If you enable the framework but never test positive (and thus never publish any of your keys), it's no different than if you had just kept Bluetooth on all the time.
If you enable the framework, later test positive, and choose to publish your diagnosis keys, each key can be used to link all your rolling identifiers together for the corresponding time period (nominally 24 hours). Contrast this with a randomizing Bluetooth implementation, which never intentionally reveals anything that would allow the different MAC addresses to be linked.
Of course, Bluetooth MAC address randomization itself is trivial to defeat for a reasonably capable and motivated adversary. If they can plant a bunch of radios for the purpose of tracking you, why can't they also use cameras?
Actually that's not true for the situation I described.
The bad actor would be able to connect any of your broadcast identifiers they observed back to each other via the diagnosis key that you published. Assuming they have a number of nodes monitoring Bluetooth traffic over a broad area that you passed through, they will be able to reconstruct the path you traveled over time.
For a naive implementation, the resolution of this reconstruction would depend on the spacing of the nodes. For a more advanced implementation, other data could be integrated to drastically improve it. Remember, your Bluetooth device is a broadcasting radio at the end of the day.
As to the likelihood of such things becoming commonplace worldwide, do bear in mind that many devices now periodically randomize their Bluetooth MAC addresses due to real world examples of tracking. Thankfully in this case it would only be possible to compromise the privacy of those who tested positive, and only within a singe 24 hour period (ie the daily tracing key rotation time frame) at that.
I'm much more concerned about reducing COVID-19 to save millions of lives.