For example, it was fairly recent that NIST updated its guidance on requiring changing of passwords at a defined frequency.
In the case of DNSSEC, it is potentially a relevant and required control under, for example, NIST 800-53, revision 5.1, SC-21 [1]. That's why I mentioned that depending on the standard, it COULD be a requirement.
[1] https://csrc.nist.gov/Projects/risk-management/sp800-53-cont...
Edit: It is also still offered as a potential (arguably secure) practice under NIST SP 800-81-2.
Two other big industry-wide things that happened vis a vis DNSSEC:
1. All the mail providers banded together and came up with an alternate SMTP transport security standard, MTA-STS, that says explicitly that it exists because nobody wants to deploy DNSSEC.
2. The DNSSEC people and the browser/TLS people got together and proposed a DNSSEC stapling mechanism as a TLS extension. That stapling --- which Geoff Huston once wrote was an existentially important feature for DNSSEC, since DNSSEC queries routinely fail when made behind random CPE equipment that won't forward weird-looking DNS messages --- failed and was withdrawn.
There are basically no positive signals with respect to DNSSEC deployment. We're belaboring it; your comment isn't really about DNSSEC. I'm just saying: even if you're very, very diligent about security, it's unlikely that DNSSEC would be a high priority item. :)