A. We decide this is fair use based on the small number of LOC used and call it a day
B. OR we can decide that APIs are not copyrightable even though they're self-evidently creative works because of the importance of interoperability based on something something related to Borland v. Lotus, a case that we couldn't agree on the last time it came up.
Hey folks. Let's do A.
Avoiding the temptation to set bigger and more far-reaching precedents than is strictly necessary for the case at hand avoids giving the impression that the judicial branch is doing the job of the legislative branch.
I have fundamental problems with an unelected council that serves for life creating law.
However, we have an extremely inefficient form of Government that doesn't allow for quick adaptation, and legal questions will arise tomorrow that did not occur to legislators today. The courts are supposed to help resolve any ambiguity.
The question over whether or not APIs are copyrightable is, however, not a question of ambiguity. APIs are software (or documentation, or source code, etc), and any category you place them into is copyrightable under the current law. If we don't want APIs to be copyrightable, then they must have explicit exemptions carved out in the law. The courts are bound to consider an API as copyrighted right now, and the only question is whether violating that copyright is fair-use.
I think the Court did the right thing in skirting the question. That's up to legislators, the Court cannot help. We need fundamental reform of IP protections for software anyway.
That really is the root issue here. So many problems we're seeing (Pai's clownshow in the FCC, SCOTUS legislating from the bench, federal agencies trampling citizens' rights, etc.) stem from the legislative branch abdicating their authority to third parties -- the librarian of Congress, the FCC, SCOTUS, and even (by legal reference) professional organizations and laws in other countries. It's ridiculous.
A first principle of a democratic government is that citizens can soon fire someone whose legislation and/or executive decision they do not like. We would all have voted Pai out if we could have... but he shouldn't have had the power to do what he did in the first place (remove network neutrality rules). Congress gave him that power - which I would argue was an abdication of authority vested in them.
Legislators assigning regulatory power to bureaucratic agencies is one of the cornerstones of modern democracies - it wouldn't work otherwise. Many of our legislators are barely qualified to send their own emails, let alone decide what is a telecom utility or how much ppb in drinking water is safe for a toxic chemical. Assigning that power to regulatory agencies allows experts to decide those issues in a neutral setting.
Pai's FCC aside, that structure prevented significant disruptions in the last four years and our country continues to function despite decades of increased partisanship and deadlock at the highest level.
Agreed that regulatory agencies are indispensable. But their job is to carry out the law, not make the law. Of course, the law has to delegate some decision-making responsibility to them -- the law can't make every decision ahead of time. But (a) the law can codify principles that regulatory agencies must uphold, and (b) lawsuits can be filed when someone disagrees that a principle has been accurately upheld -- the courts can decide.
We as a country ought to be arguing and disagreeing about principles, and the results (decided by legislators who are under the gun of potential non-reelection) ought to be codified as laws. A lack of principle in congress and in law is what really causes this abdication and delegation of authority.
An ideal legal corpus represents (as much as possible) a simply and directly expressed set of principles under which the country operates.
It is difficult to talk about "regulations" in the abstract but I would suggest that many regulations aren't about a perfect solution devised by an expert. They are more often about finding a tradeoff, a balance between competing goals. Those sorts of decisions can be informed by "expert" knowledge, but I think it is a mistake to think that domain experts are necessarily best positioned to resolve tradeoffs in public policy.
I'm not arguing against expert knowledge being incorporated into construction of regulations -- just pointing out that expert knowledge may be necessary but not sufficient to finding a workable public policy.
If your democratically elected legislators don't like a bench ruling, they are free to make a new law that specifically overrides that ruling. The legislature is the ultimate source of authority in the land. The courts only have a bit of wiggle room in interpreting unclear statutes.
The system is designed well. Unfortunately, democratically elected legislators at the moment would rather obstruct, wreck, and go on wild-ass conspiracy rants, than legislate.
If that legislature spent half the time it complains about activist judges actually drafting law, it would have nothing to complain about. If you, as a constituent are unhappy about the current state of affairs, vote in legislators who are willing to do their job.
But I really do think this case falls squarely inside the parameters of "interpretation" as most members would see it.
Well, that's the theory.
In fact, they are doing the job of the legislative branch, they can't stop people from noticing this, and sticking to this approach just means they're doing their job badly.
In an earlier concurring opinion when he was on the D.C. Circuit — i.e., before joining the Supreme Court as Chief Justice of the United States (his official title) — John Roberts referred to "... the cardinal principle of judicial restraint — if it is not necessary to decide more, it is necessary not to decide more ...." [0]
[0] https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=192785774326304...
The main influence of the Supreme Court is in setting precedent. In the absence of a ruling from the Supreme Court, the previous ruling from the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit is binding precedent on the whole country that APIs are copyrightable. That means that the most important precedents set in this case are still an issue for the software industry.
This is not true - other circuit courts are free to set their own, conflicting precedent. Each circuit's decisions are binding only on its own judges, and suggestive but not binding on other circuits.
Circuits deciding differently (a "circuit split") is uncommon, and considered urgent grounds for the Supreme Court to take up a test case to resolve the ambiguity; but it's not considered a "breaking" of precedent by either circuit, just a difference of interpretation for the Supreme Court to resolve
That said I do not actually know whether they would be binding on another circuit court. But they are definitely binding on all federal courts lower than that.
However that question is sort of moot. It is extremely easy for the entity filing the case for infringement to include something about patent or trademark in the suit, which guarantees that you wind up in the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. Where that ruling is binding.
Copyright is not part of their subject matter jurisdiction.
> However that question is sort of moot. It is extremely easy for the entity filing the case for infringement to include something about patent or trademark in the suit, which guarantees that you wind up in the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. Where that ruling is binding.
It’s not, though; outside of its own subject matter jurisdiction, CAFC is bound by the law of the Circuit to which the trial court belongs, which it, in theory, merely applies. Another case coming up through the Northern District of California like Oracle v. Google did would be governed vy Ninth Circuit, not Federal Circuit, copyright precedent even if heard in the Federal Circuit because of other issues in the case.
No, its not.
The CAFC’s interpretation of Ninth Amendment case law on copyrightability in this case (before and after the Supreme Court sidestepped it) is binding on no one except future courts hearing cases on issues and between parties so closely related to those in Oracle v. Google that res judicata rather than rules of precedent is the deciding factor
I understand the intuition you're getting at: logically, the first question could make the second irrelevant. But if the second question resolves the issue even when the first is construed in favor of the other party, what's the rationale for demanding the court focus on the first question?