Imagine I give you a dictionary purporting to contain descriptions of the referents of the following words: (I assume you know what a sprint is, but not a bilparyoti or a zambungar)
* sprint - to run at a rapid pace for a short distance
* bilparyoti - a kind of bright blue butterfly, found in Congo-Brazzaville
* zambungar - a muddy colour, specifically that created when a landslide enters a clear river
Now, based on knowing that 'sprint' is 'correct', what is your probability, posterior to being supplied the dictionary, that you know what a 'bilparyoti' references?
Now, imagine that I tell you that the 'bilparyoti' is wrong and you are able to be convinced that the 'bilparyoti' is wrong. Is your prior for the accuracy of the 'zambungar' reference the same as the posterior after being supplied the information about the 'bilparyoti'?
Matticus, there, presumably laments the fact that the zambungar accuracy probability has not moved. Rationally it should move towards zero. By varying amounts, certainly, but towards zero. With his friends, P(zambungar_correct | bilparyoti_wrong) = P(zambungar_correct|bilparyoti_unknown), truly a situation worthy of wailing and gnashing of teeth.
Granted. But OP seems to be at the other extreme which is equally problematic:
> Everyone reads a book, everyone but me likes it.
That strongly implies a boolean value judgment to me.
Sometimes books about magical properties of crystals get their geology right. Sometimes they get it wrong.
If I apply your superficial filter I essentially give up my ability to convey the difference to your friends.
If I ignore your filter and pay attention to the entirety of each book, it's trivial for me to help them separate wheat from chaff. (Or at least chaffy-wheat from pure chaff.)