I know you're a reasonable guy. But, look: you either trust CNNIC or (like me), you don't. If you can't trust CNNIC, you axe their cert and click through to make persistent exceptions to the sites that need that cert.
At the end of the day, we're talking about a very simple UI problem. Yes, our notion of "trust" is broken. But it's broken in large part because nobody has put any effort into communicating to end-users enough information to enable them to make informed decisions. Then, after putting no effort into the problem, we look at and say "you're asking my mom to understand X.509 CNs!", as if that was the extent of what engineering could bring to bear against this problem.
Then we throw up our hands and say "let's make a simpler protocol; who cares if predictably and reliably allows middlemen to hijack our connections, at least we won't have to explain X.509 to our moms".
Can you blame me for being a bit cynical about this?
This is not a problem with the protocol, but with the criteria used for trusting a signature.