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Re:A Look at iMessage in iOS 14 by saagarjha on Friday January 29, 2021 @01:41AM (#25954742)
> Historically, ASLR on Apple’s platforms had one architectural weakness: the shared cache region, containing most of the system libraries in a single prelinked blob, was only randomized per boot, and so would stay at the same address across all processes.

Historically ASLR on Apple’s platforms has had many weaknesses, mostly stemming from poor randomization across many different subsystems :P

What I’m also really curious to know is what the performance implications will be of isa PAC…

Re:A Look at iMessage in iOS 14 by pjmlp on Friday January 29, 2021 @02:14AM (#25954897)
Even if it turns out to be a bit slower, it is the pursuit of speed at the expense of bounds checking that has brought us here, although other ill fated OSes proved that it didn't had to be that way.
Re:A Look at iMessage in iOS 14 by astrange on Friday January 29, 2021 @03:24AM (#25955242)
Exploitations like this are much more complicated than lacking bounds checking; after all most web exploits start by defeating the supposedly memory safe JS interpreter.
Re:A Look at iMessage in iOS 14 by pjmlp on Friday January 29, 2021 @04:01AM (#25955441)
Because they trigger bugs in the underlying engine code written in C and C++.
Re:A Look at iMessage in iOS 14 by astrange on Friday January 29, 2021 @01:00PM (#25960266)
If your JIT interpreter is written in a safe language it can still have memory bugs because it’s generating and executing assembly directly.
Re:A Look at iMessage in iOS 14 by pjmlp on Friday January 29, 2021 @02:23PM (#25961230)
It might, just like the microcode, firmware and hardware design can have such bugs.

Safe languages don't magically make all code impossible to exploit, they just reduce the attack surface to logical errors, instead of having to deal with UB and memory corruption as well.

The same way that helmets and belts don't save people from dying all in all kinds of accidents, yet they surely help reducing the mortality numbers.

I enjoy languages with helmets and belts.

Re:A Look at iMessage in iOS 14 by wizzwizz4 on Friday January 29, 2021 @02:16PM (#25961139)
That sounds like a challenge.
Re:A Look at iMessage in iOS 14 by szc on Friday January 29, 2021 @05:06AM (#25955787)
I am posting this as an independent comment.

There isn't a "popular" CPU architecture that is 100% PIC for all of the allowed address ranges. There are "optimizations" the compiler can choose for limited addresses "reaches". Please consider independently compiled libraries that are aggregated into something larger, specifically languages that permit subclassing and inheritance. How can they be moved within an address space?

If there is a hierarchy of address availability this means that ASLR cannot be implemented in a pure way - it must involve runtime fix-ups if the base address changes. If the length of an instruction must change because of the addressing mode, what happens? How can you do ALSR? Do you rewrite all instructions (is there space? was space allocated?) or always use the most expensive address mode?

Re:A Look at iMessage in iOS 14 by saagarjha on Friday January 29, 2021 @06:19AM (#25956179)
Compilers know how to generate code that is position independent. Apple requires such code on the iPhone. Therefore, all code that runs is slidable using ASLR. Whether you want to call that "the most expensive address mode" or not (it's really not all that expensive) is up to you. (Also, note that arm64 has fixed-length instructions regardless.)
Re:A Look at iMessage in iOS 14 by johncolanduoni on Friday January 29, 2021 @05:59AM (#25956084)
The major architectures & ABIs are all capable of producing and loading fully position independent code. The performance impact varies; for x86_64 and aarch64 instruction pointer relative addressing reduces the number of relocations that are needed by quite a lot.

Languages that support subclassing and inheritance don’t represent any special hazard to relocation; ultimately these are built out of data and function symbols that need to be supported even if you’re only compiling C.

Re:A Look at iMessage in iOS 14 by szc on Friday January 29, 2021 @03:46AM (#25955367)
Slap, slap, slap. I do not think you did a complete or accurate analysis.

Randomization is NOT free. Randomization either requires that the values are pre-computed before install (which means delivering and pre-computing N different versions) or it is computed it on device.

If the randomization is computed on-device how to you validate that the binary or a library has not been "substituted" - persistent malware, APT?

The "compute on device" was a feature of very old macOS versions - it was annoying and took quite a lot of resources.

"TOTAL ASLR" depends on a CPU arch if it fully endorses over all addresses position independent code and data (Q: homework for ARM, x86_64...). If the ABI allows violations of this you cannot glide / slide all code and data addresses without significant runtime costs. This will likely result in a compromise.

Re:A Look at iMessage in iOS 14 by saagarjha on Friday January 29, 2021 @04:00AM (#25955435)
I believe my analysis is both accurate and complete; actually, I would dispute many of the things you mention. "Baking in" randomization into a binary before installing it is rare; on Apple's platforms ASLR is done at runtime. I am well aware that ASLR does not come for free; it requires position-independent code to function and support from the kernel to do randomization (for image base addresses and anonymous mmaps) and a dynamic linker aware of how to apply relocations. On iOS PIE code has been required for many years, and the various OS subsystems are not only aware of ASLR but ensure validity of code signatures regardless of load address. I suspect the expensive process that you are referring to is shared cache prebinding, which was never a thing on iOS AFAIK and is no longer used on macOS either.

To be clear, I am not complaining about a lack of ASLR where it would be prohibitive, such as mapping the shared cache at a different address for every process (which, unless done carefully, would kill the benefits of it being in shared memory as the pages would all be dirtied). I am talking more about various instances where Apple has generally used very poor slides for reasons that aren't all that great, leading to the randomization being easy to break.

Re:A Look at iMessage in iOS 14 by Hackbraten on Friday January 29, 2021 @07:27AM (#25956542)
> mapping the shared cache at a different address for every process (which, unless done carefully, would kill the benefits of it being in shared memory as the pages would all be dirtied)

Assume foo.dylib and bar.dylib are system libraries, both live in the shared cache, and foo links to bar. Both are loaded and mapped to a running user-space process.

If foo links to bar, then there must be a symbol table somewhere in physical memory with an entry that points to bar’s TEXT.

That symbol table is part of the shared cache, right? Doesn’t it already follow that bar’s TEXT needs to be at the same virtual address in every process?

Re:A Look at iMessage in iOS 14 by saagarjha on Friday January 29, 2021 @07:37AM (#25956609)
> That symbol table is part of the shared cache, right? Doesn’t it already follow that bar’s TEXT needs to be at the same virtual address in every process?

Yes, and this is how the shared cache works. If you wish to map the shared cache elsewhere there would have to be another copy of it in memory, which is why this would be a massive pessimization if done without designing for it. Perhaps you might have some idea as to what would need to change to make this not be as bad.

Re:A Look at iMessage in iOS 14 by Hackbraten on Friday January 29, 2021 @06:58PM (#25964498)
Got it, thanks!
Re:A Look at iMessage in iOS 14 by floatboth on Friday January 29, 2021 @09:52AM (#25957797)
> "Baking in" randomization into a binary before installing it is rare

OpenBSD relinks the kernel with new randomization on every boot ("KARL").

Fun stuff, but probably a nightmare to make it work with signature checking :D

Re:A Look at iMessage in iOS 14 by szc on Friday January 29, 2021 @04:29AM (#25955588)
Sorry no. This is not about the main executable - this is a misdirection. The comments you make about the "main binary" are 100% correct. But, they do not address my comment at all.

My comments were entirely about the shared cache region and how it can be moved.

I again ask you to do the homework - please calculate how it could be done better given the address spaces involved. Address spaces going from 32bit to 64bit have gotten better, but this does need to be kept into consideration given the size of the object involved and the API / CPU instructions available (please, I ask you to consider all of the addressing modes available to the ABI for all of the currently supported platforms)

[added]

It is likely the individual objects that compose the share cache region are compiled independently. There are lots of individual objects! Resolving the dependencies of the composite shared object are likely expensive.

Historically I observe that the contextual data available to a static or dynamic linker has been very constrained, which makes relinking / reallocation objects a challenge.

Re:A Look at iMessage in iOS 14 by saagarjha on Friday January 29, 2021 @06:32AM (#25956241)
Please assume good faith–I am familiar with how the shared cache works and my comments apply equally to either the main executable or the shared cache. My point is that the shared cache is not very well randomized at all–for its size, the region it has to slide around in is fairly small. From the original blog post detailing the ASLR break (https://googleprojectzero.blogspot.com/2020/01/remote-iphone...) the number of probes required to find the mapping is quite small, purely because it can only be located within a single 4 GB region for whatever reason. On a system with terabytes of virtual address space, this is a strange choice.

Oh, and because you mentioned it: yes, the shared cache has many objects in it. The process of making it is fairly involved, especially since many optimizations go into it (string deduplication, perfect hashing for Objective-C runtime metadata, shortening intra-cache procedure calls, …) But this is all done once when it is built by Apple's B&I, so it's not a problem on-device.

Re:A Look at iMessage in iOS 14 by szc on Friday January 29, 2021 @04:45PM (#25963062)
Sorry, I got animated and committed the faux-pas of familiarity. I forgot that this medium is not the same as a lively discussion between people who "know" each other - I see lots of your posts and the thoughts and depths of your knowledge.

There has to be some reason.

Re:A Look at iMessage in iOS 14 by saagarjha on Saturday January 30, 2021 @08:09PM (#25974721)
I really have no issue with assuming familiarity, the part I was concerned about was you calling my comments a "misdirection" when it was not my intention to be misleading.

And, I am sure there is a reason, I just have not seen anything that indicates anything good enough that it is worth drastically reducing the quality of the ASLR they provide.

Re:A Look at iMessage in iOS 14 by joosters on Friday January 29, 2021 @05:53AM (#25956047)
Stop setting homework questions in your posts, please. If you have something relevant to say, why not say it yourself instead of roleplaying a teacher delivering work to your students.
Re:A Look at iMessage in iOS 14 by szc on Friday January 29, 2021 @04:51PM (#25963139)
You are right, it is rude, sorry. Will do better.