News for hackers. Stuff that matters.
Re:Telegram messaging app proves crucial to Belarus protests by wintorez on Friday August 21, 2020 @12:57PM (#24236652)
Telegram has a feature that I really like. It allows you to delete your messages from other people devices as well.
Re:Telegram messaging app proves crucial to Belarus protests by godelski on Friday August 21, 2020 @02:29PM (#24237547)
I have been frustrated with Signal on this. I pitched that it is a good idea because of a scenario:

> You're protesting with people. Cops pick them up, but not you. You can delete their messages and it is likely that you are able to do so before the police can clone your phone or copy the messages (screenshot, whatever).

I got a few strange responses back:

- Deleting messages doesn't mean they can't be saved (yeah... this is probabilistic privacy, not guaranteed)

- My device, my data (okay?)

- Some people run custom apps that save everything (how does that apply here? Funny enough, a sibling comment said something similar)

- Just own up to your typos (-_____-)

- Don't use Signal for communication then because you can't be guaranteed privacy (great, I'll use smoke signals with my friends to organize)

To be fair to Signal, the devs did not get into the forums. To also be fair, Signal is taking the same position and is going to only allow deletion an hour after a message was sent. As much as I love Signal, it is my preferred messaging app, I think they are not in touch with the needs of people. We should look at why people are turning to Telegram when protesting. What can we do to better preserve the privacy of people protesting in HK, Belarus, America, etc? Everything is probabilistic security and privacy when it comes down to it. But what tools would help these people the most? I would argue that bidirectional deletion to reduce the chance of self incrimination is one of them. The other is group messaging, channels, and anonymous messages (so your phone number isn't visible in channels). Emojis are nice and fun for day to day use, but it is getting more and more important to push these other features (yes, I know they are extremely difficult to do and actually preserve privacy to the standard Signal currently does. I think many would be fine if it was an incremental increase in privacy with these newer features).

Re:Telegram messaging app proves crucial to Belarus protests by newscracker on Friday August 21, 2020 @03:42PM (#24238192)
> I think they are not in touch with the needs of people.

Sadly, this has been true of Signal for a long time. Signal marches only to its own beat, and is quite slow to address real needs of most people.

Re:Telegram messaging app proves crucial to Belarus protests by y-c-o-m-b on Friday August 21, 2020 @06:01PM (#24239332)
I don't know why you're getting down-voted. It's an accurate statement that many loyal Signal users can attest to. Signal has been my primary messaging app for years now, but that's my main issue with them outside of group MMS issues still being problematic all these years. Their slow response or lack of care was especially apparent after the huge outcry over constant nag notifications for verifying PIN, setting a profile name, and asking contacts to join Signal. It's like they don't understand how badly they need better adoption for Signal to be effective. If 90% or greater of my contacts don't use Signal, then what good is that? They need to start listening to their users better.
Re:Telegram messaging app proves crucial to Belarus protests by godelski on Friday August 21, 2020 @07:17PM (#24239913)
I do think that things like emojis and the (now fixed) link previews do help with adoption. But I think there is another and more compelling adoption method given the current state of the world: privacy and security. The reason people are turning to telegram is because they think it is secure. Signal will never gain mass adoption without good groups. And honestly, they probably need channels too. If it had both those things then all these protestors would turn towards Signal. After all, isn't that why they get funding from the US government? To "enable" democracy in other countries?
Re:Telegram messaging app proves crucial to Belarus protests by johnchristopher on Friday August 21, 2020 @03:06PM (#24237884)
I was pitching the following idea to a friend of mine yesterday:

- the UI should hide e2e/“reallyprivate” conversations by default - as in "not visible anywhere" (edit: unless the app is in the foreground and you are chatting of course)

Unless you:

- do the “add a new user/conversation" - then instead of adding mail/GUID/phone you add a whatevercanberemembered number/emoji/sentence that unlocks the private conversation you initiated long before

There should be no trace in the UI that private conversations are going on.

What does HN think ? Why hasn't it been done before ?

Edit: there could even be notifications disguised as another app (news subscriptions, medical reminders, battery low, etc.)

Re:Telegram messaging app proves crucial to Belarus protests by indigo945 on Friday August 21, 2020 @03:27PM (#24238070)
This doesn't give you plausible deniability if law enforcement gets their hands on your unlocked phone, as they can see that the file size of the encrypted message logs doesn't match the visible content. If the phone is jailbroken and the key for the message logs is leaked, it doesn't help at all.

Security by obscurity is never a win.

Re:Telegram messaging app proves crucial to Belarus protests by godelski on Friday August 21, 2020 @03:37PM (#24238147)
Wouldn't the solution here just be to allocate a larger disk space and encrypt that? Then when the space is filled up you expand again? I've seen this done before.

Rather I'd change the GP's solution to having a secret vault in an already encrypted chat system (so you can do the above), essentially making it two layers. Just the second layer isn't a button that says "look at me, I'm where all the real secret shit is."

I agree that security through obscurity isn't a winning solution, but it is part of the toolkit. It would just be dumb to rely on your security solely being obscurity. Encrypted steganography is still a powerful tool, hackers obscure code, and real spies use obscurity all the time. It just isn't the dominant factor.

Re:Telegram messaging app proves crucial to Belarus protests by johnchristopher on Friday August 21, 2020 @03:41PM (#24238175)
> This doesn't give you plausible deniability if law enforcement gets their hands on your unlocked phone, as they can see that the file size of the encrypted message logs doesn't match the visible content.

Hmmm. What about from the get-go saying that the app allocates 100Mbytes of space and fills it randomly at regular time until some encrypted content is generated. That'd put a 100Mbytes log/message limit to conversations but that'd be by design and nobody could be sure those bytes are random or genuine messages.

> If the phone is jailbroken and the key for the message logs is leaked, it doesn't help at all.

Why would the key get leaked if it's never stored ?

Re:Telegram messaging app proves crucial to Belarus protests by Krasnol on Friday August 21, 2020 @07:54PM (#24240170)
> . We should look at why people are turning to Telegram when protesting.

Every single person I know who uses Telegram does it for either porn or piracy or both. So using what you already have for protests if they occur makes sense. Trying to get ppl to install a different app is much more complicated at this point. Sometimes may even be prevented by the regime.

Re:Telegram messaging app proves crucial to Belarus protests by maqp on Saturday August 22, 2020 @01:59AM (#24241996)
That must be a generational/geolocational thing. I've never even heard either of them was available in the app.
Re:Telegram messaging app proves crucial to Belarus protests by Krasnol on Saturday August 22, 2020 @07:22AM (#24243383)
Maybe geological but surely not generational.

What it also is here is male. I haven't met a single woman in Germany who'd have the app.

Re:Telegram messaging app proves crucial to Belarus protests by Marsymars on Friday August 21, 2020 @11:30PM (#24241278)
See, the lack of bidirectional deletion is one of the reasons I prefer Signal. Nobody other than me should have the ability to delete data on my device.
Re:Telegram messaging app proves crucial to Belarus protests by stilisstuk on Saturday August 22, 2020 @03:18AM (#24242365)
There are two parties in a conversation. Both 'own' the conversation. Both have a 'veto' right.
Re:Telegram messaging app proves crucial to Belarus protests by Marsymars on Saturday August 22, 2020 @01:18PM (#24245608)
I disagree. I see my phone as an extension of my brain. If I have an in-person conversation, the other party can't force me to forget the conversation, and they shouldn't have that ability for my phone either.
Re:Telegram messaging app proves crucial to Belarus protests by stilisstuk on Sunday August 23, 2020 @02:48AM (#24250112)
What if only the other partys messages where deleted?

In telegram it is understood that 'secret chats' constitutes confidentiality. As such, both parties, I believe, ought to be able to delete everything.

I kind of see you point about non-secret chats.

But then we are back with a opt-in model for privacy.

Personally: what I tell you at the coffee machine, in confidence or not, is ephemeral. I would probably not talk to you at all if you where taperecording all conversations, as you want to do with messages... so I think both.parties.should be able to delete text conversations. And privacy should be on by default.

Re:Telegram messaging app proves crucial to Belarus protests by godelski on Sunday August 23, 2020 @01:23PM (#24253513)
In Signal ALL conversations are private.

> I would probably not talk to you at all if you where taperecording all conversations

You hit the nail on the head with this one. To me deletion is a nice compromise and why the coffee shop analogy isn't a good comparator. Similarly we don't record video calls (and Moxie himself doesn't like this). So why should every text be recorded and parties do not have control over that data? I do feel that each person in the conversation has a right to control that data (if anything the sender more so) and when policy fails it should fail in the direction that has more privacy (which is the message not existing within Signal's log^). But currently people aren't given this choice and there is no consideration of failure modes.

^ Careful wording because if I don't make this added comment people think I'm unaware that screenshots exist.

Re:Telegram messaging app proves crucial to Belarus protests by Marsymars on Sunday August 23, 2020 @05:07PM (#24255308)
> I kind of see you point about non-secret chats.

I don't really make that distinction, I think it's harmful to have E2E as optional, and only use platforms than have either mandatory E2E encryption (Signal, WhatsApp), or no E2E encryption (SMS, email).

If you have an in-person conversation with me in confidence, that doesn't grant you any additional powers to make me forget details of the conversation.

> Personally: what I tell you at the coffee machine, in confidence or not, is ephemeral. I would probably not talk to you at all if you where taperecording all conversations, as you want to do with messages...

What if I have a very good memory, and follow conversations by writing up their details in personal memos that you can't delete? (e.g. Comey's contemporary memos of conversations he had with Trump.)

> so I think both.parties.should be able to delete text conversations. And privacy should be on by default.

The problem for you is that I'm not going to agree to that - if you won't use Signal, I'm going to force a downgrade to SMS or email, and then you get even worse security and privacy.

If you want to have a conversation that can't be recorded in an automated way, you basically need to meet in a sauna.

Re:Telegram messaging app proves crucial to Belarus protests by stilisstuk on Monday August 24, 2020 @02:56AM (#24258109)
> If you won't use Signal, I'm going to force a downgrade to SMS or email, and then you get even worse security and privacy.

Or we will set up e2e encrypted telegram. Or not talk.

> What if I have a very good memory, and follow conversations by writing up their details

You saying that you remember I said something, even took a screenshot vs you can prove I said something, is a big difference.

If I am doing a snowden, I might go to a sauna. If I am planning to overthrow my boss, I think e2e telegram is okay. Because I can delete the conversation it might even be preferable to signal.

Use cases and threat models...

Re:Telegram messaging app proves crucial to Belarus protests by Marsymars on Wednesday August 26, 2020 @11:02AM (#24283068)
Sorry, I just can't agree with your take. You're fundamentally trying to use technology to restrict rather than enable use cases, and doing so in ways that aren't actually robust to your use cases and threat models.
Re:Telegram messaging app proves crucial to Belarus protests by iso8859-1 on Friday August 21, 2020 @01:27PM (#24236970)
But there is an open source client. So it should be trivial to not actually delete, but instead log every attempt to delete.
Re:Telegram messaging app proves crucial to Belarus protests by godelski on Friday August 21, 2020 @02:32PM (#24237572)
I'm not sure what this has to do with anything. Sure, maybe this doesn't help you in a channel, but one on one? Or small groups? Most people don't run custom apps and you're probably going to know if your friends do. The biggest use I see of bidirectional deletion is if you see your friends be picked up by a nefarious actor and you can delete the messages. This reduces the chance of self incrimination because you can probably delete the messages before the phone is cloned or the messages are saved in some way.
Re:Telegram messaging app proves crucial to Belarus protests by saagarjha on Friday August 21, 2020 @02:36PM (#24237605)
It has everything to do with this when the conversation is if the government is going to use your messages in the unencrypted channel to come after you. If your friends are picked up by a nefarious actor, you would have to know that they were–and also, you'd have to ensure that Telegram isn't keeping some sort of deletion log.
Re:Telegram messaging app proves crucial to Belarus protests by godelski on Friday August 21, 2020 @03:01PM (#24237826)
I want to repeat

>> Sure, maybe this doesn't help you in a channel, but one on one? Or small groups? Most people don't run custom apps

The bidirectional part is helpful in the non-public channel context.

How does this help? Why does this matter? Well you can keep a public face and a private face. Private channels, group chats with friends, or one on one messages you can be more open and use this tool. But this is normal. Everyone shows a different face in public than what they show to friends (offline!).

> If your friends are picked up by a nefarious actor, you would have to know that they were

Sure. But they're your friends. I don't know how you interact with your friends, but usually when I'm out with them I'm physically near them and know what they are doing. Chances are pretty high I'd know within a few hours if they got arrested/abducted.

> you'd have to ensure that Telegram isn't keeping some sort of deletion log.

This is a different issue and FWIW that's why I don't personally use Telegram. There's no verification so no trust. But that doesn't mean that the deletion tool can be useful in certain contexts if the implementation is correct. No reason to throw the baby out with the bath water. It is about the probability of reducing self incrimination, not guaranteeing.

Re:Telegram messaging app proves crucial to Belarus protests by saagarjha on Friday August 21, 2020 @03:12PM (#24237937)
I certainly do not know what my friends are doing 24/7, perhaps not even within a day or two. And that's plenty of time for law enforcement to install a third-party client on their phone, or just read the messages. I agree that having it is better than not having it, but I would not put too much faith in it being useful against law enforcement. Perhaps retracting a mistakenly sent message, but not much more than that.
Re:Telegram messaging app proves crucial to Belarus protests by godelski on Friday August 21, 2020 @03:28PM (#24238076)
I feel like you're being needlessly dense. The threat scenario is being at a protest with your friends, not some midnight abduction. And I'll I'm arguing is that it is better to have it than not have it because there's a __chance__. When it comes down to it every aspect of security and privacy is probabilistic. Security walls aren't impenetrable, but unlikely to be penetrated in a given time-frame. If it doesn't reduce the floor on security or privacy but increases the probabilistic upper bound, why not? So my complaint to Signal is why shoot yourself in the foot by limiting this to 1 hour? (24 if you run a custom app)

There's a reason big companies/government employers want root access to your phone and will wipe data if it is lost or stolen. Because it reduces the chance that company/state secrets. No one thinks it is a guarantee. But if given the choice of "revealing a secret" vs "rolling a dice to see if I reveal a secret or not" I'm going with the latter no matter the odds.

Re:Telegram messaging app proves crucial to Belarus protests by shawnz on Friday August 21, 2020 @03:09PM (#24237904)
Whatsapp also has this useful feature, and it also provides always-on E2E encryption unlike Telegram.