although I've never personally understood the advantage password managers have over just using AES encryption that most text editors have.
Personally, I use keepassxc + keepass2android + browser plugins + syncthing. The idea of storing my passwords in someone else's cloud gives me the heebie jeebies...
My password manager can't communicate with anything, it's local only. It runs on a separate host so no, it doesn't have any browser integration. A browser is way too complex attack surface to trust. Only way I get a password is to ssh into the isolated host, decrypt password and cut & paste.
Less convenient, sure. Also far more secure.
Security can never be perfect. It's a lesson in trade-offs.
For example, if you make security so hard or inconvenient that people won't engage in secure behaviors, then in the end you're worse off.
This is the reason password rotation has fallen out of favor lately.
If in general we did away with password managers and took your lead, I guarantee we would collectively be worse off because, for most folks, what you describe would be seen as way more trouble than it's worth.
Your black-and-white take also fails to account for varied threat models.
Remember, the most common threat model online today is service breaches leading to passwords being exposed, followed by credential stuffing. Password managers encourage practices that eliminate that threat model.
If your threat model is centered on password manager service breaches like this one, then use a solution that doesn't require cloud hosting (e.g. keepass).
So now we need to worry about device breaches, which requires hackers to go after individual users (either targeted or untargeted), which has a much higher cost/complexity. We've made the hackers job a lot harder, which is good.
And if your model is centered on device breaches, well, bad news: your browser already sees your passwords go by (among many other things), so if the device is breached, you're hooped, password manager or no password manager.
Say a Pinephone with no way to ssh into by default that is normally powered off. No services listening on the network running on it + strict firewall.
It can only initiate connections to other devices.
Unless I want to sign a ssh key from a CA stored on it or provide a password to some of my other devices it's just powered off. All of DRAM is cleared prior to shutdown. Pinephone can boot to UI in ~2-3s so it would not be bothersome to keep it normally off, and boot up only when needed. Battery would last months for a single charge for this use case.
It would run just a few processes. Init, maybe wpa_supplicant for wifi, and a UI process. Very simple SW, extremely limited attack surface.
Pinephone has a nice feature that it can emulate any USB device, so I could connect it over USB to any machine, and just make it look like a keyboard, and just type in the username and password into a focused field, for the password filling feature.
If I want to create a short term ssh certificate and sign a SSH key for access to a customer machine, the phone would connect to my workstation/notebook/whatever directly over ssh and sign/upload the certificate.
A browser is too complex but an OS and SSH aren't? There are vulnerabilities in both disclosed regularly.
Yes, most certainly.
A browser is running adversarial third party code all the time as a matter of course. While browsers do a good job at isolating, expecting this to be perfect is way too fragile for a security critical requirement like putting all passwords in one basket.
An isolated and minimized OS install, much easier to harden. Never runs any code you don't know about.
You can use different computers / VMs
Other applications can sniff the clipboard, you might accidentally copy another of your credentials into website or you might forget to clear it after use and then later accidentally paste it into an irc-channel.
There is also risk of visually exposing the password in the text editor, either to someone else in the room, screen sharing or screenshot from another malicious app.
A bit into the tinfoil-hat side, but it's passwords we are talking about after all.
-- Pen and paper? It is still a thing and cannot be stolen online.
-- If you are afraid your family will access it without your knowledge, use tamper evident bag and a notepad to make notes of bag serial numbers. This prevents anybody from accessing it without your knowledge.
-- Split the password into components so that even if somebody gets access to the piece of paper with the password they still can't log in. I make a note of the variable part of the password and remember a different prefixes/suffixes. I use different prefixes/suffixes for different classes of accounts. For most critical accounts I don't reuse anything.
-- Use hardware (yubikeys) as second factor, to lessen pressure on the password. Unfortunately almost nobody implements these well. In most cases it is possible to turn off the second factor without presenting second factor which basically nullifies the value of it. If you use second factor on a site that implements it well, remember to have MULTIPLE copies of it. Keep it in triplicate, one with you, one in tamper evident bag and one offsite.