You get the zoom signed package installing your unsigned code.

But the truth is you don't really need to do that. If people are coming to your own domain you can ship them whatever you want. I'd wager that well below 1/1,000,000 users actually verify signatures on binaries. For the huge majority of users, there is little you can do to prevent this.

did not try/verify though

The network can't do it if it is downloaded over TLS. A malicious host can already ship evil scripts. Malware on the local machine can already do worse that edit a script.

>Malware on the local machine can already do worse that edit a script.

Malware on the local machine may not have root rights. You're basically arguing that privilege escalation isnt a real threat.

What is the threat model?

To me, all this looks like people knowing that signing is somehow good and demanding it in a context where it isn't clear that it makes sense. And given that the top post in this thread is about skeevy domains, how the heck would signing scripts achieve anything? Even the reposted tweet says "don't think you could weaponize".

This is equivalent to not having signatures on your repository packages and saying "no biggie, we rely on transport encryption". Might work in most cases, but there's a reason good security uses layers. A failure at any point-- TLS downgrade attack, repo compromise, proxy compromise, DNS poisoning-- can result in your preflight script executing malicious code.

Requiring code signing with a pinned cert would solve this issue, but would be terribly out of character for the company that brought us a hidden local REST API to bypass OSX security prompts.