I'm still developing on it a bit but my solution is open source [1]. If anybody want to use this I'm happy to provide answers to questions, and quick bug fixes (as this directly benefits my work right now). If you're using kubernetes this is a pretty easy drop in for your pod. It's part of our default setup now.
Yes, Istio was the service mesh I referenced above that we can't install for different reasons:
>> It was a huge PITA tho without a service mesh (which we can't use for different reasons)
If you have Istio then you don't need MeTaLS (unless your client comes from outside the cluster or something, and even then I think there are ways to make it work).
I don't know that I would agree that it is "for free" as Istio still needs to be configured, and it isn't trivial from my experience. I could also see situations where something like MeTaLS where you place a few env vars for certs and you're done is nice to have. I would definitely recommend Istio if you can use it though.
If you're exclusively interested in mitigating SSRF, a more targeted solution is to run your connections (HTTP or TCP) through a proxy that enforces network-level rules. That seems like it would have worked here. For HTTP SSRF, Stripe has a good tool, Smokescreen.
For example, I have Grafana backed by Postgres, and they both understand this authentication scheme out of the box. Postgres is happy to be provided with a cert to present to connecting applications, and is happy to check the cert that applications present against the CA cert.
The main problem with my setup is that I use a ClusterIssuer CA, so really anyone in the cluster can get a valid certificate. This is not amazingly secure and things like Istio do a bit more provenance checking of the application before issuing a cert, which I like. But this is simple, and does protect against the attack this article covers -- as long as you don't go out of your way to present the application's cert when proxying a connection. (Which is probably an easy mistake to make, so be careful.)
MeTaLS won't provide you with client-related stuff, but most clients and client libs make it easy to set a certificate/key with a request.
I'm not sure if any of the PSK modes manage to work with perfect forward secrecy though. Otherwise, leaking the PSK would also allow decrypting any previously-sniffed traffic.