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Re:SaltStack Mining Attack by twic on Tuesday May 05, 2020 @01:16PM (#23082352)
I assumed that the problem was that if a master is accessible on your intranet, it could be hit with some sort of XSS attack from browsers inside the firewall.

But apparently there are 6000 people just straight up exposing their masters to the internet:

https://gbhackers.com/saltstack-salt/

Re:SaltStack Mining Attack by NikolaeVarius on Tuesday May 05, 2020 @01:38PM (#23082593)
> This whole "don't have your salt master exposed to the internet" thing has me annoyed. The whole point of salt is to manage boxes all over the place. I manage around 500 machines. Most of them are behind the firewalls of incompetent admins who have spent hours in the past trying to set up port forwards when salt-minion crashed so I could access the box again. I'm about to test binding salt-master to localhost and salt-minion to localhost and then setting up spiped to wrap the traffic...

Some companies need better DevOps apparently

Re:SaltStack Mining Attack by dijit on Tuesday May 05, 2020 @07:18PM (#23086236)
Nitpick: this is purely an operations/sysadmin problem.

The DevOps grouping doesn't apply too much, Operations-minded staff should be focusing on keeping things locked down.

Unless, you know, you're not hiring those people and instead are hoping that developers take the Ops burden. ;)

Re:SaltStack Mining Attack by dijit on Wednesday May 06, 2020 @07:53AM (#23089938)
People downvoting: I guess I hit a nerve, but could you explain why?

Development and Operations are different disciplines and the idea was to remove silos, not make one person responsible for both.

Re:SaltStack Mining Attack by Spivak on Tuesday May 05, 2020 @02:15PM (#23082997)
But that's like half the point of SaltStack. It's supposed be secure enough to run on the public internet to manage road-warrior endpoints.

"I found this site called Alexa that lists a bunch of companies that just straight up expose their web servers to the internet. Crazy."

And I have some bad news about how many companies are exposing their VPN servers to the internet too.

Re:SaltStack Mining Attack by tilolebo on Tuesday May 05, 2020 @02:35PM (#23083229)
It's really not.

You also wouldn't expose your database just because it's password-protected?

I bet all these public servers have a firewall running to protect other services.

Shouldn't be hard to include the saltstack port(s) and whitelist the relevant IP addresses.

Also,the main difference with your example is that the clients that connect to webservers and vpns are either not known in advance or don't have static IP addresses.

Re:SaltStack Mining Attack by saltyguy22 on Tuesday May 05, 2020 @03:51PM (#23084142)
You can't really compare Salt to a password protected database. SSH is probably a better comparison as both use public key crypto and plenty of servers are exposed on the internet via it. Its just that salt hasn't been audited as heavily as OpenSSH or other implementations of SSH so its risky exposing Salt to the internet, but I can see why some admins might do that.
Re:SaltStack Mining Attack by Spivak on Tuesday May 05, 2020 @04:05PM (#23084331)
Anyone who's putting their Salt master on the internet is having to deal with clients without fixed addresses. And it's not uncommon to have to deal with clients that aren't known advance which is when autosign scripts are used.

Sans the current CVE this is otherwise a service that is safe to expose to adversarial networks.

Re:SaltStack Mining Attack by tilolebo on Wednesday May 06, 2020 @09:45AM (#23090842)
From Algolia's outage retrospective:

  What we did so far:
  We’ve secured the impacted SaltStack service by updating it and adding additional IP filtering, allowing only our servers to connect to it.

So clearly unrestricted access wasn't a necessity.

I understand it's a pain, I've been running a 1000+ server stack with puppet on a public network and relied on iptables to secure it. But I'd rather cope with the daily iptable rules update than having to fight a 0-day exploit...

Re:SaltStack Mining Attack by lmm on Tuesday May 05, 2020 @09:20PM (#23087008)
I would (and do) expose my database to the internet, because it's properly secured (client certificates rather than just passwords).

I don't run firewalls. If a service doesn't need to be exposed, the port isn't open. Means no worrying about who has access to the wifi (because that's outside the security boundary) and no mucking about with VPNs when accessing remotely.

Re:SaltStack Mining Attack by tilolebo on Wednesday May 06, 2020 @07:23AM (#23089766)
>because it's properly secured

That's what these Saltstack users thought too until this week.

Re:SaltStack Mining Attack by lmm on Wednesday May 06, 2020 @08:08AM (#23090032)
People are saying they used a hand-rolled crypto stack rather than something standard like TLS? That should have been a massive red flag.
Re:SaltStack Mining Attack by cat199 on Tuesday May 05, 2020 @02:40PM (#23083282)
> road-warrior endpoints

would or could often have a vpn tunnel back to some static infrastructure, this and not the public network can be used for mgmt

Re:SaltStack Mining Attack by Spivak on Tuesday May 05, 2020 @04:07PM (#23084364)
Right, except that registering with the salt master is how your VPN is provisioned.
Re:SaltStack Mining Attack by panarky on Tuesday May 05, 2020 @07:42PM (#23086390)