If it was its designed goal, it would've also included provisions to provide proofs anonymously, and reduce physical traceability.
I very much see some cryptocurrencies tried, and some are moderately successful with it, but none have progressed much on the former other than by using crypto signing by some centralised, or semi-decentralised entity which processes the ledger, or does proof of work. So, none of the popular cryptocurrencies have achieved a true "non-chain" way of working, which does not rely on a continuous record of the global state of the ledger.
The cryptographic trust in such mechanism would be much less than in a non-anonymous ledger, where the state of all wallets is recorded for everybody to see, and check for signs of something weird.
1. Houses are meant for you to live in. Not super contentious I wager.
2. Trustless and decentralized means you can transfer value without the permission of a centralized authority. I believe that's frequently touted.
3. Money laundering is transferring money without the permission of a centralized authority with the intent to conceal the original source of funds.
That's the wrong part, even if it was just hyperbole for literary effect then you are conflating legal terms you don't really understand then. Money laundering is a legal term that requires an illicit origin, not merely circumventing the permission of a centralized authority. You were correct that it is designed to ignore the concept of centralized authorities, the rest was either a completely incorrect extrapolation of that, or hyperbole that did not give the effect you thought it did as it just undermines your point and the strength of your argument.
> Money laundering is a legal term that requires an illicit origin.
I'm not 100% sure if it requires both an illicit source and intent to conceal or not. It might, but it sounds like we both have half the definition.
For instance, structuring -- breaking apart large transactions into smaller ones to avoid a currency transaction report -- is illegal regardless of whether the source of funds is criminal or not.
[1] https://www.wired.com/story/was-bitcoin-created-by-this-inte...
Okay. And that's partially why I'm open to the idea of the government ceasing to use public resources on whitelisting all transactions, instead of debating you over whether something is or isn't money laundering.
Structuring is a different crime than money laundering, which is actually another exhibit on why I want the government to cease using bothering using public money and resources on whitelisting all transactions. I read enough court cases on Google Scholar about paranoid people doing legal things convicted for only structuring on Google Scholar to make this opinion, and this was before HSBC got a slap on the wrist for literally accepting cash deposits from the literal cartel and getting caught, undermining the whole point of whitelisting transactions to begin with.
I assume you mean according to USC (ie USA law), could you cite which section please?
https://www.justice.gov/archives/jm/criminal-resource-manual...
and pretty much trying to avoid any monetary reporting threshold is a criminal charge whether you intended to or not.
so this one is funny because almost every fairly poor person I know, the kind of people that would rarely have over $10,000 at once ever, are the exact people that would harbor some belief about doing X, Y and Z to "avoid transferring over $10,000"
believe it or not, jail, right away.
Thinking about workarounds, of course carrying money over the border is limited to $10k too, but this was amusing (in a 'I can't believe they were that petty' sort of way):
>"There was also a case in Canada in 2013 where fluctuating exchange rates caused a man to have his funds seized. In this situation, the man carefully calculated and was carrying just under $10,000 CAD. However, by the time he reached the airport two days later, the exchange rate tipped his combination of USD and CAD dollars to over $10,000 CAD. Sniffer dogs detected the undeclared cash and the CBSA seized the total amount from him." (from https://clearitusa.com/u-s-customs-cash-limit/)
and carrying a cheque that's signed counts as carrying >$10k. So, I wonder about carrying a Bitcoin wallet?
In reality, like with cryptocurrency, trying to attribute intention where you only see an effect is just manipulative.
Or maybe that's intentional.
That is simply false. Virtually every cryptocurrency is 100% traceable.
Yes, there are a few cryptocurrencies for whom untraceability is a design goal. Obviously this does not include Bitcoin (which is the subject of this thread), and in general it doesn't include the vast majority of cryptocurrencies.
One single counter-example of someone who failed to take necessary precautions when committing a crime doesn't mean the tens of thousands of people you never heard of haven't been very successful.
Maintaining proper opsec for any significant length of time is extremely difficult, nigh impossible. Almost everyone will fail at some point. With pseudonymity, a single failure ever means everything is lost. With anonymity, only that single failure is lost.
.init: generate a new wallet and return its public key, the public key of another wallet (probably one per service for obvious reasons) with at least a DIME to mix and a opaque token identifying (only to you) the pair.
.fini: given a token from .init and a transaction that adds up multiple source UTXOs and sends 1 DIME to each of a (sorted) list of wallets that includes the .init-generated wallet, sign that transaction with your source wallet.
.link: given a DIME size in BTC and a (.onion) URL implementing this interface at that size, add it to a internal list.
.list: given a DIME size, return (possibly a random subset of) the list from .link for that size.
For best results you'd need to formalize this interface a bit more and popularize it for better entropy and better plausibility of "well, I guess someone else thought this was a good idea to imitate". Speccing a client to interact with such services (feeding data from .list back into .link and collecting keys from .init to build transactions for .fini) is left as a excersize for the reader.
The key point is that you have disposable pseudonyms that will mix their coins with anyone who offers a valid mixing transaction. Assuming there is demand for mixing from anyone other than you (if there's not, you can't really do anything anyway), this captures that demand in order to satisfy your own mixing needs, while also allowing others to bootstrap the exact same trick by adding their own backends via .link.
There's QOS and anti-DOS issues to be solved, but it's definitely something that in principle can work.
And suddenly, it becomes a SPOF for those people.
You probably have some good points to make, but saying something like this is just willfully not engaging in communication with the other side of the argument. That is an egregious strawman which obscures whatever valid points you actually have.
No it's designed to eliminate debasement and inflation
Cryptocurrency is designed specifically, by virtue of its decentralized and trustless nature, to facilitate money laundering. It was a design goal. This is what it's for. That and of course, collecting the proceeds of ransomware. Another way of describing 'money laundering' is transferring value, without the permission of a centralized government authority, with the intent to conceal the source of funds (hey it's your money right?).
That it has yet to achieve the same scale is not relevant.
All sorts of illegal activities aren't done at scale, that doesn't mean they shouldn't be policed. Otherwise you'll be pointing to the small scale right up until the moment it's not small anymore, and then it's too late.