For example, I have Grafana backed by Postgres, and they both understand this authentication scheme out of the box. Postgres is happy to be provided with a cert to present to connecting applications, and is happy to check the cert that applications present against the CA cert.
The main problem with my setup is that I use a ClusterIssuer CA, so really anyone in the cluster can get a valid certificate. This is not amazingly secure and things like Istio do a bit more provenance checking of the application before issuing a cert, which I like. But this is simple, and does protect against the attack this article covers -- as long as you don't go out of your way to present the application's cert when proxying a connection. (Which is probably an easy mistake to make, so be careful.)
MeTaLS won't provide you with client-related stuff, but most clients and client libs make it easy to set a certificate/key with a request.
I'm not sure if any of the PSK modes manage to work with perfect forward secrecy though. Otherwise, leaking the PSK would also allow decrypting any previously-sniffed traffic.