You will maybe have a randomized fingerprint but it doesn't matter if 99% of other fingerprinting vectors are Stoll left open.
Just look at their github. They have fingerprinting bugs that are beyond uniquely identifying (fonts best example) which are open since years. It isn't solvable through Chromium which all of Brave knows yet they market this.
If a vector can be randomized or otherwise arms-raced vs. the remote adversary via C++, then "Chromium" is not an obstacle for Brave. Consider the case of extensions, where your point would have been valid if you'd written "Chromium extensions".
Fingerprinting can be done many ways, but most are not economic: they cost too much for the too few bits they get from the target browser. The common methods, notably fingerprint2.js, use APIs that we at Brave, along with Apple and others in the W3C Privacy CG, are taking on.
ICYMI, https://brave.com/whats-brave-done-for-my-privacy-lately-epi....
I mean benefit of doubt is one thing but you claim it can be done while it's hard to read it out with JS (which it isn't it's a ten line script to identify all of those vectors). But the cpp code that requires thousands of lines of edits is easy?
That Chinese girl (sorry don't know your name) explicitly said it's too hard years ago but 4 years later you sat it's possible yet the bug is still left open?
That is so much noise that it renders fingerprinting as a strategy utterly useless.