This isn't to say TOFU/POP is the right move. But there's a very real problem here. One that HTTPS's strengths do nothing to address or offset.
[1] And of those, I doubt they all remember to check their CA list at every browser install/upgrade/borrowed laptop browsing situation.
This is not a problem with the protocol, but with the criteria used for trusting a signature.
At the end of the day, we're talking about a very simple UI problem. Yes, our notion of "trust" is broken. But it's broken in large part because nobody has put any effort into communicating to end-users enough information to enable them to make informed decisions. Then, after putting no effort into the problem, we look at and say "you're asking my mom to understand X.509 CNs!", as if that was the extent of what engineering could bring to bear against this problem.
Then we throw up our hands and say "let's make a simpler protocol; who cares if predictably and reliably allows middlemen to hijack our connections, at least we won't have to explain X.509 to our moms".
Can you blame me for being a bit cynical about this?
What's the issue here? CNNIC isn't trustworthy. You should get a warning every time you visit a CNNIC-signed site.
I don't understand how people can build entire advocacy campaigns on getting other people to switch from IE, but removing untrustworthy certificates? Time to scrap the protocol and move to a crappier one that we can at least get our heads around!