Not a stretch at all. Proven time and time again that shareholders focus on short term gains over long term.
When hired CEOs pay is tied to equity (i.e. shareholder) they make decisions based on how it affects the share price during their tenure, not after. GM after Jack Welch left is a good example.
Shareholders can sell their shares anytime. They care about the horse winning current race more than the next because they can bet on another horse next time. So they only care about the horse as long as they are betting for it.
The drive for the short term is one possible strategy and outcome, that's all. In a competitive environment sometimes it even makes sense. Even when it doesn't the existence of failure modes in a system doesn't invalidate the entire system. All systems have failure modes, they need to be evaluated as a whole.
It is a stretch beyond what I am arguing. On the other hand, I don't think it is a stretch to say that you are arguing that every shareholder has quality and reputation concerns indistinguishable from that of the direct proprietor. I claim that that is what would be necessary for Friedman and Smith to be saying the same thing.
As I’ve commented elsewhere I don’t entirely agree with Friedman because I think some social spending can make commercial sense for a company, but I think what he’s saying is just a pretty direct refinement of the exact same points Smith made.