This sounds like a 32-bit TXID exhaustion bug in a Postgres database, which is a notorious and very difficult to recover from problem in live systems. It is probably the #1 arcane Postgres cataclysm. It would be consistent with how this is a "single coding error" (i.e., the call to VACUUM), additionally why it was so difficult to recover from ad-hoc. I'm generously assuming that everything else went well, that people who are building 911 systems aspire to do a really good job, and that it didn't fail anyone how important their work was.
Which is funny, I mean what if Postgres "failed" for every TXID exhaustion cataclysm it had. Arguably the best database product in the world "failed" because of this. It probably provides more than a few billion dollars to our tech economy, on top of being the hub for research in databases - research whose goal is the same as the one as this paper, to use automation to reduce bureaucracy and improve society.
Anyway we always imagine these rinky-dink consultant shops as writing all this custom stuff, and in actuality they are almost always combining a bunch open source and off the shelf things - which I would like to not see fail.
Besides the well known Y2K mitigation, there were some problems on day 10,000 when four characters to represent days since the epoch overflowed, mid 90s for Unix derived systems and I believe VMS as well. None were civilization threatening.
We also had Second One Billion in early 2000s. Also no public catastrophes.
Next big one is 2038, when 32-bit Unix timekeeping overflows.
Thanks for the reminder! We had a small fun party to celebrate!
Go figure.
Not only failed projects can prevent bureaucratic complexity, they can also save lives
> automated system assigns a unique identifying code to each incoming call before passing it on — a method of keeping track of phone calls as they move through the system. But on April 9, the software responsible for assigning the codes maxed out at a pre-set limit; the counter literally stopped counting at 40 million calls. As a result, the routing system stopped accepting new calls, leading to a bottleneck and a series of cascading failures elsewhere in the 911 infrastructure.
Had that automated system failed at the development phase...
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-switch/wp/2014/10/20...