-- Pen and paper? It is still a thing and cannot be stolen online.
-- If you are afraid your family will access it without your knowledge, use tamper evident bag and a notepad to make notes of bag serial numbers. This prevents anybody from accessing it without your knowledge.
-- Split the password into components so that even if somebody gets access to the piece of paper with the password they still can't log in. I make a note of the variable part of the password and remember a different prefixes/suffixes. I use different prefixes/suffixes for different classes of accounts. For most critical accounts I don't reuse anything.
-- Use hardware (yubikeys) as second factor, to lessen pressure on the password. Unfortunately almost nobody implements these well. In most cases it is possible to turn off the second factor without presenting second factor which basically nullifies the value of it. If you use second factor on a site that implements it well, remember to have MULTIPLE copies of it. Keep it in triplicate, one with you, one in tamper evident bag and one offsite.
although I've never personally understood the advantage password managers have over just using AES encryption that most text editors have.
Personally, I use keepassxc + keepass2android + browser plugins + syncthing. The idea of storing my passwords in someone else's cloud gives me the heebie jeebies...
My password manager can't communicate with anything, it's local only. It runs on a separate host so no, it doesn't have any browser integration. A browser is way too complex attack surface to trust. Only way I get a password is to ssh into the isolated host, decrypt password and cut & paste.
Less convenient, sure. Also far more secure.
Security can never be perfect. It's a lesson in trade-offs.
For example, if you make security so hard or inconvenient that people won't engage in secure behaviors, then in the end you're worse off.
This is the reason password rotation has fallen out of favor lately.
If in general we did away with password managers and took your lead, I guarantee we would collectively be worse off because, for most folks, what you describe would be seen as way more trouble than it's worth.
Your black-and-white take also fails to account for varied threat models.
Remember, the most common threat model online today is service breaches leading to passwords being exposed, followed by credential stuffing. Password managers encourage practices that eliminate that threat model.
If your threat model is centered on password manager service breaches like this one, then use a solution that doesn't require cloud hosting (e.g. keepass).
So now we need to worry about device breaches, which requires hackers to go after individual users (either targeted or untargeted), which has a much higher cost/complexity. We've made the hackers job a lot harder, which is good.
And if your model is centered on device breaches, well, bad news: your browser already sees your passwords go by (among many other things), so if the device is breached, you're hooped, password manager or no password manager.
Say a Pinephone with no way to ssh into by default that is normally powered off. No services listening on the network running on it + strict firewall.
It can only initiate connections to other devices.
Unless I want to sign a ssh key from a CA stored on it or provide a password to some of my other devices it's just powered off. All of DRAM is cleared prior to shutdown. Pinephone can boot to UI in ~2-3s so it would not be bothersome to keep it normally off, and boot up only when needed. Battery would last months for a single charge for this use case.
It would run just a few processes. Init, maybe wpa_supplicant for wifi, and a UI process. Very simple SW, extremely limited attack surface.
Pinephone has a nice feature that it can emulate any USB device, so I could connect it over USB to any machine, and just make it look like a keyboard, and just type in the username and password into a focused field, for the password filling feature.
If I want to create a short term ssh certificate and sign a SSH key for access to a customer machine, the phone would connect to my workstation/notebook/whatever directly over ssh and sign/upload the certificate.
A browser is too complex but an OS and SSH aren't? There are vulnerabilities in both disclosed regularly.
Yes, most certainly.
A browser is running adversarial third party code all the time as a matter of course. While browsers do a good job at isolating, expecting this to be perfect is way too fragile for a security critical requirement like putting all passwords in one basket.
An isolated and minimized OS install, much easier to harden. Never runs any code you don't know about.
You can use different computers / VMs
Other applications can sniff the clipboard, you might accidentally copy another of your credentials into website or you might forget to clear it after use and then later accidentally paste it into an irc-channel.
There is also risk of visually exposing the password in the text editor, either to someone else in the room, screen sharing or screenshot from another malicious app.
A bit into the tinfoil-hat side, but it's passwords we are talking about after all.
As for the rest, a written record is sufficiently secure since most of those login credentials aren't protecting anything important. I also have a tendency to avoid services that require a login.
Also, the article says this product is primarily for enterprise customers, who need other features like sync across team and team access management.
Though fair enough when it comes to enterprise features.
It is strange how people get blinded by technology and forget about oldest, most reliable methods.
I have worked as a security officer at a credit card acquirer (basically, processing credit card transactions between terminal and the bank).
The process to safeguard your PINs is extremely complex but at the very end relies on pieces of paper with passwords and key components written down, put in tamper evident envelopes and then into safes.
In case of HSM keys, the HSM itself is built to loose those keys at the least pretense. It is also not possible to retrieve the keys.
So whenever you want to provision a new HSM or even just move it couple centimeters (it looses keys when you try to move it) you have to go to the components written on paper.
It is just like a password on a website -- you have to be entering it regularly. But once you enter the password you don't need to retype it for every HTTP request.
Key components = password HSM = browser Message with PIN block = HTTP request
Then a random breach happens, and the website will force you to choose a new password.
I couldn't remember which variant of my rule I used at a particular website. This is aside from how easy my rule was to reverse engineer (which was made really clear to me once when I saw a couple of my PWs on haveibeenpwned
In case I'm losing you, here's a parallel: if I ask you to pick and remember a random number between 1 and 1 billion, the odds of me figuring it out are low. But if I ask you to pick and remember 200 numbers between 1 and 1 billion, you will likely come up with "a rule", and then if I get a couple of example numbers (in a "password leak"), i can probably figure it out. The numbers are no longer secret, it's the rule that is.
Also, what the rules is is completely up to you. Be inventive.
If it comes to reverse engineering your rule it means you are facing a targeted attack. Believe me, you can't prevent a targeted attack by a good password.
It is better to have one rule to generate a lot of passwords that are good on their own and independent enough than have small number of passwords shared between many services.