What's the issue here? CNNIC isn't trustworthy. You should get a warning every time you visit a CNNIC-signed site.
I don't understand how people can build entire advocacy campaigns on getting other people to switch from IE, but removing untrustworthy certificates? Time to scrap the protocol and move to a crappier one that we can at least get our heads around!
This isn't to say TOFU/POP is the right move. But there's a very real problem here. One that HTTPS's strengths do nothing to address or offset.
[1] And of those, I doubt they all remember to check their CA list at every browser install/upgrade/borrowed laptop browsing situation.
This is not a problem with the protocol, but with the criteria used for trusting a signature.
At the end of the day, we're talking about a very simple UI problem. Yes, our notion of "trust" is broken. But it's broken in large part because nobody has put any effort into communicating to end-users enough information to enable them to make informed decisions. Then, after putting no effort into the problem, we look at and say "you're asking my mom to understand X.509 CNs!", as if that was the extent of what engineering could bring to bear against this problem.
Then we throw up our hands and say "let's make a simpler protocol; who cares if predictably and reliably allows middlemen to hijack our connections, at least we won't have to explain X.509 to our moms".
Can you blame me for being a bit cynical about this?
> Think to yourself, if you ran the great firewall of China, which system you'd rather have: the flawed one we have now, or the one that explicitly allows your connection on the first and subsequent connections to a new service to be hijacked?
The one we have now explicitly allows your connection on the first and subsequent connections to a new service to be hijacked by the Chinese government, assuming they can get your packets to go to them, because CNNIC has a CA cert in your browser. (Have you removed it? I haven't. I didn't know it was there.) Additionally, it allows any connection to any service, old or new, to be hijacked, even if you previously connected to that service without being hijacked, and it doesn't leave any evidence that this has happened. TOFU/POP solves these additional problems, without solving the introduction problem.
It's possible to solve the introduction problem --- which is what CAs do --- in a variety of more or less secure ways. SSH gives you a key fingerprint and prompts you, which pretty much pushes the problem back on the user. But you can do better than that in a bunch of ways.