The Dark Forest attack is possible because everyone can see all the notes on the board waiting to be processed, and everyone can simulate exactly, precisely what the really slow computer will do with a given note.
Suppose you found someone wanting to sell TSLA stock for $5 and someone wanting to buy it for $400. You would write up a note to buy it for $5 and sell it for $400, and stick it on the board. However, the moment you put the note on the board, the attackers and their automated telescopes have simulated that this note results in the holder having $395 more than they started with, and gave nothing away in return. The attacker then simulates an alternate future in which they post the note instead, and verify that they get the money. It works! So the attacker copies your note, signs it themselves, puts a much bigger wad of cash on it than you did, and slaps it up on the board.
When the operators come out, they collect the attackers note first (more cash) and by the time your note is run, the opportunity is no longer there.
Having spent much of my professional life designing and building trading systems, and despite the problems with current blockchains, I’m convinced there’s something here and blockchain technology can massively improve finance in a number of areas (cost, pace of innovation and openness/fairness of access being the big ones). What we’re looking at now on Ethereum and other platforms is a set of early experiments, and some weird (and often unsavoury) artefacts of the fact that technical research and experiments are intertwined with, and creating, financial assets and economic systems.
At my company, we’re working on the hard problems required to do this properly, and one particular area of research that we’ve contributed is a “fairness” protocol that can be added to the consensus layer of decentralised systems to provide a better alternative to ordering by fee for financial trading and that would prevent this sort of issue. We’ve published a paper describing this research at [1] if you’re interested, and a more accessible talk by the author, Klaus Kursawe, on the topic can be found at [2].
Disclaimer: my company is building a decentralised trading protocol for serious, professional use cases, and the linked research is part of our effort to achieve this mission.
no one is responsible, that's the whole point. The thing runs by itself and game theory keeps it afloat - not a group of people. Else it's just like a company.
That said, the protocol isn't finished and you have people involved in maintaining and upgrading the protocol. Which is in no way forced down upon everyone: once they have an update everyone is free to choose to run it or not.
These people have influence (you could argue too much) about the future of the protocol.
> if your arbitrage trade takes away too much money from an account belong the core devs
This is not why these decisions were made at all, because some core dev instested in the DAO.
The decision-making and communities of Ethereum (this goes both for the clients, the blockchain, the foundation and the larger community) looks completely different today compared to 2015. There has been a lot of lessons learnt, debate and churn since.
If they same thing happened today, it'd play out completely differently.
See the Parity Multisig hack, for one.
Finally, it's a stretch to call the dao hack "arbitrage trade".
It is absolutely not. It is exactly the same from the value judgments of the ETH project, specifically "Code is Law". The DAO specifically went as far as endorsing that the software execution takes precedence over the reading of the English functionality spec.
The ETH system, but the core values of ETH, should do exactly what your arb contract specifies, and exactly what the DAO contracts specify, even and especially if that's not what the writer originally intended. To selectively reneg on that principle would be wrong for the same reason as doing it on an arb contract.
> the simultaneous purchase and sale of the same securities, commodities, or foreign exchange in different markets to profit from unequal prices.
What’s being bought and sold? Who’s the counterparty?
I’m not arguing right and wrong, just that you can’t call any permissionless extraction of value from a contract “arbitrage trade”.
And again, incorrectly assuming that 1) it somehow sets a precedent 2) the people making the decision then are the same that would be making it today 3) the overlapping people would make the same decision today as then 4) the EF and core devs have a strong authority on these matters
There’s always ETC if you want to stay on the timeline where the DAO hack executed as specified without being overridden. No one forced anyone to fork.
Note that a marketplace contract like this isn't the only kind of smart contract; it's not the case that all smart contracts have the potential for front-running vulnerabilities. For example, there are smart contracts that do things like manage community funds and require people to vote on how the funds are spent, which don't do anything that could be vulnerable to front-running.
What the bot does is that it checks each transaction that is waiting to be executed and simulates sending that transaction itself on a private blockchain forked from the real network. If the simulation results in a profit, it frontruns that transaction -- i.e., it sends the transaction itself for real, but bidding a higher price than the original sender did, so that its transaction will get executed rather than the the original transaction it's copying.
It doesn't need to perform any sort of vulnerability scan; it just mimics other people exploiting arbitrage or vulnerabilities and pays more to get there first.
Similarly, it doesn't need to adjust any destination addresses. It's just looking for arbitrage opportunities or vulnerabilities that will direct ether to the sender. Smart contracts are entirely capable of getting the address of the message sender, and using that as a destination to send ether to. So the bot doesn't need to adjust the transaction data at all, which would be substantially more complicated.
One day you go to get it so you load up your pickup with gold digging equipment and drive to the ranch. On the way are spotters. They see your truck has gold digging equipment. They see that the road you're going down leads to the ranch. It's obvious what you're going to do.
They load up their faster Ford Ranger and blaze down the road. You can't catch up. They have a faster car. You get there. They have taken your gold.
If you hadn't gone there, the gold was relatively safe. Maybe some day someone happens on it but realistically probably not.
But you went. By looking for it you revealed you were looking and you revealed where you were looking.
You can't take advantage of a "normal" cryptocurrency transaction this way because the "normal" transaction is like a super-minimal smart contract that's designed to pay only one hard-coded recipient. Therefore, that transaction either happens or doesn't happen, but its recipient can't be altered. Nor can you take advantage of a non-vulnerable smart contract this way, because the non-vulnerable smart contract can't be triggered to perform an action that its creators would consider inappropriate. But for a vulnerable smart contract, there's a series of events that would cause it to send value to an arbitrary address (and not in exchange for some other adequate compensatory value). It's this case where the front-runners want to find a way to swap in their own addresses for these transactions, and that's also why obfuscation could deter that -- making it hard for the front-runners to notice that that was possible.
If anyone could just replace an address and execute a profitable transaction by being first on existing contracts, surely miners would be doing it already, no?
To a large degree not yet.
Thus, you have white hats racing to siphon money out of a buggy, immutable contract which also happens to be worth millions of real dollars. It'd be funny if there wasn't so much real money involved.
My understanding: