Yes, but only if you assume that an adversary's power is stable over time, and that it's safe to amortize the risk over an extended period of time, both of which are wrong assumptions.
> If your users have strong passwords (e.g. a 20 alphanumeric random password from a typical password manager) it makes no difference at all
Yes, except that is not the world we live in, which makes this a pointless argument.
> If your users have very weak passwords then once again it makes no difference. Scrypt password hashing doesn't prevent me guessing that Steevo412's password might be something obvious
> None of this makes you any safer from inadvertently leaking the plaintext passwords, which your system unavoidably needs to know during authentication
Yes, if you frame the question as "being able to defend against threat models you can't effectively defend against under this authentication model" then indeed none of this matters, but that's a self-propelling argument, and also not the discussion we're having.
The discussion we're having is that given we know password-based auth is a bad security model, and that people have shit security practices, how do we squeeze the most value out of whatever entropy is given to us, in a way that will last as much as possible, since passwords are often recycled, rarely rotated, and you can get pwned decades into the future because of a leak that happened in 2004.
Password-based auth is a reality, and will keep on being for a long time. It's just not a defensible position to argue that there is no point in leveraging given entropy to the max because "we're all doomed anyways", or that since it's a bad model we shouldn't care.
The goal is explicitly to protect knowingly reckless users from themselves. Saying that "if they all used random passwords from a password manager it wouldn't matter" is not realistic or helpful.
> If security actually is important you could deploy something that's actually a clear improvement such as WebAuthn
I don't think anyone at any point in this thread defended passwords as a solid threat model, and I made this same point in another comment. WebAuthn is awesome, but passwords are a reality and will keep on being for a foreseeable future, we just have to deal with it
The password hashes buy you an improvement for the narrow range of passwords that are bad but not that bad against adversaries who are powerful but not that powerful. It's pretty much the definition of a marginal win. Which hash you choose slightly tweaks the margin.
It's essentially impossible that this is the lowest hanging fruit for your system security and so "use a different password hash" ought to be nowhere near close enough to the top of the TODO pile to get done if you're already using any of these decent password hashes listed such as PBKDF2.
If your users have strong passwords (e.g. a 20 alphanumeric random password from a typical password manager) it makes no difference at all. Even plain MD5() of such a password is as safe for the user and for you as Scrypt or Argon2 or other choices.
If your users have very weak passwords then once again it makes no difference. Your heavily tuned Scrypt password hashing doesn't prevent me guessing that Steevo412's password on your site might be something obvious like "letmein" - on a lowly mid-range laptop before I get bored.
So all this work is to achieve a marginal improvement in the middle. Maybe if Steevo412 has picked "LetMeInNOW" and maybe the script kiddies who stole the database ran out of stolen Amazon credits, they don't "crack" his password this time. Maybe.
And none of this makes you any safer from inadvertently leaking the plaintext passwords, which your system unavoidably needs to know during authentication, or numerous other pitfalls that have nothing to do with dick-measuring contests about which hash is better.
OR if security actually is important you could deploy something that's actually a clear improvement such as WebAuthn and stop trying to sweep the problems with password storage under increasingly complicated rugs.