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Re:Metcalf Sniper Attack by areoform on Saturday August 29, 2020 @06:07PM (#24319756)
The reason why the Intelligence Community freaked out is because this is exactly the kind of small-scale test they'd do to test a possible attack pattern. https://foreignpolicy.com/2013/12/27/military-style-raid-on-...

The people spooked here are spooks. And that should be telling for those of us on the outside. It's an attack scenario no one had planned for.

I would highly recommend this article by Michael Lewis (and his book) that explores related systemic risk, https://www.vanityfair.com/news/2017/07/department-of-energy...

> The safety of the electrical grid sat at or near the top of the list of concerns of everyone I spoke with inside the D.O.E. Life in America has become, increasingly, reliant on it. “Food and water has become food and water and electricity,” as one D.O.E. career staffer put it. Back in 2013 there had been an incident in California that got everyone’s attention. Late one night, just southeast of San Jose, at Pacific Gas and Electric’s Metcalf substation, a well-informed sniper, using a .30-caliber rifle, had taken out 17 transformers. Someone had also cut the cables that enabled communication to and from the substation. “They knew exactly what lines to cut,” said Tarak Shah, who studied the incident for the D.O.E. “They knew exactly where to shoot. They knew exactly which manhole covers were relevant—where the communication lines were. These were feeder stations to Apple and Google.” There had been enough backup power in the area that no one noticed the outage, and the incident came and went quickly from the news. But, Shah said, “for us it was a wake-up call.” In 2016 the D.O.E. counted half a million cyber-intrusions into various parts of the U.S. electrical grid. “It’s one thing to put your head in the sand for climate change—it’s like mañana,” says Ali Zaidi, who served in the White House as Obama’s senior adviser on energy policy. “This is here and now. We actually don’t have a transformer reserve. They’re like these million-dollar things. Seventeen transformers getting shot up in California is not like, Oh, we’ll just fix the problem. Our electric-grid assets are growingly vulnerable.”

> In his briefings on the electrical grid MacWilliams made a specific point and a more general one. The specific point was that we don’t actually have a national grid. Our electricity is supplied by a patchwork of not terribly innovative or imaginatively managed regional utilities. The federal government offers the only hope of a coordinated, intelligent response to threats to the system: there is no private-sector mechanism. To that end the D.O.E. had begun to gather the executives of the utility companies, to educate them about the threats they face. “They all sort of said, ‘But is this really real?’ ” said MacWilliams. “You get them security clearance for a day and tell them about the attacks and all of a sudden you see their eyes go really wide.”

Edit

Personal Interpretation: Someone hired highly trained mercenaries (?) to operate on US soil to test destroying critical infrastructure that led directly to Apple + Google. Large, stationary, expensive infrastructure that is lacking in redundancy.

They knew exactly what targets to hit. It follows that they knew that there was backup capacity in the system. This was a test run. And bullets are cheap.

What if instead of one team for one location, it had been three teams for three locations? Or, four? Five? Six? Could they have successfully crippled the nation? And plunged the stock market?

Re:Metcalf Sniper Attack by csilverman on Saturday August 29, 2020 @07:02PM (#24320038)
I'm neither a national security expert nor a terrorist, but if I wanted to pull off an attack like this, I'd be concerned that a test run—especially of this sophistication, which would likely get a lot of attention in certain quarters—would result in measures that'll make future attacks more difficult.

Nobody's going to make the grid impregnable overnight, and—depressingly—it may well be that security is so pervasively bad that the attackers don't believe any immediate attempts to fix the situation can stop them. I'd think, though, that additional security at even a few more sensitive spots could change the situation enough to make whatever was learned by the test run less useful. An attack like this would only serve to tip one's hand and underscore the threat (my personal suspicion of why this was done).

It seems a little like testing a valuable 0-day by defacing one government website; okay, that worked, but now everybody's going to start thinking about fixing that vulnerability.

Re:Metcalf Sniper Attack by areoform on Saturday August 29, 2020 @07:44PM (#24320206)
The time span for a deployed "patch" IRL is between years and never. What matters to these unnamed, unknown operators is practise and training. It is a pattern repeated for most covert ops.

Semi-software example, Stuxnet (and I'm sure different deployment methods) were tested in Israel pre-deployment - https://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/16/world/middleeast/16stuxne...

For Neptune Spear, the Bin Laden raid, they created different layouts and practiced every part of it, https://special-ops.org/operation-neptune-spear-killing-osam...

Adm. McRaven's interview is highly recommended to understand their psychology https://www.cnn.com/videos/politics/2016/05/02/bergen-mcrave...

The value gained by practicing on US soil to execute such a mission likely outweighs tipping their hand.

Re:Metcalf Sniper Attack by yourapostasy on Saturday August 29, 2020 @09:07PM (#24320539)
> The value gained by practicing on US soil to execute such a mission likely outweighs tipping their hand.

There is tremendous operational value in carrying out the logistics and process of such a test. The lessons learned can be applied not just to the electrical grid, but many other reserves-sensitive infrastructure.

Long rant ahead that comes as no surprise to Taleb and principal-agent problem space cognoscenti which most HN readers are, so freely ignore.

The US lacks reserves of nearly every kind except in the crudest forms like the Strategic Petroleum Reserve. As already noted elsewhere, the leadership-think that in the US permeates both private and public sector leadership to treat redundancy as deadweight losses still outweighs any and all national security considerations. This is absolutely rampant everywhere, and not a national secret.

It is so severe that even companies like 3M who actually plan ahead and do what they're supposed to do (set up emergency production lines, materiel, procedures, and staffing that are mothballed until needed, urge customers to keep a working reserve on hand suitable for continuity planning) get unjustifiably crucified [1]. Because...tada!...leadership in hospitals ditch working reserves who then turn around and blame 3M when the shit hits the fan for their lack of continuity planning. Then these same leaders who utterly failed their continuity planning lean in on government. And...tada!...leadership in government let working reserves exhaust from SARS who then turn around and blame 3M for their lack of continuity planning.

Of course this happens because the incentives are misaligned; leadership are not an evil cat cabal, they're just min-maxing to incentives they've been handed like everyone else. There is no tail risk governance of life- and national-security-critical infrastructure to maintain continuity.

There is no clawback for intentionally ignoring pointed out tail risk, nor is there an emphasis upon leadership in the same organization across a long period of time to expose and correct misalignments. Tail risk decisions are not tracked and evaluated in most organizations. Raising the organizational risk profile way after the leader has left for another role, and disconnecting the organization's ability to systemically learn from those expensive and infrequent tail risk mistakes.

Even worse, the US business culture and political culture itself severely punishes those who do prudently and competently assess tail risk. How the US arranged reserves is about right for nearly a century ago, but that means a successful attack on reserves-sensitive infrastructure will take us roughly back to that tech tree until we resupply.

Precision coordinated infrastructure attacks through black-hat, memetic and specops combined force of arms can be far more effective than many stealth bomber runs, with the additional invaluable bonus of plausible deniability, and possibly economically eclipsing the US if it causes enough damage. It's a really effective asymmetric attack mode option.

The US has long had people who thought about all this already, and encoded their thought experiments into various policy guides, with some updates from lessons learned like during SARS (and now COVID-19). Our policy leadership are choosing not to follow their advice because it involves unsavory spending decisions with negative political ramifications. COVID-19 has not sufficiently raised awareness about this, so it will likely take a Carrington-scale event to have these guides dusted off to see the light of day of implementation.

Individually as a normal citizen, at least prepare for natural disasters as guided by FEMA, financially prepare as much as you feel prudent (if you see the rampant de-reserving in infrastructure going on, just what do you think is happening in the less-regulated parts of finance?), and just hope three standard deviations doesn't hit our asses in our lifetimes.

[1] https://marker.medium.com/how-3m-gambled-its-reputation-on-t...

Re:Metcalf Sniper Attack by cma on Saturday August 29, 2020 @11:20PM (#24321115)
I thought the strategic PPE reserves were exhausted from H1N1, not SARS. The Democratic House tried to replenish, but it was prevented by the Republican Senate, so there wasn't uniform lack of care or treating it as deadweight.
Re:Metcalf Sniper Attack by yourapostasy on Sunday August 30, 2020 @06:41PM (#24326601)
Correct, they were physically depleted to far below minimum levels after H1N1 (and other crises), but SARS was their last warning before COVID-19. General political leadership across parties and jurisdictions [1] routinely treat it as a deadweight loss by allowing severe atrophy, short-changing the requested budgets; most recently in 2011 a -$121M shortfall [2].

Read into that what you will, but my hot take on it is if there is another pandemic, or an NBC attack, unless you are part of the 0.1% of government, you're on your own preparedness supplies.

I don't see the SNS placing the long-term supplies under inert gases and in extremely dry storage conditions (though much of it is secret, so I'm hoping they're doing this and just not telling anyone), the primary cause of various rubber components expiring. They are definitely not integrated into vendor supply chains, nor practicing shipping on a regular basis to rotate stock and evaluate large-scale field trials of preserved PPE to establish long-term operational practices that no one in the world has performed, injecting into re-supply orders and tracking the results with the healthcare institutions.

Once PPE preservation is worked out reasonably well, then the costs of maintaining the stockpile switch to marginal replacement costs. Then they can switch to funding research into reusable PPE, and ultra-long storage (on the order of 100 years). The national security angle is to weaponize the increasingly-long storage durations themselves, while at the same time benefiting the environment (less disposables): the ever-increasing lifespan covering an ever-increasing percentage of the population for an ever-increasing incident timespan are wielded as a deterrence factor; if we quickly react and return to semi-normal relatively quickly based upon such a robust supply chain, the effectiveness of such attacks are neutralized to that extent.

[1] https://www.politifact.com/article/2020/mar/30/federal-pande...

[2] https://www.businessinsider.com/strategic-national-stockpile...

Re:Metcalf Sniper Attack by timeinput on Saturday August 29, 2020 @09:39PM (#24320659)
Three standard deviations doesn't hit in our life times again
Re:Metcalf Sniper Attack by yourapostasy on Monday August 31, 2020 @08:26AM (#24330719)
The three standard deviations (or three-sigma) rule of thumb / guide relies upon a normal distribution to yield the 99.7%/0.3% probability tails. Humans are terrible at gut-feel statistics and probability due to a number of cognitive biases that seem nearly hardwired into us from birth, though. And exogenous factors can distort the normal distribution. This is just the normal landscape of highly complex interacting systems, but command-and-control style leadership's coping mechanism for simplifying complexity smooths out this information into lossiness.

A lot of what people ascribe to tail risk, upon closer examination that brings out the nuances instead of smoothing it away, are not three-sigma events. They're just three-sigma for the duration of now-typically very short job tenures. Of leadership.

What we have here, is a failure to communicate complexity.

Get some Royal Dutch Shell-like cross-disciplinary Long-Term Studies-like [1] groups going on globalization, and they'll probably eventually figure out that globalization will accelerate human encroachment upon habitats, in turn accelerating introducing novel bugs into our civilization. Up until recently in the span of homo sapiens history, while we've always encroached into habitats, and ran across new infectious agents, without quick global travel they would usually wipe out a locality and leave the modified habitats intact for nearby people to take over. So the diseases would usually wipe themselves out, and seemingly "retreat" back into the well they sprung from.

It should come as no surprise that we see increasing spread of infectious agents as globalization mechanizes the modification of habitats, and swiftly moves along the disease into the Amazonion flow of worldwide travel today. And we see an increased frequency of outbreaks of both old enemies and novel vectors.

It might not come as a surprise to Sagan fans [2] that a large fraction of the US population's reaction to these complex systems is superstition and irrationality.

[1] https://hbr.org/2013/05/living-in-the-futures (two-articles-per-month-then-register-wall)

[2] https://www.snopes.com/fact-check/carl-sagans-foreboding-of-...

Re:Metcalf Sniper Attack by thinkling on Saturday August 29, 2020 @06:50PM (#24319970)
> They knew exactly what targets to hit. It follows that they knew that there was backup capacity in the system. This was a test run. And bullets are cheap.

Sounds like perhaps this was a white hat actor intending to push others to get serious about these risks?

Re:Metcalf Sniper Attack by mhh__ on Saturday August 29, 2020 @08:06PM (#24320301)
Entirely possible. It's sometimes useful to remember that even in today's "open" world (The fall of the Soviet Union made it a lot less like active warfare even in the spooks still roam free) there will still be huge amounts of material known only to those on the inside.

In the 70s there was an unannounced (to the PM) "terrorism drill" on Heathrow Airport, that some have alleged was a practice run for a potential coup against Wilson (I don't think that holds much weight, but it's not impossible)

Re:Metcalf Sniper Attack by baybal2 on Saturday August 29, 2020 @06:57PM (#24320007)
Kind of useless act it was then.

Fences, and cameras would not stop a well armed sabotage team.

Re:Metcalf Sniper Attack by bonchicbongenre on Saturday August 29, 2020 @06:56PM (#24320001)
The answer: yes, they could've. I had a professor who previously had been part of a US gov group that had been tasked with preparing for an attack on the electrical grid, all the way back in the tail end of the cold war. His impression of the security of the US grid was that it was completely unsecured. He told me that they had no chance of solving the problem then, and that he expects the same is still the case. His worst fear is a large EMP attack, not locally cutting powerlines, but the danger still stands
Re:Metcalf Sniper Attack by g_p on Saturday August 29, 2020 @07:11PM (#24320069)
Putting aside EMP attacks (a real risk, but harder to mitigate against), the big issue right now on a day to day level is that energy suppliers are under pressure from regulators to reduce prices to consumers (in most countries which run regulated private sector energy distribution).

This means redundancy is written down by MBAs as excess capacity. It means assets are stretched to far nearer their safe limits than was ever envisaged previously. This ironically reduces their safe working life (in many cases), but this problem is cast along the road - in markets where providers re-tender regularly to continue to operate, that means it's a problem for the next franchise holder.

The incentives just aren't there to encourage creation of new redundancy. Existing redundancy won't be removed (as that would cost more!), but the long term outcome of this kind of "regulated private provider" system seems to be systemic under-investment in capital assets, with a view to deferring the problem until another time.

Another big challenge is that often the regulators for energy companies are "market" regulators, and therefore staffed by expert economists, rather than expert engineers. This further perpetuates the myth you can maintain and run critical national infrastructure with an economics degree and a calculator, and means the regulator tends to focus solely on economics, while assuming any issues with technology are fixed through economic incentives. Often they aren't, as the cost of a systemic black swan event is multiplied out by its likelihood, and the end result is to take no action while enjoying the profits today.

At least the above is based on my experience in trying to get energy market regulators to understand security and the issues of their regulator approach.

Re:Metcalf Sniper Attack by jonathankoren on Saturday August 29, 2020 @07:56PM (#24320255)
That’s weird that his concern is an EMP attack. Pretty much every serious nuclear scholar I’ve read find an EMP attack laughable. It’s a great thing to stir up fear among a domestic audience, but as an actual military tactic, it’s stupid. First, there’s never been an operational test anywhere, second, you have to fire a nuclear weapon, which is the very act that triggers a full scale nuclear response because of launch-on-warning. And finally, there’s just better uses for a nuclear weapon, like you know, air bursting in a city.
Re:Metcalf Sniper Attack by crystalPalace on Saturday August 29, 2020 @08:48PM (#24320465)
An EMP attack from an enemy nation is unlikely but a solar flare could happen at any time. In 1859 the world experienced an enormous geomagnetic storm when a coronal mass ejection hit Earth's magnetosphere. If the same solar flare happened today most of the world's power grid could be wiped out minus government and military hardened assets.
Re:Metcalf Sniper Attack by 01100011 on Saturday August 29, 2020 @08:58PM (#24320498)
Non nuclear EMP weapons have existed for years, and that's only the stuff they're talking about publicly. There may be other techniques, say distortion of the Earth's magnetic field to send charged particles toward a target, that we don't know about.
Re:Metcalf Sniper Attack by nradov on Saturday August 29, 2020 @09:09PM (#24320546)
The non-nuclear EMP weapons are very weak and have only minor localized effects. They aren't capable of taking out the power grid for a whole city or something.

And please no one waste our time by claiming that the military has some secret magic EMP technology. The laws of physics impose severe constraints on what can be achieved with conventional explosives in a weapon small enough to put in an airplane or truck.

Re:Metcalf Sniper Attack by 01100011 on Saturday August 29, 2020 @11:11PM (#24321069)
You only need to take out a few key points to take out the grid. Large scale EMPs are not needed. Knowing which key points to take out is the domain of nation states, but it is absolutely possible.
Re:Metcalf Sniper Attack by tgsovlerkhgsel on Saturday August 29, 2020 @10:44PM (#24320954)
> there’s just better uses for a nuclear weapon, like you know, air bursting in a city.

If your choice is completely annihilating one city, or destroying even just 10% of computers (including industrial control systems) in 50% of the country, which do you think causes more damage?

Destroying even a small fraction of individual computers makes most larger systems inoperable.

Without industrial control systems, power plants can't operate. Without power, cities become unsurvivable for a majority of the population within days, industrial output becomes effectively zero, and immediate issues like starvation and resulting unrest become a much bigger priority than fighting a war. Most importantly, recovery efforts will be extremely slow without power. How do you call the supplier, or other places that might have spares, when there is no phone network, no cell phones, no Internet? How do you call the experts that could diagnose which of the hundreds or thousands of control components need swapping? How do they get the fuel for their vehicle to get to you? And food and water to survive until you put everything into place? And safety so they don't get murdered by the looters?

According to http://www.empcommission.org/docs/A2473-EMP_Commission-7MB.p..., a peak field strength of 15 kV/m is expected to cause permanent damage to computer equipment. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nuclear_electromagnetic_pulse#... shows a single explosion (of unspecified yield) covering most of the US with a 25 kV/m field.

> which is the very act that triggers a full scale nuclear response because of launch-on-warning.

AFAIK the US doesn't practice launch-on-warning. Even if it did, a peaceful low earth orbit satellite launch is hard to distinguish from a not-so-peaceful low earth orbit nuke launch (unlike a conventional ICBM that's supposed to come back down). It would likely still result in nuclear retaliation, but if e.g. a dictator was already being invaded by the US, they don't necessarily have much to lose.

Re:Metcalf Sniper Attack by jonathankoren on Saturday August 29, 2020 @11:08PM (#24321053)
You are very misinformed about how satellite launches are publicized, and about the US launch on warning policy. Even if you are too young to remember the Cold War, a simple google search will confirm this.

Again, the threat of an EMP attack is absurd, perpetuated by fundamentally not serious people.

https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/07/21/electromagnetic-pulses-...

Re:Metcalf Sniper Attack by tgsovlerkhgsel on Saturday August 29, 2020 @11:33PM (#24321150)
> You are very misinformed about how satellite launches are publicized

Then tell me, where is the difference between North Korea saying "we will be launching this peaceful satellite of peace" and launching a spy satellite, and North Korea saying the same and launching a nuke satellite? Same orbit, same weight, contents kept secret to the best of their ability (and possibly swapped last minute in secret), same orbital timer to trigger it, only difference is whether it takes pictures or goes boom.

> and about the US launch on warning policy

https://www.armscontrol.org/act/1997-11/news/clinton-issues-... states:

Bell pointed out that while the United States has always had the "technical capability" to implement a policy of launch on warning, it has chosen not to do so. "Our policy is to confirm that we are under nuclear attack with actual detonations before retaliating," he said.

> https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/07/21/electromagnetic-pulses-....

This just says that a nuclear EMP attack would start nuclear war (or rather, nuclear retaliation if the EMP nuke was the only one the attacking country had/could deliver).

An EMP attack by Russia is indeed unlikely.

Re:Metcalf Sniper Attack by nullc on Saturday August 29, 2020 @06:52PM (#24319979)
Sounds like a great promotion for someone selling substation security.
Re:Metcalf Sniper Attack by gnopgnip on Sunday August 30, 2020 @02:24AM (#24321757)
The fact that it is an attack no one had prepared for, and over $100m was spent as a result points to an insider.