NASA has been making it very clear that everything more that it does from now on is a bonus.
If you keep it framed like that, it's more exciting to have a successful mission & likely to continue to get funding, than if you set high expectations and fail.
This seems to be the more plausible reason. You keep the bar for success low so you keep getting funding for subsequent missions. Isn't that pretty much how every organization with public funding sets goals?
If you promise one run and fail to complete it, it's a disappointment, but eh, it was a high-risk mission anyway. If you promise a hundred runs and fail to complete even one, you'll catch a ton of flak. If you promise one and complete a hundred, you're a hero.
The math checks out that way, especially when one single mission is good enough to get the funding anyway. Everything else is literally a bonus, why promise ten when they're paying you for one?
What happens over a period of time in any organization if you consistently under-commit & over-deliver is that people stop believing in your "official" under-committed number ("It's just on-paper") and start creating their own informal "realistic" expectations (which are possibly different across stake-holders) and start taking (possibly mis-aligned) decisions based on these. As you may imagine, such situations tend to blow up from time to time.
Your boss wants to know how long you'll spend on a job; if you tell him 30 days and spend 30 days you're just good at estimation.
If you do it in 20, you're a star for doing it under budget!
Say you have 5 critical components, any of which fail, you are no longer able to complete your entire mission (which in this context is a set of scientific experiments that you've pitched and believe that if you get nothing but that data back, that your entire mission cost was worth it). If you need X time to finish your mission, and say... you want a 95% (I have no idea what the real model number is) chance of finishing the entire mission. This will require you to push the reliability of your individual components up a lot. Say your failure rate model is uniform - your probability of failing in any given period of time is the same as any other given period of time (so you're in the bottom of the bathtub curve).
Very roughly you'd need like a maximum of 1% chance of any given component failing over X period to reach your reliability goal. If X is something like month, that translates into a mean time to failure that is not suddenly measured in years. Very quickly you can see how the constraint that N=1 MUST survive for X period will naturally lead to many instances where that N=1 CAN survive for much longer.
Now say that you can withstand component failures, and still continue with degraded performance (that would have impeded your original mission), then you can stretch things out even more.
I suspect we see a similar process play out with nearly every probe mission. They couldn't get funding to build something that'll work with a REALLY HIGH probably of working for a year, but they made trade offs to get them a high probably of it working for a year.
Maybe there's politics around funding. I wouldn't be surprised if the major costs are people costs over months and sometimes years to support the science vs. the actual core mission costs but it may be a big sticker shock to ask the Congress at one go. So possibly they ask funding for a short under balled-mission (which no one really scrutinizes) and then keep getting funding extensions citing opportunity costs (the probe is already on Mars, we can get extended value etc). I can imagine there's massive politics here, so it maybe is the only smart game to play