But the audience for this blatant nonsense are the people who want Hover.com to mail their password to them, so they think they can get away with telling us that "a combination of their network security and physical security† mitigates these flaws." You know this to be false, I know it to be false, and I suggest they know it as well.
(I know neither of these things to be true for a fact and am just making a rhetorical point.)
That is not how I read it. You could argue the other way:
If they have to send password reset URL:s anyway, they can just as well send the password itself.
That makes sense. It's just that by storing the passwords at all, you risk losing them if someone gains access to your database.
https://secure.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/en/wiki/Password_hash...
And you'll still be able to brute force "cat" in under a day.
The Big Problem here isn't that Hover has decided that user convenience warrants storing passwords insecurely. That is a problem, of course, but it is not as big a problem as The Big Problem here.
The Big Problem is the grafs spent defending the soundness of Hover's password storage strategy. Hover does not appear to understand that they have conceded user security. They believe that a combination of their network security and physical security† mitigates these flaws. If you're going to sell out user security to minimize customer support costs, I'd at least like to know that you know that's what you're doing.
That Hover does not appear to know what they are doing suggests that there is much more badness to be had in their systems, which is a problem that will burn them much more painfully than password hashes.
† Notably, not application security --- no external auditor would let "user passwords appear in plaintext in a database column" slide.