The original text is true. The Concorde was what the airlines, aircraft makers, and the public wanted. It was fast. It was expensive. It was a trophy project. All things that appeal to one or more of those segments.
What changed was that fuel got too expensive, deregulated airlines started cutting corners everywhere, and people's priorities changed.
The world went from people wearing their Sunday suits to embark on a flight to people piling into Southwest air buses in their pajamas without bathing.
So the history is correct. It's just that the world has changed.
/Flew on the Concorde in the mid-1990's.
There is a reason why Boom Supersonic is only targeting a plane that comfortably seats 50.
Also, it seems the bill for development of the Concorde was paid for by the governments of Great Britain and France, and wasn’t fully accounted for in the unit price.
If so, that made it a much more attractive proposition. I also would think some airlines placed pre-orders in a defensive move (if it had become wildly successful, airlines flying slow planes could get in trouble)
I doubt any manufacturer would have dared to design and build a supersonic plane if they had to have to pay for all development (Boeing had a competing project (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Boeing_2707), but that, too, seems to have been heavily government sponsored)
But when business class came in, it got converted into an upper deck of business class seats in most configurations.
Interesting to note that China apparently also ordered Concordes.
https://www.nytimes.com/1974/06/29/archives/shah-of-iran-rep...
And that’s ignoring the possibility that that order was in return for other transactions (for example, they got enriched uranium from France (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/France–Iran_relations#Nuclear_... says they refused to continue to provide Iran with enriched uranium after the 1979 Islamic revolution, so they must have been delivering it before) and the technology to make it (https://foreignpolicy.com/2010/12/29/the-shahs-atomic-dreams...) and hundreds of Chieftain tanks from Britain (https://www.offiziere.ch/?p=33866)
https://www.nytimes.com/1991/10/26/world/france-and-iran-men...
> I wouldn’t use the Shah of Iran‘s intents as indicator of economical feasibility.
Or people who post from surface knowledge. Sure.
-- ps --
In 1975 Sweden's 10 per cent share in Eurodif went to Iran. The French government subsidiary company Cogéma and the Iranian Government established the Sofidif (Société franco–iranienne pour l'enrichissement de l'uranium par diffusion gazeuse) enterprise with 60 and 40 per cent shares, respectively. In turn, Sofidif acquired a 25 per cent share in Eurodif, which gave Iran its 10 per cent share of Eurodif. Mohammed Reza Shah Pahlavi lent 1 billion dollars (and another 180 million dollars in 1977) for the construction of the Eurodif factory, to have the right of buying 10 per cent of the production of the site.
"President Gerald Ford signed a directive in 1976 offering Tehran the chance to buy and operate a U.S.-built reprocessing facility for extracting plutonium from nuclear reactor fuel. The deal was for a complete 'nuclear fuel cycle'."[27] The Ford strategy paper said the "introduction of nuclear power will both provide for the growing needs of Iran's economy and free remaining oil reserves for export or conversion to petrochemicals."
A 1974 CIA proliferation assessment stated "If [the Shah] is alive in the mid-1980s ... and if other countries [particularly India] have proceeded with weapons development we have no doubt Iran will follow suit."[28]
There's a difference between aspiration and market reality.
'The Public' never actually wants a 'Trophy Project' to the extent that they are not willing to actually pay for it out of their own pockets. Yes, they might like the idea, but what matters is "are people willing to pay the price"?
I suggest there was probably a lot of hubris in the project, that said, there's probably a lot of demand these days for such a thing.
There are a lot of hyper-rich people and they desperately need status.
Also, in Finance, there are a lot of 'important people' who's time is actually valuable. With long-flight times what they are, doing an Atlantic or Pacific run 'very fast' actually is just 'worth it' even for the company paying for it.
It was a market reality for 27 years — longer than most of the companies that employ people who post on HN.
One can argue that they got a lot more value out of it than the equivalent amount of money spent on fighter jets and bombers though, and those are just as much prestige projects.
Research revealed that passengers thought that the fare was higher than it actually was, so the airline raised ticket prices to match these perceptions.[70][191] It is reported that British Airways then ran Concorde at a profit
Given that the original project ran into delays and overages throughout, it strains credibility to propose that, starting with the 'B', all the hard problems would be in the past, and that performance would henceforward live up to the promises.
The TSR-2 never went into production, which raises the question of which (if any) of these projects was riding the coattails of the other. I accept that the total bill written-off could have been reduced if there was some R&D cost-sharing, but, as the TSR-2 was a ground-hugging strike aircraft intended for relatively short European-theater missions as opposed to intercontinental flight, I suspect the issues that needed R&D were quite different for the two aircraft.
As for supersonic interceptors, the missiles that rendered the high-altitude supersonic bomber irrelevant did the same for the interceptor. The only supersonic interceptor both developed and deployed by the UK was the EE/BAC Lightning, the predecessor of the TSR-2. At least, unlike the TSR-2, this airplane was put into production and into service.
There would arguably be no FBW (fly-by-wire)[1] in commercial aviation without the Concorde.
Like if I put a loaf of bread and start eating it before them, they would keep describing the Hypothetical Sliced Bread and that table would look like a live Monty Python filming.
For literature loving people, need-item is subset of want-item chosen by urgency or necessity, but I think maybe logical processes for needs and wants of average people are completely separate that they don’t care how two correlates or overlaps.
Still, supersonics will need some major breakthrough in operational cost.
Didn't know average people flew it.
Glad to have experienced it, though.
The “public” you’re referring to is the small 0.1% of the population that gets annoyed when Delta One is sold out.
This is a little bit unfair. Among other innovations, Concorde was the first production airliner with fly-by-wire controls (first flown March 1969!). The people who worked on it carried their experience to later highly successful designs such as the Airbus 300 and Airbus 320 series, which is a backbone of modern air travel.
The 737 MAX fiasco shows that Boeing still hasn't caught up with what Airbus was doing in the 1980s.
The Air France 447 accident demonstrated to me that Airbus hadn't really thought things through either. Pilots entered conflicting inputs and the plane averaged them out instead of giving (good, actionable) feedback.
Side question: is fly-by-wire an obviously good idea for passenger airplanes? It's ubiquitous in e.g. fighter jets because of the inherent aerodynamic instability of those platforms, making them hard or impossible ("Hopeless diamond") to fly without computer assistance. Passenger jets have different goals and are built to have stable flight -- the plane wants to fly level. My takeaway from Air France 447 was that I want more Boeing-style (linked, mechanical) controls in passenger airplanes than I want fly-by-wire. Am I off base?
In AF447 it has been established that the crew failed to follow multiple protocols, ignored warnings (including the audible "dual input") and while design / instrument improvements have been put forward, it's not clear they would have avoided that tragedy. The conflicting inputs only happened during the final seconds of descent.
Here's a good discussion on the why: https://aviation.stackexchange.com/questions/23577/why-do-ai...
The latest Boeing 787 has switched to fly-by-wire.
EDIT: an eerily straight-forward report of how the AF447 flight came down: https://www.popularmechanics.com/flight/a3115/what-really-ha...
The Boeing 777, much earlier, was the first Boeing aircraft with fly-by-wire.
Once you have electric control, you can start putting logic between pilot inputs and actual control surface movements. You can create dynamic, real-time-conditions-based safety stops that prevent pilots from doing common mistakes like pitching up too much and falling from the sky.
With direct control, it's up to pilots to figure out where the limits are and ensure that they are not crossed. With advanced fly-by-wire, pilots can resort to setting goals and it's up to the control system to figure out how far the aircraft can go (within safety limits) to meet them.
This is really difficult to get right, but saves lives when it finally works.
It's like memory safety in computer programming. If you're really good at programming and you never make mistakes, then you don't need it, but most people make mistakes from time to time and are better off when something checks that their buffers don't overflow and variables don't go uninitialized.
Which may end up doing more harm than good, as seen in Air France 447.
The AF447 didn't have automatic protections available due to sensor failure. Flight computers detected the failure and degraded flight controls into direct mode with less protections than under normal operating conditions. While flying on their own, pilots performed below their expected standard and there was not enough information available from sensors for automatic systems to save them.
Notably the net result was that when the pilots did the right thing (pitching down) and the sensors recovered, a stall warning sounded.
> While flying on their own, pilots performed below their expected standard
You're talking as though pilot performance is a constant. Notably these pilots had little experience flying "on their own", precisely because of these automated systems, and were thrown in at the deep end, having to take over flying under bad conditions.
This is to be expected. Pilots learn on their first single-engine prop trainer that stall horns are primitive mechanical devices based on airflow over the wing and warnings may trigger intermittently when the airflow is seriously disturbed. It's additive: blasting alarm indicates that something is wrong, but lack of warning doesn't mean that everything is right.
> were thrown in at the deep end
Shallow end. Like stall warnings, airspeed indicators are also known to become unreliable relatively often. It's like loss of cabin pressure, bird strike or a blown tire. Every pilot can reasonably expect it to happen to them, unlike the 737 MAX crashes that took place in completely uncharted territory that nobody knew to be afraid of or prepare for.
This makes the official animation at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=n-hbWO0gL6g really puzzling. Speed keeps wildly jumping around throughout the event, an obvious sign that it's faulty. At one point, airspeed indication drops by 200 knots in three seconds to almost zero without any other indications supporting it. Everything else remains consistent. Nose is pitched up and stable. Altitude is dropping fast, vertical speed is negative. Stall warning is blasting, albeit intermittently, and the aircraft is experiencing a characteristic stall buffeting as turbulent airflow develops around wings. Why would any pilot look at that and give a nose up command? It goes opposite to their training and the flying instinct that every pilot should have.
If anything, the AF447 case shows that automatic protections should be developed further, to work under wider range of conditions than they currently do.
Had some other failure disoriented the crew instead (eg engine failure), and had the protections remained active, they probably would've saved the flight.
In which case surely the warning does more harm than good - if the warning is sounding you need to check, and if the warning isn't sounding you... still need to check.
> Shallow end. Like stall warnings, airspeed indicators are also known to become unreliable relatively often. It's like loss of cabin pressure, bird strike or a blown tire. Every pilot can reasonably expect it to happen to them
Sure, which is why it's something that should be practised under normal conditions, rather than something that you do only when it's icing.
> It goes opposite to their training and the flying instinct that every pilot should have.
But how is a pilot supposed to develop that instinct if they're not hand flying often?
What we don’t have data for is how many accidents would have happened if not for the systems that prevented them. But we should be able to compare incidents of aircraft with and without such systems and get an idea of the (no pun) impact fly-by-wire has had on safety.
In other words, the answer is, show me the data.
Fly by wire is about removing the weight and complexity of mechanical control systems. A pilot wouldn't likely have the strength to move the controls without fly by wire. However, I don't think that's what you are asking. Fly by wire does not inherently have to be computer assisted; it could simply translate your input to a control surface movement without interpretation. Of course, to get any kind of feedback, it is going to have to be computer generated. The question is where to draw the line.
Finally, you compared Airbus to Boeing. Both are fly by wire. The difference is, I guess, that the control yokes on Boeing are mechanically linked to each other but not on Airbus. However, from the yokes to the control surfaces is fly by wire either way. My understanding is that the difference is in philosophy of how much the computer does for you.
I hope I got all this right.
You also can do more complicated mappings of control inputs to control surface movements more easily with FBW (you can think of automatic traction control in a car as a somewhat analogous system - it uses differential braking per wheel, which the driver has no direct control over, to attempt to straighten out the path of the car and follow the driver's inputs from the steering wheel). As another comment mentioned, this has been happening in fighter jets for a long time, mostly due to how inherently aerodynamically unstable they are.
I can think of a particular passenger jet that doesn't.
At that point it's either repudiate AA's announcement, harming relations with a customer worth at least 100 aircraft, or go build the thing. And if they build it, they're stuck with a bunch of the problems with the 737, like being unable to change how the controls work.
If they could sub out the control system from mechanical cables to fly by wire, they wouldn't have had any visible issues with the Max.
The improvements to fuel economy, range and sound would have made little difference to the commercial viability of a niche of aircraft that already spent most of the time on the tarmac because the tiny handful built and basically given away weren't allowed to fly most routes or remotely approach economic viability for most others.
The governments threw their money at a project later called the Airbus A320 instead. Difficult to say they were wrong...
i know its a controversial post but its right for more reasons as well. Concorde was economically advantageous as long as fuel represented a small percentage of operational costs it launched in 1973 during the oil crisis and all the way through the OPEC embargo, and almost immediately became the most expensive plane any airline could choose to operate.
Airlines also had to contend with when and where to execute supersonic flight, as a boom over a populated city would immediately draw negative publicity. pushback in some cities in europe reduced the Concordes routes and speeds significantly in 1976
Concorde produced nitrogen oxides in its exhaust, which, despite complicated interactions with other ozone-depleting chemicals, are understood to result in degradation to the ozone layer at the stratospheric altitudes it cruised. while concord was a small fleet, 500 of them could become an ecological disaster.
Concorde's high cruising altitude meant passengers received almost twice the flux of extraterrestrial ionising radiation as those travelling on a conventional long-haul flight. the flight deck had a radiometer and an instrument to measure the rate of decrease of radiation. If the radiation level became too high, Concorde would descend below 47,000 feet. to my knowledge we still havent produced a SST that solves the radiation concern.
Doesn't government still bankroll the whole airline industry? I read about some massive handouts to both Lufthansa and The Scandinavian Airlines (SAS) due to the coronavirus; perhaps it was even more extreme 50 years ago.
Not revisionist, speculative, as the B never came into being.
> logistics of flying the Concorde .. expensive and just not that desirable
Research revealed that passengers thought that the fare was higher than it actually was, so the airline raised ticket prices to match these perceptions. (Wikipedia)
> routing
Hmm...vastly improved routing was one of the main benefits touted for Concorde B discussed in the fine article.
> plane was conceived in the era of big government bankrolled air travel
It is reported that British Airways then ran Concorde at a profit. (Wikipedia)
Furthermore, it was actually (American) government that had a significant hand in killing the Concorde, by imposing overflight restrictions that made it far less useful. Of course this had absolutely nothing to do with the fact that the US competition to Concorde never took off.
> doesn't have a role in the reality of flying buses we see today.
Concorde was operating profitably at time of its retirement, which came after an accident and issues with keeping the fleet in the air.
This is largely revisionist history. The reality was that logistics of flying the Concorde (routing, timing, airport services) combined with the experience (speed over comfort) made it expensive and just not that desirable. The plane was conceived in the era of big government bankrolled air travel and doesn't have a role in the reality of flying buses we see today.