As someone who's severely sleep-deprived, can you please share more / share a source? Thanks in advance
Could one of the effects of massage be something similar?
If you are too impaired to exercise, massage, warm salt-water baths and eating/drinking the right things to help flush wastes from the system can help compensate for the lack of exercise.
https://www.npr.org/sections/health-shots/2013/10/18/2362118...
If you want more info than that, it's easy to google this question and come up with other articles.
>Our analysis showed that norepinephrine also is a key regulator of glymphatic activity and that norepinephrine might be responsible for suppression of glymphatic during wakefulness. [1]https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4636982/
I suspect it would feel something like daydreaming or regular dreaming, or experiencing a serious mental disorder.[1][2]
[1]https://www.medicalnewstoday.com/articles/319846#The-seat-of...
[2]https://www.mdlinx.com/article/what-are-lucid-dreams-and-are...
https://www.audubon.org/news/scientists-finally-have-evidenc...
In some old Western movie -- as in The Wild West with cowboys -- there was a Samurai character who claimed to sleep while they marched somewhere.
I have no idea how to look up a citation supporting the idea that this was a real phenomenon, but I did find this article that I kind of skimmed and I don't think it says anything on the topic I want a citation for and additional googling gets me absolutely nothing of value:
https://www.bbc.com/future/article/20160506-the-japanese-art...
I won't swear that I was "truly" asleep, but I have no memory of the last three miles of that run, nor of climbing into the fartsack.
sift/scan/alert/invade
I always find it interesting how much agency we assign these systems when we describe them. Listen to some of the descriptions of our genetic machinery, you’ll hear the same thing. I understand much of it is to help the audience understand, but even when you dive deep into a topic it doesn’t seem to go away entirely.
Agency language is strongly tied to our ability to understand the mechanism by which phenomena occurred. For example, take 4 different chess bots:
1. The bot moves in a 100% predictable way to you (say it checks each piece in order to find a possible move, the first it finds that's legal it moves)
2. The bot moves randomly
3. The bot uses minimax + library (traditional chess engine)
4. The bot is running via reinforcement learning
When we discuss the moves the bot made, in which of the above scenarios would we say it 'chose' to move in a particular way? These different examples call out different forms of 'agency'. In cases 3 and 4 (maybe even 2?) most people - including the creator of the bot - would say the bot chose to move pawn to c4.
As effect gets sufficiently far removed from cause it's natural to ascribe agency to the mechanism. In a very real sense in case 4 the creator designed the bot but has no idea why it moves in certain ways - they can analyze the weights of course - but why did it 'choose' those weights over others during training? If we knew that we wouldn't need the costly training in the first place.
So back to your distaste of agency language when describing a phenomena. We're talking about _incredibly_ complex machinery. There is no guarantee that these mechanisms are a 1. or even a 3. type bot. They could be a 5. or 6. (whatever that even means). Thus even if we knew _everything_ about the last order mechanism, we would still ascribe agency to the effect.
Sorry rereading my note I can see why this seemed like a critique. I really mean 'interesting' in its standard denotation.
It's very hard for us to find any other kind of explanation intuitive.
We are perfectly fine abstracting high-order things that have nothing to do with apes, and using those terms and abstractions IF they are useful. We are also perfectly fine to not bother with it if existing terms offer the best possible utility.
So no, our basic assumption is not that everything is an ape.
I'm not sure where this fascination with undermining the great intellectual feats human brains are capable of is coming from?
I think it is, exactly, a feat of the imagination to arrive an an explanation which does not require this premise.
But it is not our default presumption. Hence 100,000 years of superstition, and 500 years of rare scientific moments.
Concepts seeming abstract, is in some sense, a bit of an illusion. Concepts are, in my view, always psychomotor. They succeed in "abstracting" from our bodies, sure, by metaphor. But the genealogy of that metaphor is the psychomotor system of an ape.
Consider your words: injection, drop, beat, oscillate... these are about how our bodies behave in (with, towards) our environment; and become "abstracted".
I think there is something quite fundamentally apeish when we think of a song dropping a beat, in the sense that our relatedness to the song is actually facilitated by an apeish psychomotor state of "dropping something".
Yes, we can reduce our engagement with some phenomenon to a purely cognitive model (pieces and their relations); but that is very hard, and typically is only useful is narrowly solving known problems.
Innovation (, creativity, etc.), including the scientific, relies quite heavily on our being able to impart to alien things some intuitive apishness which we then, at best, abstract away.
Many of course cannot perform this final abstraction. Which is why we speak of "The Economy" and other such apelike characters of the imagination.
our terms and thinking is based on abstraction, a certain feat of processing information. Other earlier Great Apes and even other animals are simply less able to implement this abstraction, and because of this they only use the abstraction for computation of their simple lives like motor skills or "psychomotor states". Since we have more brainpower, we are able to implement a higher percentage of abstractability.
Thus, the core aspect is the program of "abstractability" (or it would be more common to use the word consciousness or awareness). We implement it to a higher degree than other apes, but since we both implement parts of it, of course we are going to share some aspects of it in our lives.
> Concepts are, in my view, always psychomotor
Even this seems much more accurate to view the other way around: both psychomotor skills and concepts require computation and abstractability. Concepts are always based on abstraction. But psychomotor skills are also based on abstraction.
And again, what does "political correctness" have to do with a psychomotor engine of an ape that can jump between trees, hold a balance and throw things at a distance? You would need to use some serious imagination to convince people that the most occam's razored hypothesis of that concept is based primarily(!) on mechanical skills?
But I guess hey, we won't know for sure until we make AGI so who knows ;)
eg., there is a level of abstraction at which an ape "alerting" another ape is the same as an chemical "alerting" a cell
My point is that these things are only equivalent to these abstractions in a very narrow kind of activity (cognition).
A concept in the brain-body of an ape is a means for coordinating itself with respect to its environment: coordinating its eye, its hand, and latterly, its mind (, emotions, thought patterns, etc.). (NB. political correctness is here just a regulation on how we socially coordinate).
That's just what we use concepts for.
They also play a purely cognitive role in the sense that "circle" is both a guide to the motion of my hand in drawing a circle, and also a "Form" to which cognition can be purely and abstractly directed (ie., a shape with various properties...).
But this cognitive role is derivative of their non-cognitive origins in, quite literally, structuring the meat of our bodies. It is this structuring process which is how we "conceptualise" the world.
A dog is replete with many concepts; it is the dumb cognitive illusion of apes lacking self-awareness to think their linguistic cognition is where "concepts" lie. This is a cognitive shadow of how every animal navigates its environment.
Your "AGI" remark indicates to me that you may take this cognitive view. I think this is the consequence of a mathematical discipline (computer science) being "let into the room" -- it should be thrown back out.
Mathematics hasn't much to say about intelligence. The dumb walnut we call a frontal lobe possesses no models of how it actually works, and only the shadow of concepts it calls "abstractions". It is a delusional Cartesian place with little to offer self-understanding.
Everything important for the development of intelligence, etc. will come from the non-cognitive (, bodily) aspects of mental function which will require building animals. Cognitive ai systems cannot conceptualise, they only automate the walnut.
Also you constant usage of the word "dumb" or "delusional" confuses, it looks like you apply some personal judgements onto parts of the discussion where it has no reasonable place to be.
So far it seems that you are trying to make the point "This is a cognitive shadow of how every animal navigates its environment.". This interpretation seems to me like an attempt by you to fit the data into this non-fitting notion that everything is based on psychomotor processing, because your mind is in love with this idea. And it's a beautiful idea, I agree. But I don't think it's the most truthful one in this space.
> (NB. political correctness is here just a regulation on how we socially coordinate).
The question was, how specifically is it rooted in motor cortex or psychomotor functions? To explain that you will likely have to widen the definition of "psychomotor" to such an extent that it would lose all its useful meaning. Which is exactly one of the signs, for me personally, that your theory is only making very limited sense with regards to everything we know about brains and minds and behavior of consciousness. That it's a beautiful theory that unfortunately too thin to fit the real world in it.
You touched on an interesting thing regarding AGI. In the purely practical sense, I see that a lot of people have taken this apparent rule(or a "universal truth") of making an AGI that says "a mind requires a body to even function or be able to be aware"-thing. People think it means actual bodies. In reality they can very likely be implemented as virtual bodies or just address spaces that can interact with their environment in an adressable way. Thus, a "body" is just a part of the AGI, a computation structured in a certain way to make sure the rest of it works properly. Like a generator in a GAN network.
In very simple terms, the machines' bodies can be just avatars in some video game, it would be enough to satisfy the requirement of the aforementioned rule, if game connects all the inputs in the correct way.
And I dont mean your intellect. I mean the thing we call "reasoning" towards which we can draw our awareness.
This is in some profound way, quite dumb. It seems smart for all sorts of reasons: in particular, it is furnished with concepts that have taken millions of years of cultural evolution to develop.
An ape, such as us, absent this cultural context would seem precisely as dumb as it really is: very dumb indeed.
We misattribute our reasoning with these concepts for their inherent intelligence. This intelligence, which we might call conceptualization, is not a congitive process. The real intelligence is animal intelligence, it's the bedrock of our cognition which is always outside of it; and cannot be observed from within.
> Thus, a "body" is just a part of the AGI,
Not at all. A body is just the place the world changes. It's the thing in direct causal contact with the world; whose effect is a kind of painful restructuring. eg., the bike rider learns to ride a bike not by "evolving his cognition", but by the structure of his muscles changing.
(Indeed, by his eye swirling differently in its socket).
It is this restructuring which is an essential aspect of conceptualization (whose effect we see in consciousness).
I strongly suspect that this kind of restructuring is necessarily organic: it is growing differently given the impact of the world. I am open to other systems which can evolve their physical structure in this way, certainly, i do not think sand qualifies.
re Political Correctness
Correctness = straightness, fit Fit = environment-body "matching"
Political = other bodies wanting from me, my wanting from them
political correctness = criteria for the fit of my body with other bodies as we want from each other
In being a criteria it is a "concept about a concept" and therefore its heavily on the psych-side of psychomotor, ie., it is a kind of regulating mechanism on reasoning (specifically, reasoning about my fit in an environment of people).
I can only partially see what you mean exactly by "cognitive" or "animal" (with regards to intelligence), it doesn't seem like you use the words in their precisely common meanings.
I also never claimed that intelligence is in its base cognitive.
The original claim was that all of the intelligence is based in "ape-ish" motor skills, that it's basically their motor cortex that is just a little more advanced that gives rise to all the behaviors that we call intelligent.
This idea would basically mean that a task such as writing and publicizing a great book such as Shakespeare's Hamlet (including accumulating all the life experience required to produce it, and make it being so good) - is "basically a motor skills task".
This just doesn't make a lot of sense to me.
While it does of course require motor skills like taking a pen and putting the words to the paper, it requires a lot more other complex skills as well that have so little to do with motor intelligence that I don't see any honest reason to put them in the same category.
Thus, my comment that your theory requires expanding the concept of "psychomotor" to such extent that the word loses all of its useful meaning.
> political correctness = criteria for the fit of my body with other bodies as we want from each other
It's just not a good explanation, it loses 90% of all of the intricacies. Try using it to explain it to someone who doesn't know what political correctness is- it doesn't do the job.
I just mean any system of inference over propositions, or anything which looks like it .
We are told our frontal lobe is the most unique aspect of our brains: not true! Our motor cortex is.
We are the only animal which learns almost all skills after-birth, via our significant and adaptable motor cortex.
> Try using it to explain it to someone
Yes, concepts need to be converted/reduced to propositional (and then linguistic) forms in order to be cognized and then to be communicated.
You can't really acquire a novel basic concept via communication, but you can acquire metaconcepts (like criteria for things) which are just combinations of basic concepts you have already learnt (ie., motor concepts).
I'm not saying that there is no propositional content to concepts, ie., that they fail in being instances of some abstract Form.
I am saying, rather, what they are; and how we acquire them.
I have significant doubts that the world can be conceptualised by mere cognition, ie., that the contents of an inferential process can be arrived at via an inferential process.
I think this is an illusion: and it is apparent with machines. There is no mechanism for their understanding what they are processing.
We aren't aware, i'd say, at all, of how we actually conceptualise the world. All we're aware of, as far as our intelligence goes, is inference(/cognition). (Though many greats have attributed mysterious immediate insights to the divine: rather it is just their actual intelligence).
I think that sets us up for a highly misleading paradigm of intelligence (cf. Cartesian dualism, etc. )
If you insist on being on some imaginary laplace daemon lowest level of interaction with the world, maybe theoretically you could escape the agency component (but even then you have problems with questions like "what makes all particles interact with each other at all"), but nobody lives on that level anyway. Just because in some distant theory it is possible to reduce everything to interaction of some miriad of particles with exactly known states and rules, it doesn't mean that you (or other human or society) can effictively and practically compute anything of value on that level of abstraction. Nobody interacts with life on that level. No useful discussions are had on that level in most of the scientific pursuits.
This is a matter of using the language effectively, not a matter of superstition. I don't see scientists cargo culting the immune system or organs of the body.
Think about it like this: if I'm programming in Python, I'm going to think about variables, scopes and closures, not about high and low voltage levels or number of silicon atoms in my processor. A closure is not an illusion just because there is no transistor that specifically makes it work, a closure is still the most useful term on it's own level of abstraction.
(Recommended reading: Gödel, Escher, Bach: an Eternal Golden Braid, also known as GEB, a 1979 book by Douglas Hofstadter)
No problem at all. Re-reading it there was much more snark than I intended (which was 0)
For me, a layman, it had some convincing arguments, at least in abstract.
[1] - https://aeon.co/essays/how-to-understand-cells-tissues-and-o...
Something medical texts tend to not spell out:
Lymph is more or less blood, minus certain blood parts (like red blood cells). And when it gets into the tissues it gets called interstitial fluid.
This is all the same fluid circulating through the body, with different elements added or removed in different contexts. It's really quite elegant and you can think of it sort of like the water cycle. (https://water.usgs.gov/edu/watercycle-kids-adv.html)
Interstitial fluid would be sort of like groundwater. And like groundwater, it gets into the tissues via seepage.
The circulatory system would be kind of like rivers and streams.
So part of this fluid cycle is controlled by the pump action of the heart. When it is in your blood vessels (and I think also when it is in the lymphatic system), the heart pumps it, driving the circulation.
When it is out in the tissues, it is beyond the reach of the heart. And this is where things get really fascinating.
It is driven back to the circulatory system via two different methods, depending on where it is. The brain has a separate system from the rest of the body.
In the brain, the glymphatic system flushes fluids from the tissues while you sleep. This is a primary function of sleep and flushing these fluids out is how the body "takes out the trash," which is likely why sleep deprivation is increasingly shown as associated with both the build-up of certain proteins in the brain and, ultimately, certain brain disorders.
In other tissues, muscle action drives the fluid back to the circulatory system. (Remember, the heart is just a big muscle. So this makes perfect sense.) So exercise dramatically increases the rate at which interstitial fluid gets returned to the circulatory system.
This means that one of the functions of exercise is "taking out the trash." And this is likely a huge and overlooked factor in why exercise is so beneficial to your health.
Different sources cite different rates, but exercise may increase the outflow by as much as eight times the normal speed of outflow via seepage. It's really a big difference.
If you have any health issues, understanding this human internal "water cycle" is something I highly recommend as enormously helpful. I sometimes take a walk to help myself feel better and I know that at least part of why that sometimes helps is it clears waste products from my tissues by pumping up the volume -- literally -- on the body taking out the trash.
I think that's everything I wanted to say.