There is tremendous operational value in carrying out the logistics and process of such a test. The lessons learned can be applied not just to the electrical grid, but many other reserves-sensitive infrastructure.
Long rant ahead that comes as no surprise to Taleb and principal-agent problem space cognoscenti which most HN readers are, so freely ignore.
The US lacks reserves of nearly every kind except in the crudest forms like the Strategic Petroleum Reserve. As already noted elsewhere, the leadership-think that in the US permeates both private and public sector leadership to treat redundancy as deadweight losses still outweighs any and all national security considerations. This is absolutely rampant everywhere, and not a national secret.
It is so severe that even companies like 3M who actually plan ahead and do what they're supposed to do (set up emergency production lines, materiel, procedures, and staffing that are mothballed until needed, urge customers to keep a working reserve on hand suitable for continuity planning) get unjustifiably crucified [1]. Because...tada!...leadership in hospitals ditch working reserves who then turn around and blame 3M when the shit hits the fan for their lack of continuity planning. Then these same leaders who utterly failed their continuity planning lean in on government. And...tada!...leadership in government let working reserves exhaust from SARS who then turn around and blame 3M for their lack of continuity planning.
Of course this happens because the incentives are misaligned; leadership are not an evil cat cabal, they're just min-maxing to incentives they've been handed like everyone else. There is no tail risk governance of life- and national-security-critical infrastructure to maintain continuity.
There is no clawback for intentionally ignoring pointed out tail risk, nor is there an emphasis upon leadership in the same organization across a long period of time to expose and correct misalignments. Tail risk decisions are not tracked and evaluated in most organizations. Raising the organizational risk profile way after the leader has left for another role, and disconnecting the organization's ability to systemically learn from those expensive and infrequent tail risk mistakes.
Even worse, the US business culture and political culture itself severely punishes those who do prudently and competently assess tail risk. How the US arranged reserves is about right for nearly a century ago, but that means a successful attack on reserves-sensitive infrastructure will take us roughly back to that tech tree until we resupply.
Precision coordinated infrastructure attacks through black-hat, memetic and specops combined force of arms can be far more effective than many stealth bomber runs, with the additional invaluable bonus of plausible deniability, and possibly economically eclipsing the US if it causes enough damage. It's a really effective asymmetric attack mode option.
The US has long had people who thought about all this already, and encoded their thought experiments into various policy guides, with some updates from lessons learned like during SARS (and now COVID-19). Our policy leadership are choosing not to follow their advice because it involves unsavory spending decisions with negative political ramifications. COVID-19 has not sufficiently raised awareness about this, so it will likely take a Carrington-scale event to have these guides dusted off to see the light of day of implementation.
Individually as a normal citizen, at least prepare for natural disasters as guided by FEMA, financially prepare as much as you feel prudent (if you see the rampant de-reserving in infrastructure going on, just what do you think is happening in the less-regulated parts of finance?), and just hope three standard deviations doesn't hit our asses in our lifetimes.
[1] https://marker.medium.com/how-3m-gambled-its-reputation-on-t...
Read into that what you will, but my hot take on it is if there is another pandemic, or an NBC attack, unless you are part of the 0.1% of government, you're on your own preparedness supplies.
I don't see the SNS placing the long-term supplies under inert gases and in extremely dry storage conditions (though much of it is secret, so I'm hoping they're doing this and just not telling anyone), the primary cause of various rubber components expiring. They are definitely not integrated into vendor supply chains, nor practicing shipping on a regular basis to rotate stock and evaluate large-scale field trials of preserved PPE to establish long-term operational practices that no one in the world has performed, injecting into re-supply orders and tracking the results with the healthcare institutions.
Once PPE preservation is worked out reasonably well, then the costs of maintaining the stockpile switch to marginal replacement costs. Then they can switch to funding research into reusable PPE, and ultra-long storage (on the order of 100 years). The national security angle is to weaponize the increasingly-long storage durations themselves, while at the same time benefiting the environment (less disposables): the ever-increasing lifespan covering an ever-increasing percentage of the population for an ever-increasing incident timespan are wielded as a deterrence factor; if we quickly react and return to semi-normal relatively quickly based upon such a robust supply chain, the effectiveness of such attacks are neutralized to that extent.
[1] https://www.politifact.com/article/2020/mar/30/federal-pande...
[2] https://www.businessinsider.com/strategic-national-stockpile...
A lot of what people ascribe to tail risk, upon closer examination that brings out the nuances instead of smoothing it away, are not three-sigma events. They're just three-sigma for the duration of now-typically very short job tenures. Of leadership.
What we have here, is a failure to communicate complexity.
Get some Royal Dutch Shell-like cross-disciplinary Long-Term Studies-like [1] groups going on globalization, and they'll probably eventually figure out that globalization will accelerate human encroachment upon habitats, in turn accelerating introducing novel bugs into our civilization. Up until recently in the span of homo sapiens history, while we've always encroached into habitats, and ran across new infectious agents, without quick global travel they would usually wipe out a locality and leave the modified habitats intact for nearby people to take over. So the diseases would usually wipe themselves out, and seemingly "retreat" back into the well they sprung from.
It should come as no surprise that we see increasing spread of infectious agents as globalization mechanizes the modification of habitats, and swiftly moves along the disease into the Amazonion flow of worldwide travel today. And we see an increased frequency of outbreaks of both old enemies and novel vectors.
It might not come as a surprise to Sagan fans [2] that a large fraction of the US population's reaction to these complex systems is superstition and irrationality.
[1] https://hbr.org/2013/05/living-in-the-futures (two-articles-per-month-then-register-wall)
[2] https://www.snopes.com/fact-check/carl-sagans-foreboding-of-...
Semi-software example, Stuxnet (and I'm sure different deployment methods) were tested in Israel pre-deployment - https://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/16/world/middleeast/16stuxne...
For Neptune Spear, the Bin Laden raid, they created different layouts and practiced every part of it, https://special-ops.org/operation-neptune-spear-killing-osam...
Adm. McRaven's interview is highly recommended to understand their psychology https://www.cnn.com/videos/politics/2016/05/02/bergen-mcrave...
The value gained by practicing on US soil to execute such a mission likely outweighs tipping their hand.