the false information from going viral.
What good is it to say "that video you saw was fake!" after the video has spread around and done the damage already?
It's hard to come up with a solution to this problem just because the solution has to preempt the problem. A cryptographic visual artifact _could_ work, but it's still likely that misinformation via deep-fakes will cause problems for society at large.
Websites like Twitter adopting a "blue tick" for a validated profile on their platform though is a model people seem to get. If we had some equivalent of a "blue tick" at a user-agent level, e.g. a for your browser to take a signature and display it in a standardised, human way to say "this video is signed by bbc.co.uk" it could work. (With a similar model for user-agents elsewhere e.g. you'd probably need adoption in apps like WhatsApp to get traction.)
The other side of it (like privacy discussions) is how much the average person will care — tabloid journalism often skirt the borders of what they can get away with at the moment & they nominally have a duty currently to only write factual information. If Fox News or the Daily Mail release videos and put their own signature to it, then you arguably lend them legitimacy ("it's on the news so it must be true. It's signed by them and all!").
That's the mood in the algorithm hole twitter put me in to.
So, make what you will of that.
But why store the signature in a blockchain? If you do not trust the certificates in the first place, the storage location won't make any difference. And if you trust the certificates, the storage location is completely irrelevant. Because the certificates alone provide the trust.
For the same reason as certificate transparency logs; you want to avoid trusting something that has a history of certifying false statements. You also need to handle throwaways, so it's definitely not sufficient (and might turn out to not be necessary once a complete solution is found), but it does seem useful.
Disclaimer: I am an armchair crypto fan. Not an authority.
Similar to how anonymous 'tip-off' stories with protected sources work in general at the moment — the media outlet put their own reputation on the line on the basis of the source & we trust (to a certain degree) reputable news outlets to validate & vet their sources correctly. This is true for stuff that's easily forgable at the moment, e.g. a whistle-blower releasing documents.
Or if you see a quote claiming to be from Emmanuel Macron or Boris Johnson, you can see it was released with a digital signature from a Guardian journalist & they add whatever date/time/location details they want to validate the information.
If instead I release something (on Twitter or wherever) that I say is a screen-capture of my TV, _I_ add the metadata (originally seen on BBC on 27 Jul, 1:55pm) and sign and then you know that you only trust it as much as you trust _my_ reputation rather than the BBC.
Wouldn't solve the problem entirely but it might create a bit of an audit trail for stuff and encourage people not to trust unvetted material.