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Re:Towards Sequoia OpenPGP v1.0 by qqii on Monday April 27, 2020 @06:26AM (#22994544)
Having an alternative implementation to GnuPG is a pretty important. Although many would argue against the use of PGP encryption for many use cases such as email, there are other use cases where PGP's ideas have no replacement.

For a specific example take signing git commits. Even fossil scm delegates this task to pgp. Personally keybase is the only project that may provide some form of alternative, but they do so by supporting pgp.

I definitely agree that PGP was and is no longer the correct tool for every use case as it sort out to be, but I find there are still pockets where PGP has no alternative. I'd be interested what HN's thoughts are on PGP for this specific use case and if there could be an alternative.

Re:Towards Sequoia OpenPGP v1.0 by forgotmypw16 on Monday April 27, 2020 @07:13AM (#22994747)
I'm using OpenPGP.js for drop-in decentralized client-side authentication for my web-based message board.

This has several benefits, which includes giving technically-savvy users to do their own key generation and message signing using whatever tools they prefer, using one of the most widely used encryption/signing standards in existence.

Meanwhile, non-technical users can create a new profile with literally one click and a couple seconds of compute time on their device. They can then back up the key as a text-file and use it on any compatible site.

I think that the potential of PGP has barely been grazed by Keybase, and there are many more applications than we've even hypothesized so far.

Re:Towards Sequoia OpenPGP v1.0 by swiley on Monday April 27, 2020 @07:15AM (#22994755)
You should definitely not be encouraging your users to give their private keys to js on other sites, that’s just as bad (or maybe worse) as encouraging them to reuse passwords.
Re:Towards Sequoia OpenPGP v1.0 by forgotmypw16 on Monday April 27, 2020 @08:35AM (#22995202)
That's a good point... Perhaps a better solution is for them to be able to sign the public keys from the other sites to connect their profiles that way.

Thank you for your feedback. I can see now how a malicious system operator could steal the user's private key by modifying the JS.

Re:Towards Sequoia OpenPGP v1.0 by GTP on Monday April 27, 2020 @08:18AM (#22995092)
He's talking about giving their public key, not the private key that has to remain on the user's device(s) under all circumstances.
Re:Towards Sequoia OpenPGP v1.0 by forgotmypw16 on Monday April 27, 2020 @08:32AM (#22995192)
The private key is stored in localStorage, but this is not the user's "real" private key which they might use for email, but a temporary device key, which can then be vouched either by admin or by user.
Re:Towards Sequoia OpenPGP v1.0 by GTP on Monday April 27, 2020 @10:20AM (#22996057)
I'm not understanding how this works, then. Are you using the user's private key to somehow derive temporary device keys?
Re:Towards Sequoia OpenPGP v1.0 by forgotmypw16 on Monday April 27, 2020 @02:15PM (#22998380)
Generate a PGP key using in-browser JS. Use that key submitted posts.

Then, later, sign either the file hashes or the public key itself using actual secure PGP. This is optional.

I'm not claiming any level of security, this is all mostly UI prototyping.

Re:Towards Sequoia OpenPGP v1.0 by GTP on Wednesday April 29, 2020 @09:06AM (#23018619)
Sorry, what do you mean by "Use that key submitted posts"?
Re:Towards Sequoia OpenPGP v1.0 by DyslexicAtheist on Monday April 27, 2020 @07:54AM (#22994950)
> encouraging your users to give their private keys

I read it twice and still can't find the place where it was mentioned this to be the case.

Re:Towards Sequoia OpenPGP v1.0 by forgotmypw16 on Monday April 27, 2020 @08:31AM (#22995184)
I'm generating the keys in-browser for device-specific keys. I am not asking the users to provide their existing private keys, but I am storing the device keys in localStorage, because, where else?

The advanced users can then use their existing PGP keys to sign the device keys.

But this is not necessary in every environment, because in some situations, e.g. casual chat or internal boards, you don't need that kind of extended security, and temporary device keys, perhaps vouched by the operator, are sufficient.

Re:Towards Sequoia OpenPGP v1.0 by qqii on Monday April 27, 2020 @11:19AM (#22996643)
That sounds really interesting, would you be willing to share a link to the message board so I can see what your account creation process looks like? The other most common place I've seen PGP used as an account identifier are in darknet markets, where users are warned to use a GPG binary from a trusted source and against whatever serverside system that was built for ease of UX.

Related to the issue that swiley mentions, I'm not really sold that attributing the user to a string of digits is good UX, whereas I like how keybase puts a distinction between identity and secrets.

A "keybase proof" simply shows that at some point a singular identity had access to a multitude of accounts, but has no guarantees about the current account holders. This may seem like a negative but shifting the responsibility onto account holders to protect their secrets is more reasonable than assigning the identity of an individual to a single, long term secret [0] or deal with key transition.

[0]: https://latacora.micro.blog/2019/07/16/the-pgp-problem.html#...

Re:Towards Sequoia OpenPGP v1.0 by forgotmypw16 on Monday April 27, 2020 @11:08PM (#23002905)
http://hike.qdb.us/profile.html

js required for key generation

Re:Towards Sequoia OpenPGP v1.0 by lstoll on Monday April 27, 2020 @08:20AM (#22995115)
Git also supports S/MIME, and GitHub provides a tool to sign commits with this directly https://github.blog/changelog/2018-09-10-smime-signature-ver...
Re:Towards Sequoia OpenPGP v1.0 by jcranmer on Monday April 27, 2020 @09:10AM (#22995452)
S/MIME and PGP share the same basic problem: they provide a container for the basic public-key crypto primitives (signing and encryption) together with an identification of the public key and leave it at that. Throw on top of that tools that are usually uninterested in actually thinking about how policy decisions affect cryptographic security and you have an example of security theater.
Re:Towards Sequoia OpenPGP v1.0 by qqii on Monday April 27, 2020 @11:58AM (#22997043)
I've seen similar projects that use S/MIME for identity management, but as seen from the README of the tool[0] the benefits of PGP's web of trust can be seen in unstructured environments. Online identities are perhaps the most unstructured environment, where aliases and personas are the norm.

[0]: https://github.com/github/smimesign

Re:Towards Sequoia OpenPGP v1.0 by Leace on Monday April 27, 2020 @06:47AM (#22994650)
> Personally keybase is the only project that may provide some form of alternative, but they do so by supporting pgp.

Why keybase? Reading their crypto page (https://keybase.io/blog/crypto) leaves the impression that they took PGP and embrace-extend-extinguished it...

Re:Towards Sequoia OpenPGP v1.0 by qqii on Monday April 27, 2020 @06:59AM (#22994694)
I'm not endorsing keybase, in fact I have much of the same criticisms as you probably do.

The fact is unlike many PGP replacements most don't attempt to solve similar ideas as the "web of trust". For those that I know do, the cryptocurrency/tokens one's don't even consider backwards compatability. As far as I know keybase are the only ones that embrace PGP and are therefore backwards compatible with git, fossil, etc's commit signing.

It may be ignorance but I don't see linux, git or any other software project that "needs" both version control and verifiable commits moving from PGP signing to something else, but rather PGP signing dying out with the rise of git platforms like github, gitlab, etc. If you squint you can see that keybase provides some form of alternative.

Re:Towards Sequoia OpenPGP v1.0 by Leace on Monday April 27, 2020 @07:59AM (#22994980)
To be honest even PGP signing has some issues: it's not clear what does it mean to sign a commit and there is plenty of misuse of that (see [0], `git push --signed` solves some of these issues).

Git patch workflow doesn't support signed commits and some kernel devs explore alternative ways of signing [1].

[0]: https://mikegerwitz.com/2012/05/a-git-horror-story-repositor...

[1]: https://people.kernel.org/monsieuricon/introducing-b4-and-pa...

By "keybase providing alternative" do you mean that they have hosted, encrypted git repos?

Re:Towards Sequoia OpenPGP v1.0 by qqii on Monday April 27, 2020 @11:49AM (#22996962)
I now see how my original wording is confusing. I'm using git not as the specific case here (albeit interesting) but as an example. From my understanding keybase attempts to solve some of the more questions in your first link, simply 'r/commit/post/g'. For example:

> He certainly knows his own posts, but how should others know that this “Linus Torvalds” guy who has been posting and commenting on posts is actually Linus Torvalds?

Perhaps that makes my other comments more clear?

Re:Towards Sequoia OpenPGP v1.0 by Leace on Monday April 27, 2020 @03:17PM (#22998981)
Yeah... I guess a little bit it does. Keybase offers an alternative to Web of Trust that kernel.org itself uses (https://www.kernel.org/doc/wot/). Keybase solution is having multiple social-proofs instead of the Web of Trust. Sadly this is unnecessarily centralized but I've seen approaches to implement Keybase-like social proofs systems in pure OpenPGP: https://github.com/wiktor-k/openpgp-proofs#openpgp-proofs
Re:Towards Sequoia OpenPGP v1.0 by qqii on Wednesday April 29, 2020 @09:37AM (#23018937)
Ooh, I've not seen wiktor-k/openpgp-proofs before. Too bad it doesn't have more adoption, as I like it's solution to keybase's centralization.

Sadly neither project has an elegant solution to private accounts or services. IRC usernames and Signal are examples of the second. For private accounts, both solutions need specific tool integration, cooperation between services, or more manual interaction by the user. Ideally, a new internet standard would be created and adopted, but I really don't see that happening.

As someone who's put thought into this, I'm wondering what your thoughts on this are?

Re:Towards Sequoia OpenPGP v1.0 by nickray on Monday April 27, 2020 @07:53AM (#22994944)
First, that's a limitation of git.

Second, it's easy to fake PGP: https://boats.gitlab.io/blog/post/signing-commits-without-gp...

Third, we're adding support to SoloKeys to do this using a hardware token: https://github.com/solokeys/solo/issues/395#issuecomment-612...

We're also collaborating with https://keys.pub/ to make "sign/verify" use cases easily usable with a GUI for everyone. So I'd say there's hope?

Re:Towards Sequoia OpenPGP v1.0 by jeltz on Monday April 27, 2020 @08:14AM (#22995067)
Your linked post is not about faking PGP, it is about replacing PGP with his own implementation which supports only a subset of the PGP standard, the subset necessary to properly sign git commits.
Re:Towards Sequoia OpenPGP v1.0 by qqii on Monday April 27, 2020 @12:28PM (#22997322)
I've not made myself very clear in the comment, but git and fossil scm are simply examples that delegate issues of trust to PGP's web of trust. Hardware keys are more secure, but from my understanding still stuffer from the same issue PGP does - a physical device is not an identity. keys.pub looks very interesting, but it seems that like keybase it doesn't address everyone's concerns[0].

From a technical perspective if keys.pub exists there's no reason that the proof process could occur at a layer above git rather than within git in some form of "social proof sidechain"-like structure.

I'm definitely going to keep an eye on key.pub, once they've addressed some of their coming soon items they'll be a very nice contender to keybase.

[0]: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=22994650

Re:Towards Sequoia OpenPGP v1.0 by upofadown on Monday April 27, 2020 @08:10AM (#22995036)
>Second, it's easy to fake PGP:

An odd way to put it, but yes, the simplicity of the OpenPGP standard is one of its greatest strengths. Somehow the standard has resisted just a ton of stuff that would be pointless over the long term over a great many years.