I don't have to be routing packets for you to find all this out; every transaction goes to every node.
There are "laundering" services which try to play a shell game with addresses, but I think they're probably easy to reverse-engineer, at least probabilistically if not completely.
OTOH, unlike IPs, you can't pinpoint addresses to any location though or find out who owns what addresses for sure. I guess they're more pseudonymous than anonymous.
The wallet provider could, in principle, be subpoenaed / coerced /hacked / owned by the NSA. I imagine there will eventually be a Tor-like "onion" anonymization method, where bitcoins are routed through multiple such services, so that no single service need be trusted (except to not steal your money). The main challenge with these techniques is avoiding forms of traffic analysis, where I notice B$98.23 heading from A to B, and shortly thereafter, B$98.22 heading from C to D, and infer that these represent a single transaction chain despite being disconnected in the block chain record. Such attacks can be minimized by, e.g., settling on a fixed transaction amount for all transactions with a given service, and adding random delays commensurate with the transaction rate and degree of anonymity required.
Sure, you can use Tor, launder your bitcoins, and effectively become untraceable, but how many people actually do this, and do this correctly? Even Lulz Security, who presumably have a reasonable degree of technical expertise, didn't bother to use Tor when talking over IRC.
Also, Silk Road is kinda ridiculous anyway, because despite all that security and anonymising, in the end you have to give out a physical address that you'll visit in person.