As tether specifies the right to repay any redeemed tokens in securities, assuming the securities they hold actually keep their value, it seems like they'd be fine
From https://tether.to/legal/ "Tether reserves the right to delay the redemption or withdrawal of Tether Tokens if such delay is necessitated by the illiquidity or unavailability or loss of any Reserves held by Tether to back the Tether Tokens, and Tether reserves the right to redeem Tether Tokens by in-kind redemptions of securities and other assets held in the Reserves."
Of course the $60b question is, what are all the non-cash reserves they have, and how much are they worth.
At best, they're choosing investments incompetently. (Chance Tether's team is equivalent to professionals at major banks?)
At worst, they're choosing investments to maximize personal gain.
Or to put it another way, what sort of company do you think is knocking on Tether's door, offering a good deal in exchange for a few billion "worth" of notes?
It ain't Coke.
At worst, they don't have any investments.
Deltec, the bank that Tether bought, has a desk specializing in zombie debt, so it's entirely possible they have loads of debt bought for pennies on the dollar, that they have through accounting/market shenanigans recognized at par as their "commercial paper".
So they don't even have to perform shenanigans.
They can just buy $1 par debt at $0.01 from Bob's Used Cars and value / declare it at $1. It's a super shady move, and would shake confidence if known, but would seem legally defensible. ("We valued it at a fair price. It turned out we were wrong and overvalued it. Oops.")
They could probably declare it at >$1 if they really wanted to, but why do hard fraud instead of easy fraud?
They are unregulated, but they're now required to publish a breakdown of their assets.
Before, they could have said "We have billions and billions in assets." Now, they're required to enumerate and value their assets, to the extent required to publish the breakdown, as part of a legal agreement.
So I guess before it could have been riskless fraud. Now, it's more risky fraud. And overvaluing assets seems like an easy way to keep the wheels turning without obviously pissing off a state AG.
No Basel II capital adequacy requirements here :)
The answer is not clear to me, but it seems like this is an important value.
Also, aren't some of those assets (like treasury bills) interest-accruing? That would seem to offset some of the losses incurred by a short-term, high-volume liquidation event.
Tether is the No.1 most traded coin (by a decent margin) which makes it a very large part of the ecosystem.
Now if their assets are all high quality low risk treasuries, it's likely all fine.
If however their asset are loans to people who used those loans to buy other crypto currencies, things get a lot more risky.
A large shock to the ecosystem, like Tether going bust, would seem like it would have a large impact on the overall space. We've seen in the last month that something a simple as a tweet can send the market up or down by multiple percent...
The unregulated, debased Tether seems less risky than holding regulated, backed-by-real-property mortgage-backed securities in 2007.
It seems much a-do about not much, to me. But, I guess people need something to worry about.
I believe the fear is:
1. The price of BTC is high because a lot of people are buying it.
2. A lot of those people buying it are paying with Tether's funny money which there is somehow $60 billion of.
3. If that $60 billion ceased to exist, the price of BTC would fall.
4. $60 billion is a lot of money, so the price of BTC would fall a lot.
Bad mortgage backed securities were the root risk.
The unregulated leverage piled on top of those MBSs (credit default swaps) ballooned the consequences of that risk.
But what really caused the global meltdown was (1) pervasiveness of exposure & (2) consequently, institutional uncertainty and withdrawal of liquidity.
When the MBSs failed, the CDSs multiplied the dollar impact. Which would have been that, except that these assets underpined large portions of institution's balance sheets. And critically, unknown large portions.
The "music stopping" was the breaking of institutional trust in the solvency of their counterparties, and hence evaporation of liquidity.
The sheer opaqueness of the crypto exchanges might actually be an advantage here, as unlike traditional exchanges and the banking system, they're not used to keeping an eye on their counterparties' balances.
I'll guess we'll have to wait and see!
Given that only 3% of each dollar is backed by fiat, they can only guarantee $0.03 on each dollar requested.
In the case of a bank run, the commercial paper etc. would be considered valueless, and unlike a real bank, their deposits are not insured.
So the value of a Tether would theoretically fall to $0.03.
In practice however, it is plausible that it would result in them blocking redemption and fleeing the country to avoid jail, so the value would be much closer to $0.
It would not be considered valueless.
It would be valued at the current market price it could be quickly cleared at.
That price is substantially less than face value, but probably more than $0. And of course depends on who wrote the note and the terms.
To clarify: there are two markets, one is redemption of USDT through the Tether company, the other is independent transaction of USDT vs. payment typically through exchanges.
During asset liquidation, Tether’s assets would not be sold for the users’ redemption, but for the company’s creditors and shareholders. As soon as the suspicion of liquidation is there, there would be a bank run while redemptions still work.
In the case of a bank run, the price of USDT would be dictated by the exchange market exclusively. As a massive number of people sell through redemption, it is clear to the holders that when the cash dries out, redemptions will close. So they will theoretically be ready to sell through the exchange at 3%, because that is the expected value of the return across all USDT holdings.
That said, at the time of a redemption, isn't Tether legally required to sell or transfer assets to service the redemption (as long as they are able, subject to the timelines and qualifiers promised in their agreements)?
Which is where I'm saying that if Tether holds $0.03 USD + 5 short term notes for every 1 USDT, they are obligated to turn over (or sell) those 5 notes (and $0.03) when a redemption is requested.
While Tether may not be a bank, their users aren't just users: they're holders of Tether credit, subject to the terms that govern it.
Contractually, they are not considered creditors. Furthermore, liability for any loss is explicitly put on the user. (Whether the contract is valid can be litigated though.)
> isn't Tether legally required to sell or transfer assets to service the redemption
Sadly not… From the contract: “Tether makes no representations or warranties about whether Tether Tokens that may be traded on the Site may be traded on the Site at any point in the future, if at all.”
In fact, US citizens are already disallowed from redeeming tokens, and have been for years.
I guess you're assuming that their assets are truthfully reported, would be sold off, then evenly distributed?
Not worried that someone might run off with the money or something?