But apparently there are 6000 people just straight up exposing their masters to the internet:
Some companies need better DevOps apparently
The DevOps grouping doesn't apply too much, Operations-minded staff should be focusing on keeping things locked down.
Unless, you know, you're not hiring those people and instead are hoping that developers take the Ops burden. ;)
Development and Operations are different disciplines and the idea was to remove silos, not make one person responsible for both.
"I found this site called Alexa that lists a bunch of companies that just straight up expose their web servers to the internet. Crazy."
And I have some bad news about how many companies are exposing their VPN servers to the internet too.
You also wouldn't expose your database just because it's password-protected?
I bet all these public servers have a firewall running to protect other services.
Shouldn't be hard to include the saltstack port(s) and whitelist the relevant IP addresses.
Also,the main difference with your example is that the clients that connect to webservers and vpns are either not known in advance or don't have static IP addresses.
Sans the current CVE this is otherwise a service that is safe to expose to adversarial networks.
What we did so far:
We’ve secured the impacted SaltStack service by updating it and adding additional IP filtering, allowing only our servers to connect to it.
So clearly unrestricted access wasn't a necessity.I understand it's a pain, I've been running a 1000+ server stack with puppet on a public network and relied on iptables to secure it. But I'd rather cope with the daily iptable rules update than having to fight a 0-day exploit...
I don't run firewalls. If a service doesn't need to be exposed, the port isn't open. Means no worrying about who has access to the wifi (because that's outside the security boundary) and no mucking about with VPNs when accessing remotely.
That's what these Saltstack users thought too until this week.
would or could often have a vpn tunnel back to some static infrastructure, this and not the public network can be used for mgmt
> WTF does that mean?
The website assumes that if you dropped by or googled the vulnerability, it's because you had saltstack exposed to the public internet.
You don't have to react so harshly to that turn of phrase.
> Even if you didn't notice any unexpected symptoms, please: nuke and restart.
If I were writing this, I'd probably write something like "On May x, a remote-code-execution in (all versions?) public salt-masters (not minions?), was unveiled. Shortly thereafter, actual exploitation in the wild is being used. If your salt installation uses a salt-master, and it's internet-reachable, it may already be compromised, along with much your infrastructure. Section 2 is how to see if you are infected, and Section 3 is how to remove the infection."
That's much worse. That implies there is a reliable way to detect and remove the infection. That's not the case. This website included some known attacks and such. There's a high chance that there were attacks of this vulnerability with additional payloads.
There's no way to know if you were hit with a rootkit that persists itself in the bootloader or other parts of your system. There's no way to know if you were infected or not.
The only way to be sure is to nuke the machine, as they said.
Security advice should always err on the right side for a naive reader.
Your use case makes absolute perfect sense though -- nice!
IMO, Salts best feature is probably running with the Master / Minion setup because it connects out to the master. Masterless is handy for using in conjunction with Vagrant, Packer, or another provisioning tool not so much for managing a the lifecycle of a server / OS.
In production, an outsized number of companies are using SaltStack a certain way.
The reason is because of the way we all evaluate business risk. I could have said that out of all of the companies I've worked with using Salt that have compliance requirements, 100% of them are using it Masterless, but then some smart-ass would have piped up with a "not me" comment.
WTF does that mean? Our salt implementation is on an entirely private network, so why would I be more likely than not to be compromised already?
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Edit: Re-downvotes -- This is a sincere question. Is there some evidence that the majority of salt implementations are compromised, or some mechanism by which this hits private networks? Or is that line just for dramatic effect?