Or another thing I would look like is the controls that are implemented with the domain registrar itself (e.g., is two factor authentication enabled, principle of least privilege implemented, etc.).
Scoping your information system is one of the most important and difficult parts of cybersecurity. Many would not think that implementation of controls with their domain registrar would be in scope. But if you think of the reality, something like weak authentication in use by a domain registrar or lack of protection of data at rest/in transit is potentially just as risky any other service provider/your internal boundary. This is especially true if your product is quite literally dependent on the domain name resolving properly.
For example, it was fairly recent that NIST updated its guidance on requiring changing of passwords at a defined frequency.
In the case of DNSSEC, it is potentially a relevant and required control under, for example, NIST 800-53, revision 5.1, SC-21 [1]. That's why I mentioned that depending on the standard, it COULD be a requirement.
[1] https://csrc.nist.gov/Projects/risk-management/sp800-53-cont...
Edit: It is also still offered as a potential (arguably secure) practice under NIST SP 800-81-2.
Two other big industry-wide things that happened vis a vis DNSSEC:
1. All the mail providers banded together and came up with an alternate SMTP transport security standard, MTA-STS, that says explicitly that it exists because nobody wants to deploy DNSSEC.
2. The DNSSEC people and the browser/TLS people got together and proposed a DNSSEC stapling mechanism as a TLS extension. That stapling --- which Geoff Huston once wrote was an existentially important feature for DNSSEC, since DNSSEC queries routinely fail when made behind random CPE equipment that won't forward weird-looking DNS messages --- failed and was withdrawn.
There are basically no positive signals with respect to DNSSEC deployment. We're belaboring it; your comment isn't really about DNSSEC. I'm just saying: even if you're very, very diligent about security, it's unlikely that DNSSEC would be a high priority item. :)