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Re:NSA Owns Everything (2015) by SlavikCA on Thursday August 13, 2020 @02:09AM (#24140430)
How does "running fully free software" helps alleviate "compromised x86"?
Re:NSA Owns Everything (2015) by panny on Thursday August 13, 2020 @02:29AM (#24140537)
If you're running fully free software, you're not running x86, since it can't boot without backdoored binary blobs.
Re:NSA Owns Everything (2015) by Thorrez on Thursday August 13, 2020 @02:40AM (#24140583)
What about Libreboot? Doesn't that allow booting x86 without binary blobs?
Re:NSA Owns Everything (2015) by panny on Thursday August 13, 2020 @03:00AM (#24140690)
Yes, very old hardware that's no longer on the market. I don't consider that a solution. Eventually that pool of hardware dries up.
Re:NSA Owns Everything (2015) by drewbug on Thursday August 13, 2020 @03:35AM (#24140878)
Re:NSA Owns Everything (2015) by daffy on Thursday August 13, 2020 @04:24AM (#24141124)
It's easy to find x200 etc. used. Flashing is another story.
Re:NSA Owns Everything (2015) by fsflover on Thursday August 13, 2020 @07:24AM (#24142167)
> Flashing is another story.

https://tehnoetic.com/tet-lis

Re:NSA Owns Everything (2015) by numpad0 on Thursday August 13, 2020 @03:07AM (#24140727)
They still need some parts of blobs to configure/initialize the system and that “some” now means full MINIX kernel along its userland
Re:NSA Owns Everything (2015) by boring_twenties on Thursday August 13, 2020 @09:28AM (#24143107)
That's not correct, Libreboot does not work on those systems that require any part of the ME to boot.

You might be thinking of me_cleaner[1], which removes most but not all of the ME blobs. This is unrelated to Libreboot though, it works on newer systems and is not needed when using Libreboot because the latter gets rid of the (very early versions of) the ME completely.

[1] https://github.com/corna/me_cleaner

Re:NSA Owns Everything (2015) by daffy on Thursday August 13, 2020 @04:28AM (#24141142)
Are you saying a librebooted machine is still probably backdoored?
Re:NSA Owns Everything (2015) by dannyw on Thursday August 13, 2020 @04:34AM (#24141166)
Precisely.
Re:NSA Owns Everything (2015) by fsflover on Thursday August 13, 2020 @07:23AM (#24142156)
You are talking about Coreboot, not Libreboot. The latter has no blobs whatsoever.
Re:NSA Owns Everything (2015) by daffy on Thursday August 13, 2020 @09:38AM (#24143193)
Does that mean that a firmware backdoor is impossible or very unlikely?
Re:NSA Owns Everything (2015) by fsflover on Thursday August 13, 2020 @01:30PM (#24145864)
Yes, it should be harder.
Re:NSA Owns Everything (2015) by novaRom on Thursday August 13, 2020 @03:42AM (#24140914)
All modern ARMs have ROM block containing undocumented booting sequence.
Re:NSA Owns Everything (2015) by panny on Thursday August 13, 2020 @05:04AM (#24141329)
You're wrong, but with such confidence! Here is a documented ARM booting sequence with fully free firmware,

https://stikonas.eu/wordpress/2019/09/15/blobless-boot-with-...

Re:NSA Owns Everything (2015) by monocasa on Thursday August 13, 2020 @07:19AM (#24142126)
That 32k BootROM isn't free in your example.

SoCs will also have "pre-boot" code that runs before that:

> However, even one of their most ardent open-source advocates pushed back quite hard when I suggested they should share their pre-boot code. By pre-boot code, I’m not talking about the little ROM blob that gets run after reset to set up your peripherals so you can pull your bootloader from SD card or SSD. That part was a no-brainer to share. I’m talking about the code that gets run before the architecturally guaranteed “reset vector”. A number of software developers (and alarmingly, some security experts) believe that the life of a CPU begins at the reset vector. In fact, there’s often a significant body of code that gets executed on a CPU to set things up to meet the architectural guarantees of a hard reset – bringing all the registers to their reset state, tuning clock generators, gating peripherals, and so forth. Critically, chip makers heavily rely upon this pre-boot code to also patch all kinds of embarrassing silicon bugs, and to enforce binning rules.

https://www.bunniestudios.com/blog/?p=5127

Re:NSA Owns Everything (2015) by panny on Thursday August 13, 2020 @08:50PM (#24151883)
>That 32k BootROM isn't free in your example.

It's a ROM. Read only.

https://www.fsf.org/news/freebios.html

"The BIOS was impossible to replace because it was stored in ROM: the only way to to put in a different BIOS was by replacing part of the hardware. In effect, the BIOS was itself hardware--and therefore didn't really count as software. It was like the program that (we can suppose) exists in the computer that (we can suppose) runs your watch or your microwave oven: since you can't install software on it, it may as well be circuits, not a computer at all."

Edit: >ROMs can still be backdoored, which is the point of this discussion.

You said it wasn't free, and when proven wrong, you moved the goalpost. Since I'm a wrongthinker who can only post once every hour or two on this site, I'm done discussing this with you. If you want to try to convince people that a 32K ROM is the same as IntelME, then you're not worth my time anyway.

Re:NSA Owns Everything (2015) by monocasa on Thursday August 13, 2020 @08:56PM (#24151935)
ROMs can still be backdoored, which is the point of this discussion.

Since we're editing: Free has many definitions. The FSF's on that one page doesn't take into account backdoored software; they would absolutely agree that backdoored ROMs aren't free. It removes user ownership over their computation. It's not "moving the goalposts" to point this out, especially when the entire point of the discussion is around backdoored software.

Re:NSA Owns Everything (2015) by waihtis on Thursday August 13, 2020 @02:22AM (#24140501)
Wrap up that fully free software with LibreBoot and you're good to go!
Re:NSA Owns Everything (2015) by marcosdumay on Thursday August 13, 2020 @01:24PM (#24145797)
Wrap with LibreBoot, replace all the non-free firmware, check your hardware on a microscope against embedded backdoors, oh, and don't forget to verify your stack's source and your building environment.

But, well, you can stop at your CPU's manufacturer website, where you will find ME/PSP, well documented as a backdoor. It will save you the trouble of verifying the hardware and firmware.