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Re:Bcrypt Step-by-Step by luizfelberti on Friday August 28, 2020 @11:23AM (#24305944)
Step 1) Use Scrypt instead

Step 2) There is no step 2

Re:Bcrypt Step-by-Step by fractionalhare on Friday August 28, 2020 @11:54AM (#24306374)
For the vast majority of developers, bcrypt, scrypt, argon and PBKDF2 provide functionally equivalent security.

It's not generally productive to nitpick between secure password hashing/key derivation functions. Unless you specifically know you can't use one of these in particular, you should just pick whichever one has a safe implementation in a secure cryptographic library that you can use.

Basically, just don't use MD5, SHA1, SHA2, SHA3 (including Keccak and the other contenders) or some non-cryptographic hash function.

Re:Bcrypt Step-by-Step by luizfelberti on Friday August 28, 2020 @12:38PM (#24306912)
While I agree with the sentiment of what you're saying, I take issue with this part specifically:

> For the vast majority of developers, bcrypt, scrypt, argon and PBKDF2 provide functionally equivalent security

1) The "vast majority of developers" should not be implementing login systems, period. The chances most people have of not falling for any OWASP gotcha, making sound security choices, and implementing them correctly, is pretty much nil. Leveling the argument to this makes many things that should not be done sound passable.

2) They do not, categorically, provide "functionally equivalent security" (especially not for bare PBKDF2). This is a myth people believe in because they normalize their perception of deviant behaviour[0], and frame the situation as "if my database never gets pwned, any one of these is fine", which is just an argument based on wishful thinking, akin to "I can drive recklessly as long as I don't crash", but we don't use this reasoning to nullify seat-belts: the choice of algorithm is important precisely, and perhaps exclusively, for when all your other security mechanisms failed.

The reality though, is that more often than not, when databases gets pwned you never find out about it because monitoring and security practices is often lackluster, and then you keep believing that these things don't matter.

[0] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Normalization_of_deviance

As a general rule for their security properties: Scrypt > Argon2 > Bcrypt, and PBKDF2 should be avoided. You should prefer the first one of these you can find with a robust implementation (which as @lanecwagner pointed out may not always be Scrypt, and that's fine, as is Bcrypt if you have implementation constraints)

Re:Bcrypt Step-by-Step by tialaramex on Friday August 28, 2020 @07:53PM (#24311796)
No. Your parent was right, it doesn't really matter.

The password hashes buy you an improvement for the narrow range of passwords that are bad but not that bad against adversaries who are powerful but not that powerful. It's pretty much the definition of a marginal win. Which hash you choose slightly tweaks the margin.

It's essentially impossible that this is the lowest hanging fruit for your system security and so "use a different password hash" ought to be nowhere near close enough to the top of the TODO pile to get done if you're already using any of these decent password hashes listed such as PBKDF2.

If your users have strong passwords (e.g. a 20 alphanumeric random password from a typical password manager) it makes no difference at all. Even plain MD5() of such a password is as safe for the user and for you as Scrypt or Argon2 or other choices.

If your users have very weak passwords then once again it makes no difference. Your heavily tuned Scrypt password hashing doesn't prevent me guessing that Steevo412's password on your site might be something obvious like "letmein" - on a lowly mid-range laptop before I get bored.

So all this work is to achieve a marginal improvement in the middle. Maybe if Steevo412 has picked "LetMeInNOW" and maybe the script kiddies who stole the database ran out of stolen Amazon credits, they don't "crack" his password this time. Maybe.

And none of this makes you any safer from inadvertently leaking the plaintext passwords, which your system unavoidably needs to know during authentication, or numerous other pitfalls that have nothing to do with dick-measuring contests about which hash is better.

OR if security actually is important you could deploy something that's actually a clear improvement such as WebAuthn and stop trying to sweep the problems with password storage under increasingly complicated rugs.

Re:Bcrypt Step-by-Step by luizfelberti on Saturday August 29, 2020 @01:06AM (#24313718)
> Which hash you choose slightly tweaks the margin

Yes, but only if you assume that an adversary's power is stable over time, and that it's safe to amortize the risk over an extended period of time, both of which are wrong assumptions.

> If your users have strong passwords (e.g. a 20 alphanumeric random password from a typical password manager) it makes no difference at all

Yes, except that is not the world we live in, which makes this a pointless argument.

> If your users have very weak passwords then once again it makes no difference. Scrypt password hashing doesn't prevent me guessing that Steevo412's password might be something obvious

> None of this makes you any safer from inadvertently leaking the plaintext passwords, which your system unavoidably needs to know during authentication

Yes, if you frame the question as "being able to defend against threat models you can't effectively defend against under this authentication model" then indeed none of this matters, but that's a self-propelling argument, and also not the discussion we're having.

The discussion we're having is that given we know password-based auth is a bad security model, and that people have shit security practices, how do we squeeze the most value out of whatever entropy is given to us, in a way that will last as much as possible, since passwords are often recycled, rarely rotated, and you can get pwned decades into the future because of a leak that happened in 2004.

Password-based auth is a reality, and will keep on being for a long time. It's just not a defensible position to argue that there is no point in leveraging given entropy to the max because "we're all doomed anyways", or that since it's a bad model we shouldn't care.

The goal is explicitly to protect knowingly reckless users from themselves. Saying that "if they all used random passwords from a password manager it wouldn't matter" is not realistic or helpful.

> If security actually is important you could deploy something that's actually a clear improvement such as WebAuthn

I don't think anyone at any point in this thread defended passwords as a solid threat model, and I made this same point in another comment. WebAuthn is awesome, but passwords are a reality and will keep on being for a foreseeable future, we just have to deal with it

Re:Bcrypt Step-by-Step by hinkley on Friday August 28, 2020 @12:48PM (#24307048)
I wonder if it’s a category error:

Because password may be thought of as a first line of defense, folks have trouble with the notion of your password encryption being the last line of defense.

There are quite a few things we do that “bookend” other operations. I’ve certainly seen my fair share of people getting those wrong too (eg, teardown should often happen in the reverse order of setup, FILO)

Re:Bcrypt Step-by-Step by fractionalhare on Friday August 28, 2020 @01:45PM (#24307779)
> The "vast majority of developers" should not be implementing login systems, period.

Yep, agree. This also supports the idea that you shouldn't get too hung up on which to use, because hopefully that decision was made for you and one of these was selected.

> They do not, categorically, provide "functionally equivalent security"

Eh, disagree, if your database is breached and your digests are salted, any of these is fine. Of course there are technical differences because these are literally different algorithms, the actual difference in security provided by each is one of degree, not category. Unhashed vs hashed, and SHA2 vs bcrypt are what I'd call differences of category.

Re:Bcrypt Step-by-Step by luizfelberti on Friday August 28, 2020 @03:01PM (#24308723)
I originally used categorically to mean "unambiguously explicit and direct", but adding to what you said (with which I mostly agree), Scrypt actually does provide a categorical increment to security by being ASIC-resilient.

There are differences among them between classes of attacks they're susceptible to, provable security properties, and how paranoid should you should be in respect to advances cryptanalysis.

I tend to weigh these as significant factors given that the dynamics of password-based auth can very well lead to a database leak screwing someone over 20 years into the future, although I admit that you can't get too picky nowadays and I'd be very glad if we, as a species, could have what you described as a lower-bound (with the exception of PBKDF2, of course :P)

Re:Bcrypt Step-by-Step by lanecwagner on Friday August 28, 2020 @12:00PM (#24306459)
Author here - and I agree with this wholeheartedly. I've done articles of Bcrypt and Scrypt and while Scrypt seems better theoretically, it can be harder to find a battle tested implementation
Re:Bcrypt Step-by-Step by cj on Friday August 28, 2020 @11:36AM (#24306101)
https://github.com/Tarsnap/scrypt

Side note, I've seen a number of places (including the Scrypt repo) compare bcrypt brute-force benchmarks without specifying the bcrypt work factor.

It's very frustrating to see this, considering the time to compute a single bcrypt hash can be < 0.01 seconds (ie. work factor 7 or 8), or more than 1 minute (ie. work factor 20).

I'm not familiar with scrypt, but it looks like instead of providing a work factor, you can provide inputs like "max time to compute hash" and "max percent of ram to use computing hash" which presumably scales up as hardware becomes more powerful?

Re:Bcrypt Step-by-Step by cperciva on Friday August 28, 2020 @02:56PM (#24308677)
I've seen a number of places (including the Scrypt repo) compare bcrypt brute-force benchmarks without specifying the bcrypt work factor.

It's specified implicitly in the scrypt README file: "if 5 seconds are spent computing a derived key". It's explicit in the conference paper (cost = 16).

Re:Bcrypt Step-by-Step by gperciva on Friday August 28, 2020 @04:21PM (#24309497)
The algorithm itself takes three cost&memory values N, r, p, and if you're calling the `crypto_scrypt()` function in C or C++ as a KDF you need to specify those.

The command-line binary generally takes "max time" and "max ram" (as percent and/or raw value) and estimates appropriate cost values. As of version 1.3.1, you can manually specify cost values for the binary if you want.

Re:Bcrypt Step-by-Step by gperciva on Friday August 28, 2020 @02:21PM (#24308294)
BTW, we released scrypt 1.3.1 yesterday: http://mail.tarsnap.com/scrypt/msg00268.html

Main page, including the signed tarball: http://www.tarsnap.com/scrypt.html

Re:Bcrypt Step-by-Step by kevin_thibedeau on Friday August 28, 2020 @11:52AM (#24306350)
Scrypt isn't an option on memory constrained devices.
Re:Bcrypt Step-by-Step by luizfelberti on Friday August 28, 2020 @12:14PM (#24306642)
Password hashing is done server side, the client only needs to worry about TLS. Are you thinking about some specific use case?

Also, it's not a good idea to base your security parameters on the compute power of the most underpowered device in the chain.

Re:Bcrypt Step-by-Step by kevin_thibedeau on Friday August 28, 2020 @12:37PM (#24306902)
Devices that need access restrictions without network connectivity have to use something to protect credentials. You can't hand wave your way out of that.
Re:Bcrypt Step-by-Step by luizfelberti on Friday August 28, 2020 @01:17PM (#24307425)
lol in what way am I being hand wavy? It was a sincere question, and the use case you're pointing to is very different than what the post was discussing

That being said, for these cases you could use Argon2 which is mostly (entirely?) based on ARX constructs and will work well on embedded/underpowered devices

There are also some symmetric encryption shenanigans that can be done, but if you can use something other than password-based auth you're free from pretty much all of these problems, with probably much better security

Re:Bcrypt Step-by-Step by lanecwagner on Friday August 28, 2020 @12:00PM (#24306462)
Assuming you can find a battle testing implementation
Re:Bcrypt Step-by-Step by luizfelberti on Friday August 28, 2020 @12:46PM (#24307025)
Agreed, one is not always easily available, and for those cases any of Scrypt, Argon2, and Bcrypt are fine (but preferrably in that order :)

If you're on Golang, Rust, or C though: leverage your options!

Re:Bcrypt Step-by-Step by LunaSea on Friday August 28, 2020 @11:28AM (#24306004)
I think you meant Argon
Re:Bcrypt Step-by-Step by brobinson on Friday August 28, 2020 @02:48PM (#24308579)
Argon2 in data independent or hybrid mode, specifically.