What do you expect the results would be, if within the next few days it were discovered that there were two different files, with the same SHA-256, each claiming to be the Bitcoin-0.21.1 release?
https://blockstream.info/address/35Snmmy3uhaer2gTboc81ayCip4...
https://blockstream.info/address/39VXyuoc6SXYKp9TcAhoiN1mb4n...
https://blockstream.info/address/3DUQQvz4t57Jy7jxE86kyFcNpKt...
And if you wanted to profit from it, via submitting the transaction or not, you could likely make far more by speculating on the effects of that announced collision on the Bitcoin price – likely sharply negative.
"It's always signing a hash.", sure, but S(m) and S(h(m)) is a different operation with very different properties.
Also, inside a block itself, transactions are part of a Merkle Tree[1], so if you can find a SHA-256 collision, you can also create confusion on what transaction where actually included in a given block.
You cannot really “find a solution around it” for two reasons:
1- the bitcoin blockchain is immutable, so the old blocks can't really be rewritten to work with another hashing mechanism. What you could do is reboot the bitcoin blockchain with another hash algorithm, with a Genesis block summarizing the last know state of the bitcoin blockchain. But that would need consensus among the entire bitcoin community, which will never happen because of reason #2
2- Bitcoin miners own millions of dollars of custom hardware designed for SHA-256 generation (mining), there's no way they'll just be like “OK, let's change hash function, I'll throw this useless stuff away and buy new ones”.
PureEdDSA does not break when a hash function without collision resistance is used.
And the kind of theoretical attack that non-prehashing protects you from requires that you sign an attacker chosen message -- relevant in some applications but kind of contrived.