A scheme that could boot when there is a hole drilled into the platter would be even better :-)
The first two bits (or any two bits you want really, it’s just convention to use the first two) on the volume must always be 0 and 1. First write both bits to 0 hard multiple times, then write the second bit to 1 and lightly write it to zero. These two bits will serve as a control for the forensic tool to determine the difference between a hard zero and a soft zero, and thus figure out the rest of your volume.
If an unknowing person simply looks at the drive by regular software means, the computer will simply show a drive of all zeros.
Please provide some evidence.
> You think just zero writing it out once is enough?
I definitely think a single zero write on a disk drive is enough (or at least that it's as good as 3 writes or 100 writes). There's no evidence anyone has ever recovered a file that was overwritten by zeros a single time on any hard disk drive from the last 20 years.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Data_remanence#Feasibility_of_...
https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=511568
Hmm, it looks like the site is down now. Well, here's a copy of the content:
https://www.techpowerup.com/forums/threads/the-great-zero-ch...
I might have to run my own Great Zero Challenge v2.
> Why do you think DoD standards call for no less than 3 writes when erasing a drive?
I think you're referring to an old DoD standard. Prior to 2007 the DoD recommended that. Now they don't recommend that, and only recommend degaussing or destruction of the drive.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Data_remanence#Standards
Old one:
https://it.ouhsc.edu/policies/documents/infosecurity/DoD_522...
New one:
Obligatory XKCD: https://xkcd.com/538/ Obviously it ignores habeas corpus but of course, so have most governments, even the more 'evolved' ones.
For most situations, denial of encryption is not necessary. I can see the point for data drives. But in a laptop/PC scenario, there must be a way to actually boot the thing. If there's a way to boot it, it can be detected by trying to boot it ;) There must be something machine-readable that asks for the password. You can store that part on a separate USB but even the possession of that is an indication that you use encryption.
And to mention the obvious: Who carries around drives with random data on them? Storage devices that are unformatted are normally filled with zeroes. Sure, it could have been wiped with random data, but it is still a very suspicious situation.
It's a nice project for this niche usecase but for encrypting my boot drives I'm perfectly happy with LUKS as it is. In most cases denying the existence of encryption is not needed.