Now, a perception in that sense only requires that the thing perceived (the object of perception) has a representation in the brain, plus that some information processing of that representation is occuring in the brain (the act of perceiving). Our objects of perception, including qualia and e.g. the awareness of being conscious, can be very rich and complex, but it's certainly not implausible that they are fully represented in the brain with all their richness — and there is nothing more to it than that representation. (In fact, my personal experience is that the range of qualia is not that large, when you observe it over a longer term and for example compare it to our memory capabilites.)
So, when I introspect my consciousness, I cannot pinpoint anything that doesn't fit that model of "information processing (perceiving) of representations (objects, including qualia)". Even what I think of as "I", in the end, is just one of those objects (or probably more a cluster of those). The confusion, I believe, stems from the fact that we can only introspect a fraction of the information processing that is really going on, and that the "I" as an independent subject is a very strong illusion. But when you try to look closely for it, there is arguably nothing really there. (The Buddhists do have a point with their concept of non-self.)
And still the question remains of how the brain produces the conscious experience and expands or contracts it, while not being fully conscious of the whole brain or of its own operation (in which case we would understand consciousness much better). Is it the chemical activity? The electrical? A combination? Is it in the energy transfers between matter or in the relationships that get established?
That's exactly the phenomenon we're trying to explain. You've just said "feeling is just feeling".
The question is - why is there someone experiencing a feeling. A machine or algorithm can be self-referential. Is there some magical "amount of recursion" that suddenly results in consciousness? That seems strange to me.