You also wouldn't expose your database just because it's password-protected?
I bet all these public servers have a firewall running to protect other services.
Shouldn't be hard to include the saltstack port(s) and whitelist the relevant IP addresses.
Also,the main difference with your example is that the clients that connect to webservers and vpns are either not known in advance or don't have static IP addresses.
Sans the current CVE this is otherwise a service that is safe to expose to adversarial networks.
What we did so far:
We’ve secured the impacted SaltStack service by updating it and adding additional IP filtering, allowing only our servers to connect to it.
So clearly unrestricted access wasn't a necessity.I understand it's a pain, I've been running a 1000+ server stack with puppet on a public network and relied on iptables to secure it. But I'd rather cope with the daily iptable rules update than having to fight a 0-day exploit...
I don't run firewalls. If a service doesn't need to be exposed, the port isn't open. Means no worrying about who has access to the wifi (because that's outside the security boundary) and no mucking about with VPNs when accessing remotely.
That's what these Saltstack users thought too until this week.
would or could often have a vpn tunnel back to some static infrastructure, this and not the public network can be used for mgmt
"I found this site called Alexa that lists a bunch of companies that just straight up expose their web servers to the internet. Crazy."
And I have some bad news about how many companies are exposing their VPN servers to the internet too.