The argument that encryption without authentication is useless seems to be too focused on the security of the connection. The larger the percentage of network traffic that is actually encrypted the less 'suspicious' encrypted connections look. In general, this is a state of affairs that we want to get to. Using encryption shouldn't make you stand out from the general population.
How is connecting to a site using HTTP any more secure than connecting to a site with HTTPS and a self-signed certificate so long as the user is not presented with any indication that the site is now 'secure?' Even better, how about having an icon that is always in one of two states: "secure" or "insecure." So now the user is presented with something that indicates "insecure" even when they are browsing over HTTP. This more accurately represents the state of affairs. The way browsers present security to the user currently is more along the lines of:
HTTP => I can browse the web and login to Facebook
HTTPS (CA-signed cert) => I can now use my credit card
HTTPS (self-signed cert) => ZOMG! I'M BEING HACKED!It's mostly useless. Anyone trying to eavesdrop needs to expend slightly more resources, and needs to take the risk that there was some out-of-band authentication that they aren't aware of.
Firefox gets a lot of grief (from idiots) for refusing self-signed certificates by default, but it's a huge credit to their security team that they've resisted the pressure to ease up.
No, it mostly gets grief (from sane people) for not also refusing plain HTTP under the same pretenses.
If Firefox silently accepted self-signed certificates, and presented the same UI as an unencrypted page, attackers could intercept requests to https://paypal.com/ and very few users would ever notice.
Additionally, automatically accepting self-signed certificates would render ideas like "HTTPS-only cookies" useless, because now the browser would happily send them to anyone who asks.
I don't believe that. I've run into tons of self signed/invalid certs that weren't attacks. If you're implicitly limiting your statement to large sites (paypal, amazon and the like) then you're probably right. But unqualified, it is definitely not the case.
I think there is potentially some middle ground to be found (e.g. a URL prefix which works over SSL but makes no implication of security) but clearly Mozilla decided that making it really irritating without any workaround was the best solution to the problem, regardless of any collatoral damage it causes.
I'm asking why an insecure SSL connection is worse than an insecure HTTP connection. If they are both completely insecure, why does Firefox turn one of them into a compete UI nightmare?
If the reasoning is that https:// somehow implies security, then the obvious and sensible solution is to create a new prefix for insecure SSL sites such as httpu://, and throw up a warning page when visiting the https version that links to the insecure SSL version.
I see this as being preferable to the awkward and annoying way Firefox treats self-signed certificates at the moment. I also suspect that had Mozilla taken the lead, the major browsers would have followed suit.
Which is exactly my point.
The fact is, even if the browser so much as displays "https" in the addressbar, you are giving the unknowlegable user a form of positive feedback when none whatsoever is warrented. Strong netagive feedback is a much more appropriate solution.
Also, consider that there are probably some users who think they understand the implications of trusting a self-signed cert while they actually do not, and the browser has no way of differentiating this.
Well, of course encryption without authentication is useless for authentication.
It is still useful for encryption, though :-)
Generally speaking, and regardless of today's protocols, surely passive eavesdropping is and will always remain easier to accomplish than actively mounting a MITM attack.
The vulnerability here isn't "someone running Firesheep" - that's the exploit. The vulnerability here is "an open WiFi network is a completely trusted medium".
Are you happy to visit a John Doe blog with no encryption because he didn't want to pay for a certificate?
Encryption without authentication is useless. If mybank.com only supports encryption, I have no idea whether I'm actually connected to mybank.com , or to the guy running tcpdump in the next booth.
Firefox gets a lot of grief (from idiots) for refusing self-signed certificates by default, but it's a huge credit to their security team that they've resisted the pressure to ease up.