there is no problem to generate a billion revenue that costs a billion and half. Barings bank in 1995, Enron in 2002, Merrill Lynch in 2008 ...
>in 2000 companies were IPO'ing without any significant revenue or traction.
Of course, nobody would fall for this old trick of 2000 - IPO without revenue. So the new trick of 2011 is huge revenue, profit negative. You see, at the scale of a billion it is clear whether it is a profitable scalable business model or not.
In all three of these cases, you have situations where sophisticated financial instruments were used to hide real losses or very risky and costly investment bets.
That's a very different situation than one where you're leveraging debt to gobble up market share to become the market leader for a certain kind of service. This is particularly useful in types of businesses where winner takes all.
That doesn't answer the question about the ratio of investor cash-outs to expansion, though. It just (somewhat) addresses the question of whether a growth strategy without profits makes any sense at all.
Iridium satellite phones.
Amazon lost $3 billion over 8 years before they started turning a profit. [1]
It's HARD to tell the difference between Iridium and Amazon. That's why some investors make money and some lose money.
[1] http://www.slideshare.net/faberNovel/amazoncom-the-hidden-em...
yep. And it was hard to pick Amazon among the well funded overhyped dot-com crowd. Nothing indicates so far that Groupon is Amazon, not Webvan for example.
>That's why some investors make money and some lose money.
Ones who picked AMZN would like to think that they were smart, not just lucky. Ones who picked some dot-com loser instead of AMZN would like to think that they were unlucky, not "unsmart" :)
Much of what they did is par for the course today but, at the time, it was innovative. Amazon didn't win because they were lucky. They won because they were smart. Investors who recognized this were betting intelligently, not just lucky.
The other thing to notice is that that culture still exists today. They take big chances in areas seem tangential to their business (eg. AWS, Kindle) or use business innovation to drive sales (eg. Amazon Mom).
That's one obvious difference between Iridium and Amazon. 10 years ago, when Amazon was still losing money, I had already made purchases from them. It was the first place I checked if I wanted to buy books online. I had never heard of Iridium.
I don't think groupon will be as successful as Amazon, but having real fans among consumers is a big deal.
I agree, which is why it is important to also look at the behavior of the founders who have intimate knowledge and secret desires. I won't begrudge anyone taking some money off the table but the amount they are funneling out seems completely out of line with the idea that they expect this business to keep growing.
It's funny how many people are so sure of the soundness/lack of soundness of a business model, yet surprisingly few put their money where their mouth is.
It sounds like an ad agency, but perhaps better suited to surviving through recessions.
The important aspect – that needs to be determined – is whether existing clients are happy, and therefore returning for more business.
Meanwhile, from Groupon's prospectus:
Our revenue is the purchase price paid by the customer for the Groupon. Our gross profit is the amount of revenue we retain after paying an agreed upon percentage of the purchase price to the featured merchant.
So they have huge revenue numbers because they move a lot of coupons. But they're operating at a loss. It's promising that they have a big audience, and a database of merchants, but what does that really mean when they're not profitable?
If I build a scalable website that sells ten-dollar bills for $9, I will probably attract as much traffic as I can afford. If I have a billion dollars to lose I can probably arrange to do roughly $10B in "revenue". But what does that number prove? Not so much in itself. It's other details that matter.
I think I will read this sentence once a week.
Let's say you're in the business of giving $10 for $9.
Let's say you become so popular at it that you beat out all your competitors and now whenever anybody wants to make $1 comes to you and goes to no one else. So multiply this by the size of your market.
Now you add the condition (or maybe you had it in the first place) that those $9 have to stay with you at least 10 years. Now you're pretty much running a bank (well perhaps a CD is closer in terms of return and style of investment.
That's a real business. It's not just leveraging capital but now you're the only bank out there so you've pretty much got a monopoly going. Now you can change your terms and say instead of giving back a $1 maybe you only give back $0.50 or $0.25. What is everyone else going to do about it since you have so much power in the industry you can crush your competition?
Read more: http://news.cnet.com/THE-DAY-AHEAD-Webvan-revs-IPO-as-questi...
http://news.cnet.com/THE-DAY-AHEAD-Webvan-revs-IPO-as-questi...
"projecting revenue of $11.9 million and a $73.8 million loss"
Lol.
Those of us who were around in the early 2000s recognize this game. Brand new ventures filing for IPOs based on 'amazing potential' and even more amazing valuations.
This is all going to come crashing down soon. The question is whether it happens before or after Bitcoins. :)