The bigger issue with nuclear power is that we can trust humans to keep up the level of effort to keep it working without a fault for a few decades, maybe centuries if we're lucky, but there's no way you can operate a plant for a millennia without a catastrophic accident, but accidents take much more than a thousand years to clean up. So it's all totally imbalanced unless you just assume we'll have fusion in fifty years, so nothing matters. But I don't think we can assume that anymore.
We do that with airplanes. Think about it - you're flying at 30,000 feet, 500 mph, 50 degrees below zero, no land in sight over the North Atlantic, in a tin balloon loaded to the gills with fuel and two flaming engines.
And yet you're perfectly safe.
How did that come about? Tolerance of failure.
Even tail mounted engines (with a shorter coupling arm to the centerline) will typically have a Vmcg (roughly, speed at which lateral control on the ground is lost with one engine inoperative) that will preclude takeoff on one (physically, not by regulations) from available runways.
> you can be sure
Not likely. Who you gonna get to fly it? Who you gonna get to pay to fly in it?
a. people in less developed countries
b. people in said countries with less money to spend than others
this has happened before (south america in the 70s, etc), which is why the aviation industry has the regulatory system it has today
sorry if we ended up talking past eachother
Civilian nuclear reactors are mostly built by a handful, rarely by a dozen. This makes learning from past mistakes and taking preventative measures across the fleet hard.
I think France has partly solved it exactly by having a small number of standardized reactors, and a number of nuclear plants which can be run in a reasonably uniform way.
Not really. Every one coming off the line is different. They are constantly being improved. Every part on the airplane is carefully tracked, from manufacturing lot to which airplane each is installed on. Everything is designed by engineers, not custom made on the spot by a mechanic.
Planes aren't perfectly safe (my brother was killed when SR111 crashed in 1998 after failures).
Anyone preferring not being exposed to a plane crash can abstain to travel in planes. Anyone preferring not being exposed to nuclear reactors boo-boos and hot waste has no real way to do so.
https://www.swissinfo.ch/eng/electrical-fire-downed-swissair...
??
I suppose there will then be incentives to exaggerate or "invent" new risks for career advancement, but is that not preferable to the alternative?
It's an absolutely incredibly good safety record. You're much safer flying across the Atlantic than driving to the airport.
That’s not to say I like nuclear power - IMHO opportunity cost is too high. I could build, operate and decommission a renewable solar or wind plant in the time it takes to plan a new nuclear plant.
“You sound like you’re looking forward for some disaster coming with those plans” worked in Japan in those times. Still do to some extent.
Opposition to nuclear's safety did not start until well after construction had started on the US's reactors. And for nearly all US reactors, the utilities had already realized that they had over-ordered nuclear reactors in the 1970s, and that there were far too many construction delays and cost-overruns for nuclear to be cost effective.
This is detailed in a 1985 Forbes cover article, Nuclear Foibles, which is not anti-nuclear, but is withering about the mismanagement of nuclear in the US. Here's the only reprint I have found, which has a weird rant about Gore at the top that can be ignored:
http://blowhardwindbag.blogspot.com/2011/04/forbes-article-r...
The idea that designs from the early 1970s refused to plan for failure because of some theoretical opposition, when there was basically no opposition to our greatest period of building nuclear reactors, doesn't make much sense to me.
Off-site center for disaster control built 5km(3mi) off site, effectively on-site, all backup generators being at basement levels, and recently discovered issue of emergency vent lines terminating inside the containment building comes to mind.
that's not true. yes a lot of systems on airplanes are redundant but also there are plenty of you die if this breaks so we build it N times stronger than we can imagine it every happening... also, teach pilots not to do things that would bring that to be more possible. on a helicopter they have a single jesus nut that if it breaks the rotor is gone.
In rock climbing as well there is redundancy where there can be but some things are built strong to the point where under most foreseeable conditions the component will not break. (the most common dynamic ropes for lead climbing twins and half ropes aside, belay device, belay loop, belay carabiner, harness are all built for worst case without redundancy.)
That's simply not true. Every component is redundant. Nothing is built "N" times stronger. The safety factor is 50% stronger than the maximum anticipated load.
(I worked for 3 years at Boeing designing flight critical systems for the 757.)
> are all built for worst case without redundancy
Why I'm not going rock climbing.
Yes. (It's for the stabilizer, not the elevator.) First off, the jackscrew is hollow and has a rod running through the center to keep it together if it cracks through. Secondly, the nut rides on steel balls in grooves. If the nut cracks and all the balls fall out, there are solid ice scrapers attached to the nut at each end that fit in the grooves, but don't contact them under normal operation. The ice scrapers peel any ice off the grooves so it doesn't jam the nut. But the scrapers are also strong enough to hold the nut in place if the balls fall out.
This is on the 757. I don't know the setup on the McDonnell-Douglas bird that crashed due to nut failure, except it's a much older design. I don't know if it had the ice scrapers on it, for example.
BTW, the jackscrew is made by Saginaw Gear. It's made from the finest steel forging money can buy, and Saginaw has been making them for a long time and knows what they're doing.
After the first trim gearbox assembly arrived, Boeing's test group had the job of applying the ultimate load, 150%, to it to see if it would buckle, crack, or bend. The test guys told me they were going to bust it. They put a big old steel I-Beam pinned at one end and my poor little jackscrew gearbox pinned at the other end. A hydraulic ram was applied to the I-beam, and the test guy cranked up the pressure.
The I-beam bent into a bow.
HAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHHAHAHAAA I love Saginaw Gear.
> there are simply no completely reliable planes and helicopters without some form of single point reliability being required.
Helicopters, you're right. They won't survive losing a blade. Planes, you're incorrect.
After 3 years of working on the gearbox I knew everything there was to know about it, including all the failure modes anyone could think of. I was also fortunate to have a couple of Boeing's best engineers mentoring me.
It's redundant.
Each component individually is designed at 150% of the maximum load ever expected.
The spar has redundant components. Any part of the spar can crack all the way through, and it will still fly safely.
Electrical/mechanical systems are different and can usually be separated/segregated etc, but there is only one structure.
I also think the amount of airplanes that exist is higher than the amount of nuclear reactors we'd need for it to be a strong power source, and I also suspect that airplanes face slightly more volatile conditions
Well there's one example! Why would you discount it?
Nuclear power could be engineered to be at least as safe as (most) commercial flight.
But it won't be - and this is absolutely predictable. Because of politics and money.
There is no answer to this, except to fix politics and money and make them as safe as commercial flight.
That's a whole different scale of problem to fixing climate change.
IMO this isn't a utopian fantasy, it's absolutely critical for species survival. But it doesn't look as if we're going to be starting the process any time soon.
Exporting the same problems to Mars or upload space or wherever won't solve them either.
I do totally agree this is a real risk for any domain, especially energy which has so much money flowing, but I just don't think "engineering" is actually the issue which these things fail under
What do you call Chernobyl? A socialistic failure driven by inept bureaucracy and central planning?
We don't have any technical defense against institutional failure. In some places and times there are cultural defenses, but those are often seen to erode.
The best defense is not to need any. There is much less need to defend against institutional failure in the case of renewables, because the technical failures to guard against have limited impact, well constrained in cost, time and space.
It's become extremely rare.
I'm not completely anti-nuclear. But it seems clear to me that it should be seen as a stepping-stone technology on the way to a renewables + storage future rather than a long-term solution.
You mentioned one, the vulnerability of the backup power to the seawall being overtopped. The generators could have been put on a raised platform. There were others:
1. the hydrogen was vented into an enclosed space
2. no way to add water to the cooling system with a gravity fed device
3. critical machinery should not be located in the reactor core building
4. no way to bring in electric power from elsewhere