For windows the CA improperly revoked the certificate in response to a renewal request and back dated the revocation and are refusing to issue a new certificate (my understanding and that the CA now believes open source collaborations aren't eligible for code signing certs, or some such nonsense... it's being worked out)
The releases are still PGP signed by an official project key which has been in use for many years and is cross signed by many parties-- just as they have the last decade--, as well as by another 16 parties that independent reproduced the binaries through the deterministic build process: https://github.com/bitcoin-core/gitian.sigs/tree/master/0.21... which has also been used for the last ten years. Anyone who already has an older faithful copy has the scripts to automatically download and verify the other signatures.
By comparison, the windows code signing provides relatively little security assurance. Not too dissimilar from the HTTPS used on the download site. It, like the https, does have the advantage that it is widely checked while many users don't bother checking the actual release signatures. It's useful to have for sure, but it's not the only protection and, unfortunately, it exist only at the whim of a third party that isn't accountable to the users of Bitcoin. But if someone can spoof the download site the executable signing won't do much to stop them from causing problems.
Nobody actually checks the executable signatures, they're buried in the file properties.
If you have a quick, trusted way of getting an EV code-signing cert trusted by SmartScreen, please, let me know.
What do you expect the results would be, if within the next few days it were discovered that there were two different files, with the same SHA-256, each claiming to be the Bitcoin-0.21.1 release?
https://blockstream.info/address/35Snmmy3uhaer2gTboc81ayCip4...
https://blockstream.info/address/39VXyuoc6SXYKp9TcAhoiN1mb4n...
https://blockstream.info/address/3DUQQvz4t57Jy7jxE86kyFcNpKt...
And if you wanted to profit from it, via submitting the transaction or not, you could likely make far more by speculating on the effects of that announced collision on the Bitcoin price – likely sharply negative.
"It's always signing a hash.", sure, but S(m) and S(h(m)) is a different operation with very different properties.
Also, inside a block itself, transactions are part of a Merkle Tree[1], so if you can find a SHA-256 collision, you can also create confusion on what transaction where actually included in a given block.
You cannot really “find a solution around it” for two reasons:
1- the bitcoin blockchain is immutable, so the old blocks can't really be rewritten to work with another hashing mechanism. What you could do is reboot the bitcoin blockchain with another hash algorithm, with a Genesis block summarizing the last know state of the bitcoin blockchain. But that would need consensus among the entire bitcoin community, which will never happen because of reason #2
2- Bitcoin miners own millions of dollars of custom hardware designed for SHA-256 generation (mining), there's no way they'll just be like “OK, let's change hash function, I'll throw this useless stuff away and buy new ones”.
PureEdDSA does not break when a hash function without collision resistance is used.
And the kind of theoretical attack that non-prehashing protects you from requires that you sign an attacker chosen message -- relevant in some applications but kind of contrived.
I never understood how this is useful... If someone would replace the executables, wouldn't they also replace the SHA-256 hashes that you are getting from the same source?
In Bitcoin's case what is actually provided is a PGP signature. The relevant key isn't provided along with the download files for the reason you mention. Though there are instructions on obtaining and validating the key on the download site. ... and if you're depending on reading those instructions' they're vulnerable to substitution.
Though those checksums are not extremely reliable and have tiny chance of being corrupted.
It uses a 16-bit ones complement addition. At the packet sizes used on the internet it's extremely weak, much more so than you'd expect just from it being 16-bits, especially on data that isn't a uniform binary.
The question is rather why distribute a separate file with hashes and their signatures, rather than just the signatures themselves, seeing how all useful cryptographic signatures contains the hash anyway?
I suspect the answer is that it is somehow more convenient for the build and release process to distribute one file with all hashes, rather than lots of individual signatures for each artifact. The release process is quite elaborate with several parties independently reproducing that exact build. But someone would have to correct me on that.
That's probably also why they don't consider the broken Windows certificate important enough to stall the release. Relying on a single CA does not provide them with the type of security they are looking for.
that is what needs to be fixed, and ideally would become part of the archive format so that it can be automatically checked (but also should have the option to disable it).
At least that was the original point. These days you usually just host stuff yourself (on your domain or someone you pay, like a paid CDN) rather than having people mirror stuff independently. And it's all https, so it's mostly moot like you say, but old habits seem to die hard though it's already far less common than in the past.
Whenever you still see one, look at where the download really comes from. Often it's third party whereas the hash is first party. If not, then it's probably just a page with old habits.
With http, you can man-in-the-middle the file and the hash.
If the checksum is hosted in a different place than the file, it requires an attacker to compromise two separate systems.
In the typical system, though, the hash sitting next to the file isn't particularly useful.
Someone should tell the nixos devs that. Not being able to verify the authenticity of something as important as your OS does not seem very safe.
A number of years back openssl changed their pgp key and for a month didn't publish it anywhere. AFAICT I was the first person to complain about it-- which also suggests that all the distros that had already shipped the update hadn't checked it.
Somewhere, someone is probably working out a way to exploit this right now.