Thank you for your feedback. I can see now how a malicious system operator could steal the user's private key by modifying the JS.
Then, later, sign either the file hashes or the public key itself using actual secure PGP. This is optional.
I'm not claiming any level of security, this is all mostly UI prototyping.
I read it twice and still can't find the place where it was mentioned this to be the case.
The advanced users can then use their existing PGP keys to sign the device keys.
But this is not necessary in every environment, because in some situations, e.g. casual chat or internal boards, you don't need that kind of extended security, and temporary device keys, perhaps vouched by the operator, are sufficient.
Related to the issue that swiley mentions, I'm not really sold that attributing the user to a string of digits is good UX, whereas I like how keybase puts a distinction between identity and secrets.
A "keybase proof" simply shows that at some point a singular identity had access to a multitude of accounts, but has no guarantees about the current account holders. This may seem like a negative but shifting the responsibility onto account holders to protect their secrets is more reasonable than assigning the identity of an individual to a single, long term secret [0] or deal with key transition.
[0]: https://latacora.micro.blog/2019/07/16/the-pgp-problem.html#...
js required for key generation
This has several benefits, which includes giving technically-savvy users to do their own key generation and message signing using whatever tools they prefer, using one of the most widely used encryption/signing standards in existence.
Meanwhile, non-technical users can create a new profile with literally one click and a couple seconds of compute time on their device. They can then back up the key as a text-file and use it on any compatible site.
I think that the potential of PGP has barely been grazed by Keybase, and there are many more applications than we've even hypothesized so far.