Nothing bad happening, everyone uninjured and a plane making an orderly airport emergency landing is many layers of safety systems all working properly.
Airplanes are big fragile inflated sausages, and it takes relatively little by way of explosive to down one. An early model (the de Havilland Comet, operated by BOAC and South African Airways in the 1950s) was downed due to a design flaw leading to metal fatigue around the windows, with three aircraft lost in 12 months due to in-flight break-ups, 99 souls lost.
Even at lower altitudes, an uncontained fan or turbine failure can be rough on the cargo or passengers, either from direct shrapnel, decompression, or (partial or full) egress.
As one commenter put it, to an ER doctor this is a shallow wound with lots of blood.
[0] https://www.pprune.org/rumours-news/638797-united-b777-uncon...
[0] https://aviation.stackexchange.com/questions/45566/how-thick...
[0]: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Southwest_Airlines_Flight_1380
WW2 fighter planes anyone?
1- meet the designers, understand the "why"s and not only the descriptive posthoc documentation
2- when you don't trust your instruments, keep following the procedures, checklists, (for this you need an excellent, trained, cold-headed team), and eventually try to reconstruct 'what aircraft you have'
3- trust the automated checklists but not too much! Crosscheck what's asked of you, with what you know of the aircraft. Since you know the 'why's you know the automated checklist system's designers probably never expected an aircraft with that much damage to keep flying...
4- there are no hall-passes for heroes. At the end De Crespigny fails his evaluation (the flight was an evaluation flight, with an instructor on board).
All around a great, great book for systems people.