a futile game of whack-a-mole that only serves to make politicians feel good, and so they can claim they're "doing something" about social threats.
malware domains can be adequately addressed at the application level through things such as: https://www.google.com/search?channel=fs&client=ubuntu&q=goo...
Authoritarian regime that forces all ISPs in a country to run networks funnelling all traffic through a government run central point where they do DPI and flow analysis on it (Chinese GFW for instance)? More of a real threat.
For instance there is one ASN in Iran that has transit connections to the outside world. All ISPs are forced to be downstream of it. https://bgp.he.net/AS12880
Agreed, the UK's DNS filtering is definitely a simple to defeat by anybody whack-a-mole (e.g. thepiratebay.org is blocked? Oh no! Let's just google for Pirate Bay and pick one of the many, many unblocked mirrors)
But the kind of DPI, forced blocking utilised by these middleboxes is certainly a step above that, to the point that most people will not be (say) using measures like a VPN to bypass the block.
0: eg, China, Iran, etc; if you don't think people getting caught is a problem then I question your basic human decency; if you don't think 5% of people getting caught is a problem then I question your sense of scale and/or ability to multiply numbers by other numbers.
There is no way - not even a theoretical way - to allow blocking of illegal content (for any definition of illegal) that won't allow for blocking of any other arbitrary content. Censorship is binary. You can accept either none of it, or all of it.
So if you say censorship is binary, it's already here, and has been here for ever. But I would guess that few believe that censorship is truly binary like you say.
You can't often choose your ISP so this makes it extra important for censorship of any kind of to be opt in rather than forced.
I think I just got everyone to take a step down the slippery slope.
Hi! Counterexample here!
Well, there is: take the person or body that ultimately determines whether content is illegal, and have them review each request and proposed response and decide whether to allow the content through to the requester.
For slightly better scalability, have that body review all content outside of any request-response cycle before it can be published and sign any approved content, then block any content they haven’t signed.
Somewhat more generally, as long as the specific blocking methodology is itself part of the definition of what content is legal, any blocking method can meet the standard of “allows blocking illegal content without allowing blocking of other content”, since any content blocked by the method is, ipso facto, illegal.
There are also civil and criminal liability concerns at the corporate level by assuming the responsibility for constructing and/or maintaining these filters.
So now your company has got a content blocker installed. What exactly are your network engineers meant to do now? Demand personal refusal over any additions to the sites that these boxes will block? That seems highly unlikely to happen, and how could that even work in practice? Are all the engineers meant to vote on blocks, and only those unopposed sites get added to the list?
Can ethical network engineers usefully oppose content blocking?