But Microsoft's "system of trust" was undermined. The attacker was even inside Microsoft and Azure. No anti-virus, no "defender", no amount of basic or advanced telemetry caught this.
FireEye alone caught it... By accident.
The real "elephant in the room" is that software security continues to be marketing theatre. Closed-source software should not be trusted and consumers should not believe that any due diligence has been done to protect them.
Overall I tend to agree with your general points, but, this statement.
Would you say that seatbelts are "safety theatre" because some people die in car accidents while wearing a seatbelt?
I really don't think it's fair to attribute all software security as BS, especially given the resources state actors throw at breaking software. It's like arguing your seatbelts don't work because your 4 door sedan was hit by a bus.
Seatbelts are real security measures. Still, more than 60K people die every year in motor accidents in North America and in the EU. Seatbelts cannot save life in all cases, such as outrageous speeds, but they are a sane measure for most -- if not all -- use-cases of driving.
In this compromise, the major purveyor of OS and security products itself was compromised. No company, no $agency did due diligence. Some of these victims are supposed to be in the business of high-assurance and due diligence.
None of the systems that we are conditioned to believe to be effective actually worked. And it was a standard use-case for all the victims.
I think the elephant in the room is actually a more general issue that is cross platform and independent of the product implementation.
It’s 2021 and we are still ignoring the fundamental “best practice” that we’ve known about for at least 20 years.
Systems should be isolated from each other unless there is an overwhelming need for them to be connected and everything should run with the least privilege.
Centralised credential vaults and binary artefact repositories are an obvious example.
The two computers are developed by two independent teams who are not allowed to talk to each other. Two different CPUs, two different algorithms, two different programming languages.
The idea, of course, is a design problem with one does not propagate to the other.
If one program is used in all your infrastructure, all your infrastructure is compromised when that program has a bug.
As a marine saying goes, never take two chronometers with you to the sea. Take either one or three.
1) Build servers: Maybe by keeping it possible to build one's software on a laptop — then, when it's time to release something, one can build the software at the build server plus some people's laptops and compare hashes.
2) ???
3) Different people who don't talk with each other, do security code review, independently of each other? Hmm does that make sense
And we should have checks built into the build pipelines and checksum the files that go into the build. We have Merkle trees for a long time. I think, it would be possible to detect injected code.
Not accurate re: leadership. A new CEO just started in January, and their CTO was either terminated or he left just after the hack news.
Second, with such negligence? They deserve to be shut down. This isn't a highly sophisticated zero day exploit, there were multiple huge failure at Solarwinds that allowed the attack to happen.
A far better system is "no fault" where the company has incentive to be open about problems and finding solutions.
Calmly, our CEO said: 'No. If there's anyone in this company who will never make that mistake again it's him.'
I was in the room when the CEO told that (one of the nice things about small companies) and have had contact with the person responsible for a few years until he got another job. True story ;)
There were changes though: the 'two pair of eyes' principle was enforced a lot stricter from then on.
On April 28th 2021 they will announce Q1 2020 results. THAT's when we'll know for sure how bad this hurt them.
They may release less than sanguine guidance on Feb 25th, we'll see.
The reason why I know this stuff I will leave as an exercise to the reader. :)
But the concerted marketing effort pays dividends. Solarwinds is almost the only choice for government. For potential attackers its a big red arrow. Exploit a rent-seeking company that writes mediocre software and exists mostly to cash in on "best practice" lock-in with government contracts.
as far as i know nobodys really addressed the elephant in the room. Solarwinds is still a preferred government purchase for monitoring. every company that was affected by it still uses it (or at least hasnt publically refuted it) and no government official has come forward to admit they will discontinue it. Solarwinds hasnt offered any remediation or major changes in their development, leadership or code. just patch, rinse, and repeat and try not to pay too much attention to the issue.