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Re:It's Time to Fix HTTPS by tptacek on Monday March 28, 2011 @10:06AM (#2378378)
... so, remove the CNNIC cert.

What's the issue here? CNNIC isn't trustworthy. You should get a warning every time you visit a CNNIC-signed site.

I don't understand how people can build entire advocacy campaigns on getting other people to switch from IE, but removing untrustworthy certificates? Time to scrap the protocol and move to a crappier one that we can at least get our heads around!

Re:It's Time to Fix HTTPS by roc on Monday March 28, 2011 @10:56AM (#2378555)
The issue is that Firefox still includes CNNIC by default. A few hundred (thousand?) people on the planet know that's a horrible idea.[1] When the community can't manage a no-brainer, pro-user change from the Mozilla foundation, maybe there's something to the compounded self-interest problem?

This isn't to say TOFU/POP is the right move. But there's a very real problem here. One that HTTPS's strengths do nothing to address or offset.

[1] And of those, I doubt they all remember to check their CA list at every browser install/upgrade/borrowed laptop browsing situation.

Re:It's Time to Fix HTTPS by kragen on Monday March 28, 2011 @12:26PM (#2378923)
Removing the CNNIC cert is not an option if you actually need to talk to sites that use it. And at this point there are literally hundreds of untrustworthy root CA certs in browsers. Just because I want to talk to some server in Turkey doesn't mean I ought to rely on a Turkish organization to vouch for the identity of Bank of America.

This is not a problem with the protocol, but with the criteria used for trusting a signature.

Re:It's Time to Fix HTTPS by tptacek on Monday March 28, 2011 @12:51PM (#2379017)
I know you're a reasonable guy. But, look: you either trust CNNIC or (like me), you don't. If you can't trust CNNIC, you axe their cert and click through to make persistent exceptions to the sites that need that cert.

At the end of the day, we're talking about a very simple UI problem. Yes, our notion of "trust" is broken. But it's broken in large part because nobody has put any effort into communicating to end-users enough information to enable them to make informed decisions. Then, after putting no effort into the problem, we look at and say "you're asking my mom to understand X.509 CNs!", as if that was the extent of what engineering could bring to bear against this problem.

Then we throw up our hands and say "let's make a simpler protocol; who cares if predictably and reliably allows middlemen to hijack our connections, at least we won't have to explain X.509 to our moms".

Can you blame me for being a bit cynical about this?